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ABSTRACT
People enter into healthcare facilities to maintain or restore health; however, often times
those seeking health are harmed during the process by avoidable medical errors. Since the
Institute of Medicine report on patient harm, safety culture continues to be the largest barrier in
realizing safer patient care. Nurses’ comprise the largest component of the health care workforce
in hospitals and consistently have the lowest perceptions of a safety culture. Leaders who play a
key role in creating and sustaining a safety culture consistently have the most favorable
perception of safety culture. The purpose of this study was to explore and describe safety culture
as experienced by medical-surgical staff nurses, registered nurses, and nurse leaders in a
community hospital. The research proposal for this dissertation, is presented, followed by a
comprehensive literature review, and the research questions proposed for this study. These
chapters are followed by the study methodology, which utilized inductive qualitative description
to discover the safety culture experiences within and between medical-surgical staff nurses and
nurse leaders. The results of this study included six themes within staff nurses and, six themes
within nurse leaders. Since the themes were similar in language, a convergence coding matrix
was developed to describe the similarities and differences in meanings or subthemes between
staff nurses and nurse leaders. These findings are compared to previous findings, along with
unique findings from this research. The dissertation is concluded with a discussion of the
strengths and limitations of this study, with recommendations for future application in nursing
research, practice, education, and policy.
ix

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
People enter into healthcare facilities to maintain or restore health; however, often times
those seeking healthcare are harmed during the process by avoidable medical errors. A patient
has a one in 300 chance of being harmed by avoidable medical errors compared to a one in a
million chance of being harmed while traveling by airplane (World Health Organization [WHO],
2018). The Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2000), now the Health and Medicine Division of the
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, seminal report on preventable
patient harm identified 44,000 – 98,000 people die each year from avoidable medical errors. The
IOM (2000) recommended patient safety become a national priority, and the development of a
safety culture to ensure that the workforce and processes are focused on improving the reliability
and safety of care for patients. A safety culture is the extent to which organizational beliefs,
values and norms are shared by individuals throughout the organization and influence actions
and behaviors that support and promote patient safety (Famolaro et al., 2018). While there have
been efforts to develop a safety culture, those efforts have not significantly impacted safety
culture at a national, organization or unit level. Almost 20 years after the original “To Err is
Human” IOM report, initiatives to develop a safety culture have not significantly nor consistently
resulted in safer patient care. This chapter will present the ongoing impact of avoidable medical
errors, the background on the national response to avoidable medical errors, and the impact of
developing a safety culture in hospitals within the United States. Given the work in better
1
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understanding the problem of avoidable medical errors and the understanding of aspects to
develop a safety culture, this study will describe the complexity and reality of safety culture
within one hospital.
Avoidable Medical Errors and its Relationship to Patient Harm
The IOM (2000) report identified patients in hospitals were being harmed by avoidable
medical errors. Medical errors can be defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed
as intended or the use of a wrong plan (IOM, 2000). Medical errors do not always result in harm
but can cause patient harm if the error reaches the patient. Preventable harm is an injury caused
by medical management rather than the underlying medical condition (IOM, 2000). Avoidable
medical errors cause preventable harm to patients, which has resulted in mortality, morbidity,
and higher costs of care.
Preventable Harm Leads to Increased Mortality
Since the seminal IOM report there have been many attempts at quantifying preventable
harm related to medical errors; however, this has been challenging due to the propensity to rely
on voluntary reporting. More recent estimations of death related to preventable harm have been
published. Using a weighted average of several studies reporting deaths related to preventable
harm, an updated estimate of 210,000-400,000 deaths attributed to preventable harm each year
was proposed (James, 2013). Another report used multiple methods of estimating harm resulted
in 251,454 deaths attributed to preventable harm in the United States each year, establishing
avoidable medical errors as the third leading cause of death in the United States (Makary &
Daniel, 2016).
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Preventable Harm Leads to Increased Morbidity
The broader impact of preventable harm extends beyond mortality and significantly
impacts morbidity. The seminal IOM report identified an estimated one million people
undergoing medical treatment were injured by preventable harm each year in United States
hospitals (IOM, 2000). Approximately 25 preventable harms per 100 patient admissions were
reported in North Carolina hospitals (Landrigan et al., 2010). Despite significant efforts to
improve the safety of care, 1 in 10 patients continued to experience morbidity from adverse
events including healthcare-acquired infections, pressure ulcers, adverse drug events, or falls
during hospitalization (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [AHRQ], 2014).
The methodologies underlying the quantification of preventable harm through
approximations have been criticized for the estimation methods used and other epidemiologic
concerns (Ranji, 2017; Shojania & Dixon-Woods, 2017). Regardless of the criticisms, the data
consistently show a minimal reduction in the number of patients harmed by medical errors since
the seminal IOM report publication.
Preventable Harm Leads to Increased Cost
There are significant costs associated with preventable harm. In 2008, the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) identified $4.4 billion in extra costs for Medicare beneficiaries in one
year associated with adverse events and preventable harm (Department of Health and Human
Services [DHHS]-OIG, 2010). The estimated cost of treating the injuries attributable to
preventable harm, the lifetime wages lost because of those injuries, and the insurance costs due
to disability and death was estimated at $19.5 billion a year (Shreve et al., 2010). A more recent
actuarial study estimated the cost of preventable harm at $17.5 billion a year (Van Den Bos et al.,
2011).
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Summary of Avoidable Medical Errors and its Relationship to Patient Harm
In summary, there has been significant mortality, morbidity, and cost related to
preventable harm that have not significantly changed over time. Clinicians are professionally
obligated to prevent and avoid harm when caring for patients (American Medical Association
(AMA), 2016; American Nurses Association [ANA], 2015). Most importantly, those seeking
healthcare trust their wellbeing to those providing care and expect to be safe from preventable
harm during the process of care. These statistics were and continue to be the catalyst for
improvements in patient safety in hospitals.
A National Response Realized Limited Impact on Patient Safety
In response to the preventable patient harm statistics, the IOM (2000) proposed several
recommendations to address patient safety catalyzing government agencies, non-governmental
organizations, healthcare organizations, and individual providers to develop voluntary and
mandatory safety practice changes launching a safety movement (Leape & Berwick, 2005). One
recommendation was to establish patient safety as a national focus to create leadership, research,
tools, and protocols to enhance the knowledge base about safety (IOM, 2000). Another
recommendation charged health care organizations to develop a safety culture to align the focus
of the workforce and processes on improving the reliability and safety of care for patients.
However, well-intentioned national efforts to address patient safety and the development of
organizational safety culture have resulted in a plethora of uncoordinated recommended
initiatives to address patient safety. These uncoordinated initiatives have not resulted in a
significant development of a safety culture. The continued preventable harm statistics suggest
these initiatives have not had a widespread impact on safer patient care.
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National Initiatives Have Realized a Limited Impact on Safe Patient Care
Following the seminal IOM report on preventable patient harm, the federal government
issued an executive order instructing government agencies overseeing healthcare programs to
implement proven techniques for reducing medical errors (IOM, 2000). The Agency for
Healthcare (AHRQ) and the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) are two national
agencies that focused on patient safety and safety culture in healthcare. These initiatives assume
safety interventions that successfully reduce preventable harm in one organization will be
successful in achieving safer care in another organization, however this has not been the case.
These efforts made preventable harm and the status of safety culture in healthcare more visible
and transparent. However, the plethora of optional interventions have not resulted in the
substantial development of a safety culture and have had a minimal impact on safer patient care
(Leape, 2015).
AHRQ Initiatives to Impact Patient Safety
AHRQ was charged with establishing a national focus to create leadership, research,
tools, and protocols to enhance the knowledge base about safety (IOM, 2000). AHRQ led
national initiatives to develop and test new technologies for preventing medical errors, create
error-reporting and error-improvement strategies, and achieve a better understanding of how the
environment impacts safer care. AHRQ initially focused on technology and measurement of
safety culture such as the implementation of electronic health records, computer-assisted
physician order entry and bar code scanning to support the right treatments to the right patients
(AHRQ, n.d.). Later, AHRQ focused on evidence-based practice bundles such as interventions
to prevention hospital-acquired infections, interprofessional team training through
TeamSTEPPS, and team improvement initiatives through the Comprehensive

6
Unit-Based Programs (CUSP) (AHRQ, 2013).
The Institute for Healthcare Improvement Safety Initiatives
The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) is an independent not-for-profit
organization with a mission to improve health and health care worldwide (IHI, n.d.). The IHI
makes recommendations for improving patient safety, however there has been a lack of adoption
of the recommended practices in the United States.
In 2004, IHI implemented a campaign in the United States, called Saving 100,000 Lives,
collaborating with healthcare organizations to reduce preventable hospital deaths by 100,000
within 18 months (IHI, n.d.). This was accomplished by encouraging organizations to
implement safer systems of care such as bundles, technology, and checklists aimed at decreasing
variability in individual human behavior to reduce preventable harm (IHI, n.d.). The initiative
was successful in achieving 122,000 fewer preventable deaths (Baehrend, 2016).
National Policy Initiatives to Impact Patient Safety
National policy has attempted to create organizational focus on patient safety (Bates &
Singh, 2018). This focus is influenced through financial penalties or incentives for hospitals to
ensure patient safety becomes an organizational priority. Organizations are incentivized to
provide safe care through the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital ValueBased-Purchasing program that withholds and redistributes Medicare reimbursement based on
safety and quality performance (CMS, n.d.). Organizations can also be penalized 1% of their
total payments through CMS programs such as the Hospital-Acquired Reduction Act in which
organizations performing in the bottom 25% of the nation receive reduced payments (CMS,
n.d.). While this has impacted the prioritization of patient safety within organizations,
organizational measurement of preventable harm is unreliable and the safety impact remains
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controversial (Bates & Singh, 2018).
Organizational Barriers in Adopting National Recommendations
There have been many organizational barriers identified in the adoption of the national
patient safety initiatives. Competing priorities for scarce resources in hospitals is a top
contributor (Atkins & Cole, 2005). Other barriers noted are employee and management
resistance to change, different understanding of the problem between administrators and
clinicians, and local culture (Atkins & Cole, 2005). Inconsistent implementation and practice of
safety initiatives remains a barrier to safer patient care (Bates & Singh, 2018).
There continues to be inconsistent participation in national patient safety initiatives and
unknown sustainability of patient safety interventions. The free IHI campaign was only
supported by two-thirds of hospitals in the United States (Baehrend, 2016). Organizations that
supported the IHI campaign did not consistently adopt recommended initiatives to improve
patient safety. The IHI campaign acknowledged a lack of awareness of the consistency and
sustainability of the recommended patient safety initiatives identified in their campaign
(Baehrend, 2016). In a national sample of 984 intensive care units in the United States, bundle
compliance to reduce infections from central lines was only 69% (Furuya et al., 2016). In
Pennsylvania, 38% of reported hospital-acquired central line bloodstream infections identified a
lack of compliance with preventative bundles, in spite of knowing that hospitals with the lowest
infection rates had the highest compliance with preventative bundles (Patient Safety Authority
[PSA], 2010).
Finally, in spite of national efforts to reduce preventable harm, preventable harm still
exists. Two focuses of the IHI 100,000 lives campaign were reducing infections from central
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lines and surgical procedures (Baehrend, 2016). In 2017, 20,152 patients experienced a surgicalsite infection, 21,173 patients experienced an infection related to a central line, and 24,865
patients experienced a urinary tract infection related to a foley catheter (Center for Disease
Control and Prevention [CDC], n.d.). While these infections are decreasing, there remain far too
many (CDC, n.d.). Patients are still being harmed by preventable medical errors at alarming
rates.
Summary of the National Prioritization of Patient Safety
In summary, in spite of evidence linking safety interventions to safer patient care, safety
interventions have not been fully embraced by all organizations (Bates & Singh, 2018).
Therefore, national prioritization of patient safety has not resulted in a national embracement of
safety interventions designed to reduce preventable harm. Despite decades of national attention,
including trillions of dollars in investment, heartbreaking stories caused by preventable harm
continue to be told (Pronovost et al., 2015). In addition to the devastating human consequences
of preventable harm, these events burden the already limited resources of the healthcare system
(Pronovost et al., 2015). Organizational culture remains the most substantial barrier to embracing
safety interventions intended to reduce preventable harm (Leape, 2015).
Barriers in Organizational Efforts to Develop a Safety Culture
In addition to the national prioritization of patient safety, organizations pursued the
development of safety cultures within their institutions. Healthcare borrowed the safety culture
concept from the nuclear industry after the release of the IOM (2000) report. Safety culture has
lacked a consistent definition across industries since its inception. However, there is substantial
agreement that safety culture is a sub-culture within a larger organizational culture (Edwards et
al., 2013). Not only has safety culture lacked a consistent definition across industries, there are
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many different definitions of safety culture in healthcare (Halligan & Zecevic, 2011). The most
commonly cited definition of safety culture in healthcare originated from the Health and Safety
Commission of Great Britain (1993) and is supported by the AHRQ as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. A Conceptual Model of Safety Culture
Safety culture has been used interchangeably with safety climate (Halligan & Zecevic,
2011). However, safety climate is only one dimension of safety culture representing shared
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of the practices and processes by which those working within
the environment manage and achieve patient safety (Morello et al., 2013). Safety culture is a
component of organizational culture that is comprised of a product of psychological aspects,
behavioral aspects, and situational aspects as depicted in Figure 1 (Cooper, 2000; Rail Safety and
Standards Board [RSSB], n.d.). The interaction and reciprocal relationship between people
(psychological), the work (behavioral) and the organization (situational) provides an explanation
for the precursors leading to unsafe acts in organizations (Cooper, 2000).
Since there was no one prescriptive approach to developing a safety culture,
organizations took individualized approaches to develop an organizational safety culture. The
interventions to develop a safety culture address the situational, behavioral and psychological
aspects of safety culture, however few studies or interventions address the interaction among the
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three aspects (Edwards et al., 2013). This approach is based on the assumption that preventable
harm is mainly caused by faulty systems, processes, and conditions in the environment (IOM,
2000). It also assumes the environment is not only a cause of errors but has the ability to shape
behaviors (Longo et al., 2005). Finally, this approach is based on the assumption that developing
a safety culture will result in safer patient care. The current approach to developing a safety
culture has had limited impact. Safety culture remains a significant barrier contributing to the
slow progression of safer care (Leape, 2015).
Situational Aspects of a Safety Culture Face Organizational Barriers
Safety culture is influenced by situational, or organizational, aspects represented by what
the organizations has to create a safety culture including policies, procedures, regulation,
organizational structures, and management systems (Cooper, 2000). Situational aspects alone
have not resulted in the development of a safety culture. The situational aspect approach
assumes a safety culture is created by changing characteristics within the organization through
organizational systems, structures and policies (Edwards et al., 2013). The situational approach
assumes safer systems of care influence safety-related actions and behaviors. Organizational
barriers and lack of embracement of situational aspects have been identified. This suggests
situational aspects alone can’t change characteristics within an organization.
Regulations Have Not Resulted in a Safety Culture
The Joint Commission (TJC), a regulatory agency, developed strategies to address patient
safety. TJC requires hospitals to conduct a thorough review of sentinel events to identify and
learn from the causes of the events (TJC, n.d.). A sentinel event is an adverse patient event, not
primarily related to the natural course of a patient’s illness, resulting in death, permanent harm,
or severe temporary harm (TJC, n.d.). After a thorough review of safety events voluntarily
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reported to TJC, the most significant cause of failures in patient safety were attributed to
leadership (Patient Safety Advisory Group [PSAG], 2017). Leadership failures include:
insufficient support of patient safety event reporting, lack of feedback or response to staff who
report safety concerns, intimidation of staff who report events, inconsistent prioritization and
implementation of safety recommendations, ignorance of staff burnout, and the role burnout has
on safety culture (PSAG, 2017).
TJC appointed a Patient Safety Advisory Group (PSAG) in April 2002 to identify critical
and emerging patient safety issues and provide suggestions for effective methods to reduce
patient safety risks (PSAG, 2018). The PSAG develops annual National Patient Safety Goals
(NPSG) to help hospitals focus efforts on the most substantial patient safety issues emerging
from the review of sentinel events (TJC, n.d.). As part of the hospital accreditation process, to
achieve compliance with the CMS payer requirements, organizations are assessed for their
response to the NPSG (TJC, n.d.).
The prioritization of NPSG have not resulted in a significant reduction in patient harm.
For example, improving the safety of clinical alarms has been a NPSG for many years, created
after determining inappropriate and lack of response to alarms was causing significant patient
harm (TJC, n.d.). However, alarms meant to save lives continue to create alarm fatigue causing
delayed or lack of appropriate response resulting in 566 deaths in the United States over a 3 year
period (Jones, 2014). Patient falls has remained a NPSG for several years, however patient falls
are a contributing cause of preventable harm in hospitals. Approximately 700,000 to 1,000,000
people fall each year in a hospital in which close to one-third are considered preventable
(AHRQ, n.d.).
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Therefore, although regulatory agencies have attempted to create regulations and policies
to improve safety culture, the regulations have not resulted in safer patient care. Leadership has
been identified as a significant barrier. Finally, the lack of adherence to regulatory policies
suggests external regulatory bodies may not be as influential in healthcare as they are in the
industries in which safety culture was borrowed.
Systems of Care Have Not Resulted in a Safety Culture
Organizational policies intended to provide safe care are a component of the situational
aspect of safety culture (Cooper, 2000). A systems approach to error focuses on improving the
systems in which individuals work while preventing blaming an individual for errors (IOM,
2000). A system of care requires many systems to work together to provide safe care to patients
without exposing the patient to preventable harm (Pronovost et al., 2015). A systems approach
to errors was borrowed from complex, accident-prone organizations, specifically nuclear and
aviation that successfully minimized errors despite complicated and hazardous work (IOM,
2000). Safer systems of care include but are not limited to: evidence-based practice bundles,
checklists to reduce practice variation, and supporting technology solutions designed to support
systems of care within the complicated healthcare system (Leape, 2015). Systems of care have
realized isolated reductions in preventable harm due to the lack of spread and adoption (Leape,
2015).
Safer systems of care have resulted in isolated reductions of hospital acquired infections,
surgical site infections, wrong site surgeries, and medication errors (Leape, 2015). A 15-year
collaborative initiative among 112 Michigan hospitals committed to preventing avoidable harm
through design of safer systems, learning from avoidable harm, and building a safety culture
realized a 20% decrease in several hospital-acquired infections and adverse drug events related
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to anticoagulation (Michigan Health & Hospital Association (MHA) Keystone Center, 2019).
This resulted in an estimated $80.6 million in cost savings (MHA Keystone Center, 2019).
Another organization reduced central line associated bloodstream infections from 3 for every
1000 device days to 0 for over 19 months at the time of publication by implementing and
embracing evidence-based practice bundles within an intensive care unit (Longmate et al., 2011).
A national prioritization of reducing all hospital-acquired infections resulted in 1.3 million less
infections over 3 years and $12 billion in cost savings over 4 years (AHRQ, 2014).
While these localized improvements are promising, there is still a significant amount of
effort needed to further reduce preventable harm (AHRQ, 2014). Furthermore, safer systems of
care are not widespread and have not always been embraced (Leape, 2015).
In summary, since the IOM (2000) report, organizations place greater attention on patient
safety (National Patient Safety Foundation [NPSF], 2015). However, situational aspects alone
have not resulted in a significant improvement in safety culture. Although national and
organizational efforts have prioritized safety culture, patients are still experiencing harm while
organizations and individuals are still not implementing all of the evidence-based safer systems
of care.
Behavioral Aspects of a Safety Culture Realize Unsafe Actions and Behaviors
Behavioral aspects include what people do, specifically safety-related actions and
behaviors (Cooper, 2000). Human errors are a contributing factor to the overall cause of
accidents (IOM, 2000). Evidence suggests 60%-80% of errors are caused by human errors
(Perrow, 1984). Although safer systems of care were developed to make it easier for people to
do the right thing, and harder to make a mistake, they have not always resulted in safety actions
and behaviors. The behavioral approach assumes behavior can be a result of a situation (Cooper,
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2000). People work in a dynamic environment in which behavior is self-regulated based on
situational and psychological aspects (Cooper, 2000). The behavioral aspects can be assessed
through many mechanisms such as reviewing an organization’s accident history and
understanding power gradients, routines and rituals (Cooper, 2000). There are instances in
which behavioral aspects resulted in nationally reported preventable harm in addition to
organization and individual liability. The development of workarounds applied to bypass
situational aspects suggests behavioral aspects alone won’t significantly impact safety culture.
Behavioral Aspects Resulting in Patient Harm
Behavioral aspects have not always resulted in a safety culture. A nurse in Wisconsin
administered an IV anesthetic instead of penicillin during childbirth after disregarding the safe
medication policy and bar code scanning technology designed to provide safe patient care
resulting in the death of a teenager and felony charge for the nurse (Wahlberg & Treleven, 2006).
Multiple decisions by multiple clinicians to disregard safer surgery practices resulted in
permanent damage to a patient’s urinary system requiring dialysis for life and a $25.5 million
settlement (Bean, 2019). Finally, a nurse was recently indicted for disregarding policies and
technology designed for safe medication administration resulting in a patient receiving a
paralytic instead of a routine sedative prior to a diagnostic imaging exam resulting in death
(Knowles, 2019).
Unsafe Behaviors Impact Safety Culture
Technology in the form of electronic support for ordering and administering medications
safely and decision support tools such as medication safety alerts and peer checking have been
developed to positively influence safety-related behaviors (Bates & Singh, 2018). Unsafe
behaviors such as bypassing safety systems, in the form of workarounds, undermine safety
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culture (Bates & Singh, 2018). This may be due to time pressure and lack of perceived safety
benefit (Bates & Singh, 2018). More importantly, the benefits of technology have not had the
behavioral impact previously predicted (Bates & Singh, 2018).
A systematic review of workarounds in acute care identified organizational work process,
patient-related, individual, social, and professional factors contributed to the proliferation of
workarounds in nursing (Debono et al., 2013). The findings of the systematic review will be
described. Organizational factors included staffing, workload and productivity pressures, poor
leadership, and lack of nurse involvement in decision making. Work process factors included a
mismatch between policies and current workflow, equipment and supply barriers, lack of
availability of doctors, emergency situations, and situations in which nurses perceived the tasks
as not important, appropriate, or necessary. Patient factors included the need to ensure patients
received care in a timely manner. Individual clinician factors included fatigue, cognitive load,
unfamiliarity with technology or policies, lack of understanding of the meaning or content of a
policy, lack of approval of the policy, and a perception that following the policy carries more risk
to the patient. Social and professional factors included poor communication, avoidance of
professional confrontation, professional etiquette or lack of, and ignoring nurses’ input into
patient’s care. Although nurses identified workarounds as risky, they are often justified as
necessary for care delivery or to support what is in the best interest of the patient. Workarounds
were further justified through autonomy of practice, acceptable when not jeopardizing patient
safety, in an emergency, when the nurse is familiar with the patient, when the doctors’ response
is predictable, and when the behavior falls within the scope of the nurse’s knowledge and skill
(Debono et al., 2013).
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Interruptions have also contributed to disruption in nurses’ cognitive work in acute care.
On average a nurse will experience between 3.4-5.9 interruptions per hour, often while a nurse is
performing patient intervention (Potter et al., 2005). Frequent interruptions include medication
problems, physician orders, supply issues, staffing problems, and broken or missing equipment
(Tucker & Spear, 2006).
In summary, in spite of the presence of situational aspects, behavioral aspects have not
always aligned with safety-related actions and behaviors. Disregard for situational aspects has
led to unsafe actions, or behavioral aspects, resulting in patient harm. Behavioral aspects alone
have not significantly influenced a safety culture.
Psychological Aspects Realize Limited Improvement in Perception of Safety Culture
Organizational culture must encompass actions and behaviors that will embrace safer
systems of care (Leape, 2015). The presence of a safety culture is measured by assessing
individual, group and organization perceptions of a safety culture, or the safety climate (Cooper,
2000). These perceptions comprise the psychological aspects of safety culture, or how people
feel (Cooper, 2000).
Several instruments have been created to measure the presence and strength of an
organization’s safety culture; however, the Hospital Survey of Patient Safety Culture (SOPS) is a
frequently cited instrument in the literature (Appendix A). The survey describes perceptions of
safety culture through assessment of individual perceptions of safety culture, which are then
aggregated at a unit or department, organizational, and national level (Famolaro et al., 2018).
The purpose of measuring safety culture at the institutional and national level is to understand
global trends in beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions to inform improvement efforts and measure
the overall effect of those improvement efforts over time (Famolaro et al., 2018). This approach
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assumes shared cultural norms, values, attitudes, and perceptions can be possessed by individuals
and the group (Edwards et al., 2013). Trends in safety culture perception have shown little to no
improvement over time. Poor nurse perception of safety culture over time and a discrepancy in
safety culture perception between leaders and nurses persists. The psychological aspect of safety
culture alone has not had a significant impact on safety culture.
The SOPS Identified Lack of Improvement in Safety Culture Over Time
There have been minimal improvements in favorable responses over time. Favorable
responses are calculated using the average agree and strongly agree responses (Famolaro et al.,
2018). The 2018 trending database survey, including 212,746 respondents, representing 306
hospitals contributing responses to the 2016 and 2017 database, identified less than a 1% average
improvement in average favorable responses among all 12 composites among all participants
(Famolaro et al., 2018).
The 2018 database of 382,834 respondents among 630 United States hospitals identified
a discrepancy between leaders, including administration, managers, and supervisors (77%) and
nurses, including registered nurses, licensed vocational nurses, and licensed practical nurses
(63%) average favorable perception of all safety culture composites (Famolaro et al., 2018). This
discrepancy in safety culture results between leaders and nurses has been consistent over time.
Nurses comprise 37% of the responses of the SOPS and have had a 0% increase in average
favorable responses among all 12 dimensions (63%) since 2016 and consistently remain the
discipline with the lowest average favorable perception of safety culture (Famolaro et al., 2018).
In addition, during the same time period, leaders consistently reported the highest average
favorable responses among the 12 composites (77%) (Famolaro et al., 2018).
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In summary, assessing and improving safety culture has had a limited and minimal
impact on safety culture. Nurses providing the majority of direct care to patients, continue to
have the lowest perception of safety culture. Nurses are critically important in ensuring patient
safety as they are a constant presence at the patient’s bedside and interact with all members of
the health care team (AHRQ, 2019). Discrepancies between nurses and leaders continue to
emerge. Nurse leaders are a sub-set of leaders. There are unknown factors contributing to the
low perception of safety culture among staff nurses and the discrepancy between staff nurse and
leader perceptions.
Summary of Barriers in Organizational Efforts to Develop a Safety Culture
Initiatives to address situational, behavioral, and psychological aspects of safety culture
have had a limited and localized impact on safety culture. In addition, there are differing
perceptions of safety culture between nurses providing care, having the lowest perception, and
leaders responsible for leading the development of a safety culture, having the highest
perception. The multi-faceted nature of safety culture warrants further exploration.
Several different sub-cultures will be in existence in an organization with very few
behaviors, beliefs, attitudes, or values being commonly shared by the whole organization
(Cooper, 2000). Sub-cultures may either be in alignment, or at odds, with the dominating overall
organizational culture (Cooper, 2000). Therefore, generalizing a culture into one universal truth
will not be effective in creating a universal safety culture. Approaching safety culture without
considering the reciprocal interactions between the three aspects within a specific context will
not likely have a substantial impact on safety culture (Cooper, 2000).
Understanding safety culture within a specific context will uncover the overarching
organizational culture as it will be reflected in the dynamic reciprocal relationships between
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leaders’ and nurses' psychological perceptions about, and attitudes toward, the situational and
behavioral practices within specific environmental contexts (Cooper, 2000). This richer
understanding can explain variances in the poor perception of safety culture among nurses and
the discrepancy in safety culture between leaders and nurses.
Problem Statement
Almost twenty years after the IOM report, leadership enthusiasm to develop a safety
culture in healthcare has not resulted in a significant decrease in preventable patient harm
(NPSF, 2015). The adoption of safer systems of care have had poor spread and adoption outside
of single units even within single organizations (Leape, 2015). Institutional culture remains the
biggest barrier to creating a safety culture (Leape, 2015).
Nurses, providing the majority of direct care in hospitals, continue to have the lowest
favorable perception of safety culture. In addition, there are differing perceptions of safety
culture between nurses providing patient care and nurse leaders responsible for leading the
development of a safety culture. Interviews and surveys have identified the situational,
behavioral, and psychological aspects of safety culture. However, safety culture and providing
safe care, as experienced by nurses and leaders within the situational context of a medicalsurgical unit within a hospital, has not been studied.
Purpose
The purpose of the study was to understand, explore, and describe safety culture as
experienced by registered nurses, hereafter staff nurses, caring for medical-surgical patients and
nurse leaders including supervisors, managers, and directors, within the situational context of
medical-surgical units in an acute care hospital. The research study aimed to (1) explore and
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describe staff nurses’ experiences with safety culture and safe patient care on medical-surgical
acute care units; (2) explore and describe nurse leaders’ experiences with safety culture and safe
patient care on medical-surgical acute care units; (3) compare and contrast staff nurses’ and
nurse leaders’ safety culture experience.
Research Question
The research aimed to answer the following research questions: (1) What do medicalsurgical staff nurses describe as their safety culture experiences in caring for medical-surgical
patients? (2) What do the nurse leaders describe as their safety culture experiences within
medical-surgical units? (3) What are the similarities and differences of medical-surgical staff
nurses’ and nurse leaders’ experiences with safety culture?
Significance
This research is essential to addressing the gaps in knowledge regarding how a safety
culture is understood, created, and maintained in the medical-surgical nursing acute care context.
Building on what is known about the aspects of a safety culture and the perceptions of safety
culture, it is critical to now explore and describe safety culture experiences of staff nurses and
nurse leaders within the context of a medical-surgical unit. Through a better understanding of
staff nurse and nurse leader experiences within the situational context of a medical-surgical unit,
it is expected that perceptions will be better understood, behaviors described, and motivators,
facilitators, barriers, and challenges identified. This knowledge is crucial for the design of safer
systems of nursing care and can inform the continued development of a safety culture to improve
patient safety and promote quality health care. This research will begin to develop a program of
research on development of a safety culture in acute care.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The previous chapter described the background of safety culture, problem, purpose of this
research, research questions, and the significance of this research. This chapter will review the
relevant literature related to safety culture including relevant theories, measurement tools, and a
synthesis of research findings. The key gaps identified within the literature and the gap that will
be addressed by the present study is identified.
Safety Culture Theoretical Frameworks
Several theoretical frameworks have informed the research. These theoretical frameworks
attempted to explain what is a safety culture, the context of safety culture within varying levels
of an organization, and the relationship between safety culture and unsafe acts resulting in
preventable harm. While the frameworks are diverse, they each addressed important aspects of
safety culture that together guided this research. These frameworks include the AHRQ SOPS,
the Dartmouth model, Reason’s swiss cheese model of accident causation, and Reason’s stages
in the development of an accident. A summary of these major theoretical frameworks will be
described.
AHRQ SOPS: A Conceptual Model Defining Safety Culture
The AHRQ SOPS measures the strength and presence of a safety culture. The SOPS is
grounded in a theoretical framework that describes the components of a safety culture to help
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define safety culture through ten composites and two outcome composites (Sorra & Nieva,
2004). The ten composites include communication openness, feedback and communication
about error, handoffs and transitions, management support for patient safety, nonpunitive
response to error, organizational learning-continuous improvement, staffing, supervisor/manager
expectations and actions promoting patient safety, teamwork across units, and teamwork within
units. The two outcome composites include frequency of events reported and overall perceptions
of patient safety. The framework will be described more thoroughly in the measurement section.
A limitation to this theoretical framework is it globally assesses the perception of the presence
and strength of a safety culture; however, it does not assess the cause of the strength or the actual
presence of safety culture (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
The Dartmouth Clinical Microsystems Model
The Dartmouth Model of Developing Microsystems proclaims that healthcare systems
are made of frontline clinical microsystems, mesosystems, and overarching macrosystems
(Nelson et al., 2007). The clinical microsystems are small, functional frontline units that provide
a majority of healthcare and are formed around patients and families creating the building blocks
of the healthcare system (Nelson et al., 2007). The microsystems produce quality, safety, and
cost outcomes at the frontline or sharp end of care (Nelson et al., 2007). This framework suggest
outcomes of a macrosystem can be no better than the outcomes of the microsystems of which it
is comprised (Nelson et al., 2007).
There are six safety principles within the framework including (1) errors are human
nature and will happen because humans are not infallible; (2) the microsystem is the key unit of
analysis and training; (3) design systems to identify, prevent, absorb, and mitigate errors; (4)
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create a culture of safety; (5) talk and listen to patients; and (6) integrate practices from human
factors engineering into microsystem functioning (Nelson et al., 2007).
The framework recognizes the impact of local unit culture and cultural variability within
a system. The framework also offers solutions to develop and support the microsystem in
creating safer care. A limitation of the framework is the heavy focus on system designs to
reduce the impact of errors without exploring individual behavioral choices. Another limitation
is the lack of appreciation for the organizational culture on the unit culture or at a minimum the
impact of the reciprocal relationship between the levels. This framework was used to provide
rationale for the unit of analysis within this study. Specifically, the rationale for a richer
exploration of safety culture at the microsystem, or unit, from a staff nurse and nurse leader
perspective.
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Accident Causation Model
The Swiss cheese accident causation model (Reason, 1997) describes how errors occur in
hospitals. Accidents are the result of a safety culture; therefore accidents inform the actual state
of the organization’s safety culture. An assumption underlying this model is that hazards are
inherent in complex, error-prone environments, such as hospitals; however, the precursors and
conditions creating loss or harm are prevented by layers of defenses, depicted as the swiss cheese
layers (Reason, 1997). An accident or error happens when the defenses are breached, depicted as
the holes in the cheese. An adverse event occurs when the holes in the Swiss cheese, or
weaknesses in the defenses, align. The breaches are caused by errors or violations committed at
the sharp end of the system, called active failures, and at administrative layers in the system,
called latent failures. There are three main central concepts that describe how errors occur in a
complex environment. These central concepts are defenses, latent failures, and active failures.
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Defenses
Defenses are the layers of swiss cheese in the mode protecting the organization from loss
(Reason, 1997). Defenses to protect the organization from loss may be engineered including but
not limited to alarms, automatic shut downs, and physical barriers such as personal protective
equipment. Defenses may also rely on individuals, especially front-line operators such as
providers, nurses, and other clinicians who determine the appropriate patient care in situations.
Finally, defenses may be a result of procedural or administrative controls such as prescriptive
communication handover between individuals, supervision, or safer surgery checklists. The
successive layers of defenses are overlapping and mutually supportive to guard against the
breakdown of the next layer (Reason, 1997).
Reason (1997) cautioned that not all defenses are created equal and defensive measures
create opportunities for different kinds of human error. Warnings and alarms that have a
reputation for indicating dangers where none exists are less likely to be acted upon. Defenses
add additional linkages and make the system more complex (Reason, 2000). Defenses also
create a reliability on automation decreasing skill sets which becomes dangerous when
automation fails (Reason, 2000). In addition to the complexity created by defenses, there are
weaknesses or holes in each defense. These weakness can be described as active failures or
latent conditions.
Active Failures
Active failures can be considered unsafe acts (Reason, 1997). Active failures create
holes in the swiss cheese compromising the barriers of protection (Reason, 1997). Active
failures are errors or violations committed at the sharp end of the system by those closest to the
work that are likely to have a direct and immediate impact on safety (Reason, 1997). Active
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failures typically result in one error or accident. An example of this is a surgeon performing a
wrong site surgery. Active failures are common in organizations and are neither sufficient nor
necessary causes of harm (Reason, 1997).
Latent Conditions
Latent factors are unsafe working conditions within the environment (Reason, 1997).
Latent failures create holes in the swiss cheese compromising the barriers of protection (Reason,
1997). Latent conditions may be present for many years before they combine with a
circumstance and an active failure to cause loss or errors (Reason, 1997). Latent conditions
include but are not limited to poor design, gaps in supervision, undetected defects, maintenance
failures, flawed procedures, training deficiencies, or inadequate resources (Reason, 1997). An
example of a latent condition resulting in the active failure of the surgeon performing a wrong
site surgery is a time pressure resulting from organization focus on productivity and operating
room turn-around time.
Latent conditions are always present and can result in multiple errors or accidents
(Reason, 1997). Latent conditions may be a result of conflicting organizational priorities
creating weaknesses in defenses due to time pressure, inadequate tools, low pay, low status, and
organizational culture (Reason, 1997). Latent conditions are more likely to breakdown a
system’s defenses by producing additional holes in the cheese.
In a complex system there are always hazards present (Reason, 1997). Defenses are in
place to protect people and assets from the system hazards (Reason, 1997). Loss or harm occurs
when weaknesses in the defenses, represented by holes in the cheese, align and create a window
of opportunity for the hazards to reach the people or assets (Reason, 1997).
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The Swiss cheese framework of accident causation explains how accidents happen but is
limited in that it doesn’t explain why accidents happen. Reason created a subsequent model to
define the stages in the development of an accident to explain why accidents happen. The
framework is also limited by the inability to understand when and why weaknesses in defenses
align to cause harm, and under what circumstances the holes in the defenses align to produce a
loss.
Reason’s Stages in the Development of an Accident Model
Reason’s stages in the development of an accident model serves to explain why accidents
happen. The model also serves as a mechanism to investigate accidents (Reason, 1997). Since
preventable harm is an outcome of safety culture, this framework serves as a mechanism to
review preventable harm to understand the actual state of a safety culture in an organization
(Reason, 1997). There are three central concepts in this model. These concepts include
organizational factors, local workplace factors, and unsafe acts.
Organizational Factors
Organizational factors are strategic decisions including but not limited to forecasting,
budgeting, resource allocation, planning, scheduling, communicating, managing, and auditing
(Reason, 1997). These leadership decisions create a corporate culture of the way the
organization carries out its business. This manifests through unspoken attitudes and unwritten
rules (Reason, 1997).
Local Workplace Factors
Local workplace factors are conditions associated with the immediate context of the
environment in which errors occur (Reason, 1997). An example of local workplace factors
include but are not limited to time pressure, inadequate tools and equipment, insufficient
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training, insufficient resources, insufficient policies and procedures, poor communication, and
poor management that cultivate local culture, or how the individuals carry out their work
(Reason, 1997).
Unsafe Acts
Unsafe acts are errors committed in the presence of a potential hazard (Reason, 1997).
Unsafe acts can be described as a slip, lapse, or mistake (Reason, 1997). Slips and lapses occur
when the intended plan does not achieve the desired results due to a failure in execution (Reason,
1997). A slip is an attentional failure in that the intention was appropriate but the action was not.
For example, a nurse knowingly intended to infuse normal saline, but selected and infused a
solution with dextrose with a similar package because the nurse did not pay attention to the
details on the package. A lapse is a memory failure created by forgetting or omitting planned
items such as forgetting to complete a surgical time out to prevent surgical harm perpetuated by
the distraction of time pressure due to a late start of the surgical case. A mistake occurs when the
plan goes as intended; however, the plan is inadequate to achieve the intended outcome (Reason,
1997). This can occur by a rule-based mistake or knowledge-based mistake (Reason, 1997). A
rule-based mistake can occur by misapplication of a good rule or application of a bad rule
(Reason, 1997). For example, a nurse gives a medication to relieve anxiety; however, because
the safe medication procedure was not followed, the patient experienced an adverse event. A
knowledge-based mistake occurs when the decision for action is based on insufficient or biased
knowledge (Reason, 1997). For example, a teenage patient presents to an emergency department
with hematuria and the provider treats a urinary infection when the teenager has beginning signs
of bladder cancer.
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The central idea of the stages in the development of an accident model concludes that the
underlying causal factors of errors begin as organizational factors that have consequences on
local workplace factors that when combined with the natural propensity for human error produce
unsafe acts. The weaknesses in defenses initiated within the organizational level are strategic
decisions made by leaders. The consequences of these decisions are communicated to the
organization and influence local workplace factors that may create conditions of unsafe acts
(Reason, 1997). Unsafe acts are often implicated in errors, however, they are not a necessary
condition (Reason, 1997). Loss or harm can occur without unsafe acts. Latent factors contribute
to significant weaknesses within the defenses (Reason, 1997). While the causes of weaknesses
in defenses start from the organizational factors, the investigation to identify the cause of an
accident starts with the bad outcome and works backwards to identify how and when the
defenses failed (Reason, 1997). Accident causation trends within an organization may be used to
provide an understanding of the current state of the organization’s actual safety culture including
behaviors and situational aspects of the safety culture.
There are several limitations of the framework. The lack of exploration of organizational
beliefs, values, and attitudes that result in supporting or disregarding safety practices impacting
safer outcomes limits the usefulness of the framework. The framework is also criticized for too
much emphasis on systems without addressing individual responsibility in performing unsafe
acts (Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006).
Summary of Theoretical Frameworks Informing this Study
In summary, the theoretical frameworks selected to inform this study addressed the
conceptualization of safety culture and the role of safety sub-cultures within a larger
organizational culture. In addition, the frameworks explained safety culture impact on
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preventable harm and how studying preventable harm informs the actual state of safety culture
within an organization. These frameworks helped inform the methods of the study.
Measuring Safety Culture in Hospitals
Understanding perceptions of safety culture informs attitudes, values, and beliefs of the
organization that influence safety-related behaviors and the embracement of situational aspects
within the organization designed to reduce preventable harm (Cooper, 2000). Safety culture has
been measured through various instruments. The variety of instruments allow organizations to
define and assess multiple dimensions of safety culture (Hudson et al., 2009). Safety culture is
measured by assessing the presence and strength of dimensions or organizational practices
associated with a safety culture at the individual level (Hudson et al., 2009). Results at the
individual level are aggregated to define unit, department, organizational, and national safety
culture results (Famolaro et al., 2018). The results are intended to raise awareness about patient
safety, diagnose and assess the current status and trends of the safety culture over time, identify
strengths and areas for safety culture improvement, evaluate the cultural impact of safety
improvements, and conduct internal and external comparisons (Hudson et al., 2009). The AHRQ
SOPS, Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), and the Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare
Organizations (PSCHO) instruments are used extensively in the literature. Each instrument has
limitations in terms of validity and reliability as described in Table 1. (Sexton et al., 2006; Singer
et al., 2008; Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
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Table 1. Psychometric Comparison of Safety Culture Measurement Instruments
SOPS

PSCHO

SAQ

Number of Participants

50, 513

21, 496

10, 843

Number of Items

41

38

30

Number of Dimensions

12

9

6

CFI

0.90

0.95

0.90

RMSEA

0.04

0.10

0.03

Reliability

α = 0.63 – 0.84

α = 0.50 – 0.89

Raykov’s ρ = 0.90

Validity

Expert Content;
CVI = 0.56-1.0;
ICC = 0.23 –
0.60

Expert Content;
CVI = 0.20-0.77;
ICC = 0.90

Expert Content;
ICC 0.51-0.99
between;
ICC 0.40-0.69
within

The measurement tools are all grounded in different definitions and attributes of safety
culture. The SOPS will be described in more detail as it was the source for describing the
problem. Each of the instruments measure different components of a safety culture. Several
dimensions of safety culture were commonly measured among the instruments including top
management support, safety systems, safety attitudes, reporting incidents, communication
openness, organizational learning, and teamwork (Alsalem et al., 2018). Although there were
common dimensions of safety culture measured by all the instruments, there were also unique
dimensions of a safety culture measured within individual instrument as described in Table 2.
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture
The SOPS measures the perception of safety culture within units, organizations, and
across organizations using a conceptual model of safety culture to guide the survey (Famolaro et
al., 2018).
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Table 2. Unique Measured Components of Safety Culture
SAQ

SOPS

PSCHO

SOS

Human Factors

Handoffs & Transitions

Risk-taking behaviors

Teamwork

Job Satisfaction

Leadership promotion of Management commitment to
safety culture
safety, safety systems

The questionnaire assesses 41 items within 12 composites of safety culture as described
in Figure 2. Results are obtained through the use of a 5-point Likert scale measuring strength of
perception (1 = strongly disagree, 5 =strongly agree) and frequency (1 = never, 5 = always)
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Respondents also provide a safety grade ranging from A-excellent to Efailing as well as the ability to share the number of safety events reported in the previous year by
selecting a range of numerical choices.
The survey was developed by a private research organization, supported by the Medical
Errors Workgroup of the Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, and funded by AHRQ
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The 41 items were selected from an extensive literature search,
psychometric analyses of two existing health care safety surveys, the Medical Event Reporting
Systems for Transfusion Medicine and the VHA Patient Safety Questionnaire, and through inperson and telephone interviews with frontlines staff (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Cognitive testing
was conducted including the use of think aloud to understand the respondents’ comprehension
and interpretation of the terms and items (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Respondents included nurses,
nurse managers, risk managers, department clerks, dieticians, food services, respiratory
therapists, pharmacists, pathologists, residents, and physicians. The draft survey was sent to
researchers, regulatory agencies, physicians, and hospital administrators for input (Sorra &
Nieva, 2004).
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The pilot survey was comprised of 79 items measuring 14 dimensions of safety culture
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The survey was pilot tested using a purposive sample including nurses
and pharmacists working in 21 hospitals within the United States. The response rate was 29%
creating a sample of more than 1,400 staff to reflect the diversity of geographic location,
teaching status, hospital size, and profit status (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). An exploratory factor
analysis was then conducted to eliminate the possibility of a single, unidimensional concept
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
A confirmatory factor analysis was then conducted resulting in the final model (Sorra &
Nieva, 2004). The overall model fit was confirmed through the comparative fit index, goodnessof-fit index, adjusted goodness-of-fit index, normalized fit index, and non-normalized fit index
with results of .90 or greater (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The root-mean-square error of
approximation measuring the unexplained variance was .04, less than the 0.5 recommended for
indicating a good fit (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Twelve final composites were retained (Figure 2).

Figure 2. AHRQ SOPS Composites and Composite Definitions
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Internal consistency reliabilities were examined for the 12 composites indicating overall
acceptable reliability (Table 1). The composite with the highest reliability included management
support with a Cronbach’s alpha =.85 and the lowest reliability included the staffing composite
with a Cronbach’s alpha =.63 (Appendix B) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Staffing, which
demonstrated the lowest internal consistency, was retained as evidence in the literature supports
the impact of staffing on safety (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010; Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
Validity analysis was conducted by calculating the mean of the responses to items in each
composite and then correlating the composites with one another once reverse scored items were
corrected (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Construct validity was supported by all intercorrelations
(Table 1) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Correlations were then calculated for the 12 composites and
the four outcome variables with the highest intercorrelation between overall perceptions of safety
and safety grade (r = .66, p < .001) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). A moderate intercorrelation between
overall perceptions of safety and hospital management support for patient safety (r = .60, p <
.001) suggests the important role leaders hold in the perceptions of safety culture (Sorra &
Nieva, 2004). There were little to no intercorrelations with the number of safety events reported
within the last year and the other composites, perhaps explained by the lack of events reported by
a majority of respondents (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Finally, ANOVA was conducted to understand
differences in composite scores within and across hospitals identifying significant differentiating
scores among all composites suggesting a good fit (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
Follow up studies were conducted to strengthen reliability and validity of the instrument.
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted through a study analyzing results from 331
hospitals, 2.267 units, and 50,513 hospital staff respondents demonstrating construct validity
(Sorra & Dyer, 2010). In a study of 454 health care staff in 3 hospitals, a factor analysis
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concluded moderate to strong reliability and validity evidence except for the staffing composite,
consistent with previous research (Blegen et al., 2009).
Extensive and appropriate psychometric testing during the pilot and throughout the use of
the survey identified an appropriate degree of precision and accuracy supporting that the survey
produces reliable and valid results. SOPS has been used in more than 100 studies in a variety of
countries demonstrating high reliability and validity. A limitation to this theoretical framework
is it globally assesses the perception of the presence and strength of a safety culture; however, it
does not assess the cause of the strength or presence of safety culture (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
The SOPS is also limited by a lack of assessment of behavioral aspects of safety culture as the
survey focuses predominantly on psychological and situational aspects of safety culture.
Summary of Measuring Safety Culture in Hospitals
In summary, various instruments are available to assess safety culture. Each of the
instruments measure different components of a safety culture. The SOPS has been used
extensively in the literature and produces valid and reliable results.
A Synthesis of Interventions to Improve Safety Culture in Hospitals
A review of the literature was conducted to identify strategies that were deployed to
impact safety culture within hospitals located in the United States. A brief description of
composite-specific trends in the SOPS informed the overall impact of specific safety
interventions on specific components of a safety culture within the United States. The 2018
SOPS database survey and trending data characteristics were previously described in Chapter 1.
Overall trends in the SOPS will be described to facilitate understanding of the historic and
current state of safety culture as measured by the most widely used instrument in healthcare. A
brief description of the impact of safety culture on safer care outcomes will be provided to
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inform potential gaps in the link between safety culture and safer care. Finally, gaps in the
literature will be described and the gap addressed in this study will be identified.
Literature Search Strategy
Studies were identified by searching Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health
Literature (CINAHL), Ovid MEDLINE, PubMed, and Scopus academic databases. Search terms
included safety culture, safety culture and leadership, safety and leadership, and safety
leadership. The search was limited to English studies published between 1998 and 2018 to
reflect healthcare response to the IOM Report (IOM, 2000).
Inclusion criteria for the search were peer-reviewed studies focused on hospital patient
safety culture interventions conducted to improve safety culture. The studies had to measure or
address safety culture or safety climate in hospitals. Studies that focused on entities other than
acute care, employee safety, students, and patient perceptions were excluded. Studies outside of
the United States were excluded due to the uniqueness of the healthcare system in the United
States. This strategy resulted in 30 final studies retained as displayed in Figure 3.
Literature Search Results
Leadership Impact on Safety Culture
Leadership has been consistently identified as a significant component of a safety culture
and critical to improving safety through designing, fostering, and nurturing a culture of safety
(Sammer et al., 2010). Leadership focus and engagement influences safe care through setting a
vision for how the organization behaves, identifying the most important actions that exemplify
the desired culture, creating the infrastructure that makes it possible for staff to implement the
actions, and role-modeling behaviors to shape a safety culture (Swensen et al., 2013).
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Figure 3. Literature Search Strategy
Although leadership dimensions are two of the more favorably perceived dimensions in
the SOPS, there remains a discrepancy between leader and nurse perception (Famolaro et al.,
2018). A review of the literature identified leader support and alignment of patient safety,
organizational culture, leadership style, and behaviors including leadership rounds impact safety
culture. Leadership was explored in this study to identify what factors are contributing to the
discrepancy in perception of leadership between nurses and leaders.
Leader support and alignment of patient safety impacts safety culture. The
foundation of delivering safe, reliable care is the ability for leaders to establish, lead, and sustain
safety as a core value (Gandhi et al., 2016). Leader attention to safety by supporting and
aligning patient safety priorities has resulted in improvements in safety culture. In addition,
different types of organizational culture impact safety culture. Organizational culture is
influenced by leadership (Gandhi et al., 2016).
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A mixed methods study analyzed the results from the SOPS from 536 hospitals between
2007 and 2014 to identify the top-improving large hospitals with over 400 beds (Campione &
Famolaro, 2018). The aim of the quantitative study was to use data to identify hospitals with top
performing safety culture perception results as measured by the improvement in average positive
response, including agree and strongly agree, over the 7-year period (Campione & Famolaro,
2018). Among the 536 hospitals that submitted data, the change in the favorable responses for
all composites averaged a 1.7 percentage point increase (Campione & Famolaro, 2018). The six
top-performing hospitals that were selected for the qualitative portion experienced an increase in
average favorable responses of 8.6 percentage points, ranging from 6.5–10.6 percentage point
increase (Campione & Famolaro, 2018). However, the significance of this increase is unknown.
The aim of the qualitative portion of the study was to identify promising practices of top
performing hospitals that may have contributed to their improvement (Campione & Famolaro,
2018). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with one to three interviewees from the
executive leadership team from six top-improving hospitals. A thematic analysis was conducted
to identify themes and best practices among the top hospitals. The three most common themes
included goal setting and strong action planning for quality improvement, implementation of
well-known patient safety initiatives and programs, and rigorous survey administration methods
(Campione & Famolaro, 2018). Other themes emerged including leadership support and focus
on organizational culture, consistent patient safety manager, importance of middle management
in safety culture, and event reporting including ease, promotion, and root cause analysis with
feedback (Campione & Famolaro, 2018). These themes all strengthen the notion that leadership
support and alignment impacts safety culture. This study allowed the researchers to obtain a
deeper understanding of how top performing organizations have positively influenced safety

38
culture as described by leaders. This study was limited by not conducting a deeper exploration
of non-leader perceptions of the causes of improvement in safety culture.
Organizational culture impacts safety culture. Different types of organizational
culture had differing impacts on safety climate. A large cross-sectional survey of 92-hospitals
representing small, medium and large size hospitals was conducted in the United States (Singer
et al., 2009). Safety climate was measured by the PSCHO (n =18, 361) and organizational
culture was measured by the Competing Values Framework (n = 5,637). The types of
organizational culture assessed in the study were production-oriented culture (α = .48),
entrepreneurial (α = .55), hierarchical (α = .70), and group (α = .77) (Singer et al., 2009). Group
culture (β = -0.241, p < 0.01), entrepreneurial culture (β = -0.279, p < 0.01), hierarchical culture
(β = 0.300, p < 0.01), and production oriented culture (β = 0.0666, p = < 0.01) significantly
predicted safety climate (Singer et al., 2009). This suggests that group culture and safety climate
are related. Patient safety climate was better when hospitals emphasized more group
participation and less hierarchy. The relationship between organizational culture and safety
climate was explained by a theoretical model. This study was limited by inadequate reliability
psychometric support of the culture type measurement scales. However, the study illuminated
the role power gradients play in safety culture. Although power gradients are known to exist in
healthcare, they are subtly exposed in safety culture measurement instruments. The existence of
power gradients could be identified in a qualitative study.
Empowering cultures impact safety culture. Feelings of empowerment enhance feelings
of support to allow decision making, which affects processes of care, increases quality patient
care, and potentially improves patient outcomes (Laschinger, 1996). Empowering environments
have been associated with a better safety culture.
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A study in the United States (n =257) identified a positive relationship between overall
safety culture, measured by the SOPS, and empowerment (r = 0.32, p < .05) (Armellino et al.,
2010). The Conditions of Workplace Effectiveness Survey (CWEQ-II), Job Activities Scale-II
(JAS-II), and the Organizational Relationships Scale-II (ORS-II) instruments were used to
measure empowerment (Armellino et al., 2010). The CWEQ-II contains 19 questions, plus two
additional items that measure global empowerment through six components that inform
perceptions of access to opportunity, information, support, and resources (α = .89) (Laschinger et
al., 2001). Two additional scales, the Job Activities Scale-II (JAS-II) and the Organizational
Relationships Scale-II (ORS-II) measured formal and informal power, however reliabilities were
not reported. The study had a 40% response rate. In addition, the study was supported by
Kanter’s theory of structural empowerment. Kanter proposes when individuals have the power,
or ability to access and mobilize resources, and have opportunities within the work environment
they become empowered to achieve organizational goals and effectiveness (Laschinger, 1996).
Empowerment had a positive relationship with safety culture explained by structural
empowerment framework. On the other hand, it is not known if empowerment is a result or a
precursor to safety culture. Furthermore, the impact of empowerment and/or safety culture on
safety-related decisions is not known. The study was limited by lack of psychometric testing of
two scales used to assess power gradients.
Power gradients identified in the SOPS. Power gradients are subtly informed through
the SOPS. In the 2018 SOPS user database, the item “staff feel free to question decisions or
actions of those with more authority” only saw a 50% average favorable response (Famolaro et
al., 2018). However, those results were skewed by more favorable leader perceptions (73%
average favorable response) compared to nurse perceptions (48% average favorable response)
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(Famolaro et al., 2018). Staff also reported fear of asking questions if something didn’t seem
right; however, those responses were more favorable (68%) (Famolaro et al., 2018). Again
leaders had a more favorable perception (80%) compared to nurses (66%) (Famolaro et al.,
2018).
Leadership styles and behaviors impact safety culture. Leaders have different styles
and behaviors. The relationships between leaders and clinicians influences a safety culture.
Active leadership behaviors, through leader rounding, had an inconsistent impact on safety
culture.
Transformational-Transactional leadership styles. A nine hospital cross-sectional study
of 41 nursing units (n = 466) in the United States found a significant positive correlation between
transformational leadership and most sub-scales of the Hospital Unit Safety Climate (HUSC)
scale (Merrill, 2015). The study also found significant negative correlations for laissez-faire
leadership style and most sub-scales of the HUSC as assessed by nurses (Merrill, 2015).
Transformational leadership had a large positive correlation with: manager support (r = 0.78, p <
.01), safety emphasis (r = 0.44, p < .01), and blameless culture (r = 0.37, p < .05) (Merrill, 2015).
Laissez-faire had a large negative correlation with manager support (r = -0.71, p < .01), safety
emphasis (r = -0.42, p < .01), blameless culture (r = -0.52, p < .01), and a medium negative
correlation with safety data (r = -0.33, p < .05) (Merrill, 2015).
The transformational-transactional leadership model encompasses transformational,
transactional, and laissez-faire leadership styles. While predominance of one type is not unusual,
there is a tendency to use any type depending on the situation (Bass & Avolio, 2004).
Transformational leaders are positive leaders who inspire followers to strive for higher
performance by being respected, instilling pride, motivating others, stimulating creativity, and

41
recognizing individuals for their achievement (Bass & Avolio, 2004). A transactional leader
obtains power from their formal authority and responsibility to the organization (Bass & Avolio,
2004). The main goal of the follower is to obey the instructions of the leader (Bass & Avolio,
2004). The leader motivates followers through reward and punishment (Bass & Avolio, 2004).
Finally, laissez-faire leadership is a passive management style in which leaders intervene only
when issues reach a critical point (Bass & Avolio, 2004). Leadership styles were shown to have
an impact on safety culture. The study had several limitations including a low response rate
(29.5%) and small sample sizes at the unit level. There was also a lack of reliability and validity
of the instrument.
Leader behaviors. Nurses have described leadership behaviors that influence a safety
culture. An ethnographic study describing how nursing supervisors keep nurses and patients safe
was conducted with 30 nursing supervisors working in 30 different hospitals in 20 different
states in the United States (Weaver et al., 2017). In addition, seven focus groups were held to
explore the perspective of working with nursing supervisors on evening, night, and weekends
from a staff nurse perspective. Administrative supervisors who support the off-shifts have been
identified as a resource to improve safety and safety culture through trust, rounds, education, and
providing support with a relationship-oriented leadership style (Weaver et al., 2017). This study
provided a deeper exploration of leader behaviors that impact safety culture on the off-shifts and
weekends. This study identified leader support provided by more than managers and
administrators occurs to support safety culture. A limitation of this ethnographic study was the
lack of observation, lack participant observations, and lack of author bracketing (Weaver et al.,
2017).

42
Leader rounds impact safety culture. Leadership WalkRounds are a simple but
rigorous management tool designed to assist hospital leaders in implementing mechanisms for
promoting safety, learning about and hearing the concerns of front-line providers, supporting
appropriate accountability concepts, and allocating resources to areas of greatest risk (Frankel et
al., 2008). They are intentional rounds with frontline clinicians to identify safety successes and
barriers preventing safe care (Frankel et al., 2008). Leader behaviors during rounds signal an
executive commitment to patient safety (Solvtofte et al., 2017). Leadership rounds have had an
inconsistent impact on perception of safety culture as described in the following studies.
A pre-post intervention study of clinicians (npre = 790, npost = 741) among two hospitals in
Massachusetts realized inconsistent relationships between leader rounds and safety climate as
measured by the SAQ (Frankel et al., 2008). Hospital A included nine patient care units while
Hospital B included 12 patient care units. Hospital A realized a significant increase in safety
climate after implementing leader rounds (t = 2.67, p = .03); while hospital B identified no
improvement in safety climate after implementing leader rounds (t = 2.06, p = .06) (Frankel et
al., 2008). Another single randomized control trial of nurses in a hospital in the United States
identified that Leader WalkRounds made no difference in pre and post mean scores of safety
climate between control and intervention groups (p = .854) using the SCS (Thomas et al., 2005).
However, nurses’ who were directly involved in Executive WalkRounds had a higher perception
of safety culture (p = .02) (Thomas et al., 2005). Nurses in the intervention group demonstrated a
significant difference in the odds of agreement compared to the control group when responding
to certain items as displayed in Table 3.
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Table 3. Nurses' Exposed to Leader Rounds Response to Survey Items
Item

Odds Ratio

95%CI

Senior leaders in my hospital listen to me and care about my 2.15
concerns

1.18-3.92

Leadership is driving us to be a safety-centered institution

2.48

1.39-4.45

I would feel safe here being treated as a patient

2.05

1.31-3.19

The institution is doing more now for patient safety than
one year ago

3.82

1.87–7.81

Patient safety is constantly reinforced as the priority in this
clinical area

2.79

1.50–5.21

This study was limited by biases related to self-survey, selection threat, differences
between groups, attrition threat, inability to identify if float nurses in the control group were
exposed to Leader WalkRounds, and lack of control for differences in leadership style and
approach during Leader WalkRounds (Thomas et al., 2005).
Leadership dimensions are among the higher scoring dimensions in the SOPS.
Leader support and commitment to patient safety are the more favorably perceived composites
on the SOPS. The 2018 SOPS database survey identified management support for patient safety
as the second highest scoring composite (82% average favorable responses) among all
respondents (Famolaro et al., 2018). However managers/supervisors had the highest average
favorable perception (86%), whereas nurses had the lowest average favorable perception (65%)
(Famolaro et al., 2018). The supervisor/manager commitment and actions promoting patient
safety were also highly favorable (72% average favorable responses), however, this composite
was most favorably perceived by managers/supervisors (90% average favorable response) with
nurses again having the lowest perception (77% average favorable response) (Famolaro et al.,
2018). Although these are higher performing composites, the discrepancies between leader
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perceptions and nurse perceptions were skewed. This suggests leader interventions may not be
having the desired impact on the safety culture among nurses.
Summary of leadership impact on safety culture. In summary, leadership attention
and commitment to patient safety had a positive impact on safety culture, specifically, leadership
commitment and prioritization of safety interventions. Group and entrepreneurial organizational
cultures had a positive impact on safety compared to production and bureaucratic organizational
culture. Positive leadership styles had a positive impact on safety culture; whereas, passive
leadership styles had a negative impact on safety culture. Finally, leadership commitment to
safety by prioritizing time to reinforce safety behaviors through walking rounds had inconsistent
results on safety culture perception. However, clinicians directly involved in rounds had a higher
perception of safety culture. This suggests this intervention can have an impact on individuals,
however there is less evidence of an impact at the unit or organizational level. Power gradients
were identified as a factor influencing safety culture in the research and SOPS database.
Discrepancies in nurse and leader perception of the leadership composites of the SOPS were
explored in this study.
Staffing Remains a Barrier to a Safety Culture
Commitment to fiscal and human resources includes leadership prioritization and
allocation of resources (Singer & Vogus, 2013). Human resource practices create the conditions
in which the workforce is selected, trained, and the structure in which services are provided
(Singer & Vogus, 2013). These resources ensure appropriate staffing policies and staffing
models to provide safe care. The perception of staffing has consistently remained the least
favorable dimensions of the SOPS. In addition, this literature review identified the importance
of staffing and safety culture.
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A cross-sectional study of 44 neonatal intensive care units in California representing
2,073 nurses, nurse practitioners, physicians, and respiratory care providers identified staffing
policies and procedures that enable safe work practices by reducing burnout and positively
impacting safety culture (Profit et al., 2014). A large significant negative correlation was found
between burnout and a poor perception of safety climate (r = −0.40, p = .01) as measured by the
SAQ and the Emotional Exhaustion scale of the Maslach Burnout Inventory (Profit et al., 2014).
Another cross-sectional study of 148 nurses from a Midwestern Veteran’s Administration
hospital in the United States identified burnout was associated with decreased safety culture
perception (Halbesleben et al., 2000). Burnout, as measured by exhaustion, had a large
significant negative correlation with safety grade (r = - 0.41, p < .01), safety perception (r =
-0.55, p < .01), and moderate significant negative correlation with near-miss reporting (r = -0.35,
p < .01) as measured by the SOPS and Maslach Burnout Inventory (Halbesleben et al., 2000).
Staffing as measured by the SOPS. The 2018 SOPS identified the staffing dimension of
the SOPS as one of the lowest scoring composites among respondents, regardless of role
(Famolaro et al., 2018). Nearly half of respondents report not having enough staff (52% average
favorable response), staff in the unit work longer hours than is best for patient care (48% average
favorable response), working in crisis mode (50% average favorable response), and use of more
agency or temporary help than is best for patient care (64% average favorable response)
(Famolaro et al., 2018). Favorable staffing responses have declined over time. The 2018 SOPS
database trending survey identified a decrease in average favorable staffing responses by nurses
from 55% favorable in 2016 to 53% favorable in 2018; whereas leaders remained stable at 63%
favorable (Famolaro et al., 2018). This indicates that adequate staffing has not been improved to
positively impact safety culture.
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Summary of staffing impact on safety culture. Burnout has a negative impact on
safety culture. In addition, the SOPS results suggest staffing is not perceived as adequate for
safe care. The risk of making errors was three times higher when nurses worked shifts greater
than 12.5 hours (OR = 3.29, p = .001) and increased with working overtime regardless of shift
length (OR = 2.06, p = .0005) (Rogers et al., 2004). These findings identify the importance for
leaders to continuously assess the environment and ensure adequate support and prioritization of
resources. Staffing was previously reported as the lowest reliable composite within the SOPS,
however staffing continues to surface as a concern. This study incorporated staffing ratios into
the description of organizational characteristics (Rogers, et al., 2004).
Comprehensive Safety Programs Impact Safety Culture
The development of comprehensive unit-based safety programs (CUSP) to identify
hazards, fix hazards, and learn from hazards have resulted in inconsistent but promising results
ranging from improved teamwork, communication, and overall perception of safety culture at the
unit and organizational level (Weaver et al., 2013). CUSP can be considered a change
management tool, however it increases relevancy in healthcare by making it relevant for
clinicians by putting the change management tools in the context of a hospital unit environment
(AHRQ, 2013). CUSP is comprised of five main steps including staff education on safety
science, identifying defects, engaging executive leaders, learning from defects, and
implementing teamwork tools (AHRQ, 2013). CUSP engages frontline clinicians and leaders in
implementing safety programs.
A systematic review identified six of eight studies found a significant association
between CUSP and improved safety culture perceptions (Weaver et al., 2013). A prospective
cohort study of 144 units in a large academic medical center in the United States implementing a
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CUSP found a significant improvement in safety climate after the CUSP intervention (t = −6.02,
p < .001) as measured by the SAQ (Paine et al., 2010).
A CUSP, comprised of the addition of an obstetrics patient safety nurse, protocol-based
standardization of practice, crew resource management, or team training, and a patient safety
oversight committee, was implemented within an obstetrics department in a New York hospital
(Pettker et al., 2011). This pre and post study design identified significant improvements in the
proportion of staff members with favorable perceptions of teamwork culture (39% in 2004 to
63% in 2009, p < .001) and safety culture (33% to 63%, p < .001) (Pettker et al., 2011).
Individual roles including nurses, attending physicians, and residents also experienced significant
improvements in safety climate and teamwork perception (p < .01) (Pettker et al., 2011). A
limitation of the study was although participants were surveyed four different times throughout
the five years, the participants responding were different and different methods of survey
delivery were used (Pettker et al., 2011)
A quasi-experimental study in one hospital identified a significant increase in several
safety climate domains after the implementation of a CUSP (Provonost et al., 2005). Clinicians
in two intensive care units (Unit Apre n = 66, Unit Apost n = 64; Unit Bpre n = 23, Unit Bpost n = 21)
both experienced a significant increase in multiple dimensions of safety culture (p < .05) as
measured by the SAQ (Provonost et al., 2005). Another pre and post intervention study design
including 72 Intensive Care Units in Michigan identified an improvement in safety climate over
a one-year period after the implementation of a CUSP (t = -2.921, p < .005) as measured by the
SAQ (Provonost et al., 2008). A prospective cohort study of 127 intensive care units in
Michigan realized an association between safety culture and the implementation of a CUSP (t = 6.21, p < .001) as measured by the SAQ (Sexton et al., 2011).
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Summary of comprehensive safety programs and the impact on safety culture.
CUSP addresses safety culture and safer systems simultaneously. CUSP provides a change
management framework that engages leaders and frontline clinicians to collaboratively identify
and improve safety concerns at the unit level. The evidence supports consistent improvements in
safety culture after the implementation of a CUSP. These results were realized in individual
units, hospitals, and among multiple hospitals. CUSP requires leadership engagement and
support, however CUSP also influences safety-related actions and behaviors. Programs that have
been implemented to improve safety were explored within this study.
Teamwork Impact on Safety Culture
Teamwork is defined as an environment in which collegiality, collaboration, and
cooperation among executives, staff, and independent practitioners in open, safe, respectful, and
flexible relationships is evident (Sammer et al., 2010). Improving teamwork has a positive
impact on safety culture. Teamwork within units is more favorably perceived than teamwork
across units (Famolaro et al., 2018).
A pre and post teamwork training intervention within one medical unit among three
different California hospitals (npre = 434, npost = 368) identified a statistically signiﬁcant (p <
.05) improvement in 10 composites of safety culture as measured by SOPS (Blegen et al., 2010).
A quasi-experimental study of a teamwork training intervention for clinicians (n = 3,465) across
24 critical access hospitals with 12 control hospitals identified a significant improvement in
several composites of the SOPS in the intervention group compared to the control group (Jones
et al., 2013). The intervention group had significantly more favorable perceptions after training
(p < .01) than did the static group in the survey composites organizational learning—continuous
improvement (76% vs 71%), teamwork within departments (82% vs 80%), and teamwork across
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hospital departments (67% vs 62%) (Jones et al., 2013). However, the distribution of the
adoption of team behaviors varied in the intervention group from 2.8% to 31.0%.
Early adopter respondents experienced an increased odds of reacting positively to the
SOPS items representing working in crisis mode (OR = 1.61, 95%CI[1.18-2.36], p < .01),
mistakes have led to positive changes (OR = 1.45, 95%CI[1.05-1.99], p < .05), and a less
favorable perception of problems occurring in the exchange of information across hospital
departments (OR = 0.773, 95%CI[0.56-0.94], p < .05) (Jones et al., 2013). Early/late majority
respondents experienced increased odds of reacting positively compared to baseline for: when
one area in the department gets busy, others help out (OR = 1.32, 95%CI[1.09-1.61], p < .01),
staff feel free to question those with more authority (OR = 1.26, 95%CI[1.06-1.49], p < .01),
mistakes have led to positive change (OR = 1.29, 95%CI[1.05-1.57], p < .05) and it is just by
mistake that more accidents don’t happen around here (OR = 1.28, 95%CI[1.06-1.56], p < .05)
(Jones et al, 2013). Laggard respondents were less likely to respond favorably to important
patient information is lost during shift change (OR = 0.64, 95%CI[0.46-0.90], p < .05) and
problems occur in the exchange of information across hospital departments (OR = 0.71,
95%CI[0.51-0.98], p < .05) (Jones et al., 2013). The distribution of adoption suggests there were
other organizational or workplace factors influencing the embracement of this intervention
warranting further exploration to inform change management strategies.
A pre and post interventional study comparing two campuses, one receiving
TeamSTEPPS training and a control campus, identified teams experiencing teamwork training
engaged in significantly more team behaviors after attending the training, including precase
operative briefings (F [1, 147] = 35.01, p < .001, partial η2 = .19) and frequency of contingency
plan discussions (F [1, 145] = 5.00, p < .05, partial η2 = .03) (Weaver et al., 2010). A repeated
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measures ANOVA analyses indicated that statistically significant gains were only found for the
dimension teamwork within units as measured by the SOPS (F [1, 25] = 21.7, p < .001, partial η2
= .19 (Weaver et al., 2010). Safety culture, as measured by the SOPS, realized a significant
increase in favorable responses after training for communication (F [4, 134] = 3.15, p < .05;
Wilks’ Lambda = .91; partial η2 = .09) and mutual support (F [2,143] = 6.41, p < .01; Wilks’
Lambda = .92; partial η2 = .08) (Weaver et al., 2010). Finally, the trained group’s perceptions of
teamwork increased significantly after training (F [1, 18] = 7.05, p = .02, partial η2 = .28);
whereas the nontrained group did not statistically significantly change over time (F [1, 6] = .271,
p = .62, partial η2 = .04) (Weaver et al., 2010).
Teamwork as measured by the SOPS. Efforts to improve teamwork have led to
favorable perceptions of teamwork (82%) as measured by the SOPS (Famolaro et al., 2018).
However, teamwork across units is generally less favorable (62%) indicating opportunities to
extend teamwork training across units or identify barriers in teamwork across units. Nurses have
the lowest perception of teamwork across units (58%) (Famolaro et al., 2018).
Summary of teamwork impact on safety culture. Evidence supports that safety culture
can be influenced by teamwork across many different settings. The adoption of team training
behaviors influences safety culture across multiple units and organizations. Teamwork within
units is perceived more favorably than across units. The opportunity to understand and improve
teamwork across units requires further exploration. This important dimension guided the
exploration of teamwork within units while revealing factors influencing teamwork between
units.
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Communication Impacts Safety Culture
Communication occurs when any and all members of the healthcare team have the right
and responsibility to speak up on behalf of a patient (Sammer et al., 2010). Communication also
occurs during patient handoffs. Several communication interventions have resulted in positive
improvements in safety culture including speaking up and handoff communication. Handoffs
and communication perform poorly in the SOPS (Famolaro et al., 2018).
Speaking up for patient safety. Speaking up has been defined as assertive
communication in clinical situations that require immediate action with appropriate persistence
until there is a clear resolution to prevent error or harm from reaching a patient (Premeaux &
Bedeian, 2003). Reporting and voicing concerns identifies lapses in patient safety that will
enable learning and changes to be made to the environment to prevent further harms (Vogus et
al., 2010). The review of literature identified a multitude of organizational and individual factors
influencing speaking up for safety.
Creating an environment in which it is safe to speak up also influences safety culture. A
systematic review, including 26 studies, identified environmental factors impacting speaking up
for safety (Okuyama et al., 2014). These factors included perceived patient risk, hospital
administrative support, policies, team work, safety of speaking up, and relationships among
colleagues (Okuyama et al., 2014). Individual factors including job satisfaction, responsibility
toward patients, responsibility as a professional, confidence based on past experience,
communication skills, and education background influenced speaking up (Okuyama et al., 2014).
Physicians and nurses on an oncology unit identified protecting patients from injury as the
primary motivator for speaking up, however the decision to speak up is often determined by
justifying the risk to the patient with the cost of speaking up in terms of damaging relationships,
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time constraints, fear of negative consequences, futility due to perceived lack of change, and
hierarchical structures created by role and experience level (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014).
A multilevel Poisson regression analysis indicated that the benefits of safety organizing
on reported medication errors were amplified when paired with high levels of trust in manager (β
= -0.68, p < .001) or the use of care pathways (β = -0.82, p = .001) (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).
This was a large cross-sectional study of 1,033 nurses and 78 nurse managers working across
seven states in the United States (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). The nurse manager response rate
(96.3%) was higher than the nurse response rate (50.6%); however, response rates overall were
favorable.
Leaders can promote or hinder voicing of safety events. A methasynthesis of 11
qualitative studies identified four themes influencing nurses and other healthcare workers to
voice concerns: (1) hierarchies and power dynamics negatively impact speaking up; (2) open
communication is unsafe and ineffective; (3) embedded expectations of nurse behavior affect
voicing concerns, (4) nurse managers have a powerful positive or negative affect on safety voice
(Morrow, 2016).
Speaking up for safety as measured by SOPS. A systems approach to error is intended
to prevent blaming an individual for human errors, while still holding individuals accountable for
unprofessional conduct (NPSF, 2015). The nonpunitive response to errors dimension has
remained the lowest scoring dimension over time. Improving situational and behavioral aspects
is reliant on reporting and learning from mistakes to identify and mitigate preventable errors
before they cause harm (NPSF, 2015). A blame culture, or set of norms and attitudes within an
organization characterized by the unwillingness to take risk or accept responsibility for mistakes
because of the fear of criticisms or management admonishments, is prevalent in healthcare
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(Khatri et al., 2009). This lack of reporting, seeded in fear of blame, results in the inability to
significantly reduce preventable harm (Gorini et al., 2012).
The 2018 SOPS database survey identified a less than favorable (47%) perception of a
nonpunitive response to error (Famolaro et al., 2018). This composite has remained the lowest
scoring dimension when trended over time (Famolaro et al., 2018).
A punitive culture creates under-reporting of potential or actual safety events that would
inform further development of behavioral and situational aspects of safety culture. The 2018
SOPS database survey identified 55% of respondents within the previous 12 months never
reported a safety event and 25% only reported 1-2 safety events (Famolaro et al., 2018). Only
2%-3% of major errors are reported in hospitals, and those reported are due to an inability to
conceal the error (Leape, 1997). In a 2010 report of 189 United States hospitals, the OIG
identified 13.5% of hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries experienced adverse events during their
hospital stay however, only 14% of the errors were actually reported (DHHS: OIG, January
2012).
Summary of speaking up for safety. Leaders create the organizational structure and
expectations for professional behavior within the healthcare environment. A plethora of barriers
to speaking up for safety have been identified through quantitative and qualitative research.
Trust in management and use of care pathways enhanced reporting of medication errors. The
poor perception of speaking up and a nonpunitive environment suggest there are factors within
the environment that have either not been explored, or there are significant challenges in
removing the barriers. This warrants further exploration to determine the facilitators and barriers
in creating an environment that supports speaking up.
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Handoff communication impacts safety culture. Communication also occurs between
clinicians to ensure the safe transition of a patients between different levels of care and through
multiple handoffs between caregivers. Handoffs and transitions have not improved in perception
among nurses and leaders over time (Famolaro et al., 2018).
A cross-sectional study of 515,637 respondents from 1,052 hospitals across the United
States assessed perceptions about organizational factors that influence handoffs (Richter et al.,
2016). The study found that perceived teamwork across units was the most significant predictor
of perceived successful handoffs (β = 0.83, 95%CI[0.77,0.89], p < .001). Perceptions of staffing
(managers: β = 0.21, 95% CI[0.15, 0.28], p < .001; clinicians β = 0. 18, 95%CI[0.13,0.22], p <
.001) and management support for safety (managers: β = 0.10, 95% CI[0.15, 0.28], p < .05;
clinicians β = 0.11, 95%CI[0.13,0.22], p < .01) were also significantly associated with perceived
successful handoffs for both management and clinical staff (Richter et al., 2016).
Communication as measured by the SOPS. Handoffs and transitions have not
improved in average favorable perception among nurses (48%) and leaders (50%) over time as
measured by the 2018 user database trending survey (Famolaro et al., 2018). The composites
with the lowest average favorable responses in the 2018 SOPS include communication openness
(66%), handoffs and transitions (48%), and non-punitive response to errors (47%) (Famolaro et
al., 2018). Communication openness average favorable perceptions have not changed over time
with leaders consistently reporting the average most favorable responses (80%) and nurses
reporting lower average favorable responses (64%) (Famolaro et al., 2018). The 2018 SOPS
identified that healthcare workers don’t always speak up on behalf of patients. Nurses have a
less favorable perception that safety issues are reported (68%) compared to the more favorable
perception among leaders (75%) (Famolaro et al., 2018). In addition, working in a nonpunitive
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environment supports speaking up, however nurses have a low perception of working in a nonpunitive culture (48%) (Famolaro et al., 2018). Leaders have the highest perception of a
nonpunitive culture (68%), however the responses are not extremely favorable (Famolaro et al.,
2018). This suggests there are underlying unknown factors influencing communication and the
creation of a non-punitive environment.
Summary of communication. Communication including speaking up for safety and
communication between clinicians to ensure safe handoffs during transitions of care are
associated with safety culture. Although there are many contributors to speaking up for safety, a
punitive environment reduces speaking up. In addition, leadership has been identified as a
consistent factor preventing speaking up. Several factors including teamwork, staffing, and
management positively impact handoffs and transitions. However, handoffs and transitions
continue to experience less favorable average perceptions in the SOPS. Both leaders and nurses
have poor perceptions of handoffs and transitions.
The limited evidence of interventions impacting these dimensions and the lack of
improvement in these low scoring dimensions suggest there are underlying factors influencing
this dimension of safety culture. Understanding these contributing factors needs further
exploration to facilitate an environment supportive of communication.
Learning Impacts Safety Culture
Learning occurs when hospitals value and learn from mistakes and seek new
opportunities to improve (Sammer et al, 2010). Learning-oriented behaviors have been
associated with a safety culture (Vogus et al., 2010). Efforts to increase organizational learning
have successfully influenced safety culture. Organizational learning-continuous improvement is
a more favorably perceived composite of the SOPS; however, opportunities to learn from
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mistakes was identified (Famolaro et al., 2018). This may be related to the previously reported
fear of reporting, but there may be other underlying factors preventing learning from mistakes.
Learning interventions, coupled with the implementation of technology designed from
learnings from previous medication errors, resulted in decreased medication errors and
improvements in safety culture (Abstoss et al., 2011). A pre- and post-intervention study in an
intensive care unit identified a 25% increase in the reporting rate of medication errors, from an
average of 3.16 to 3.95 per 10,000 doses dispensed (p < .01) (Abstoss et al., 2011). At the same
time, the rate of medication errors resulting in harm decreased 71%, from an average of 0.56 to
0.16 per 10,000 doses dispensed (p < .01) (Abstoss et al., 2011). The post intervention
assessment of safety culture (n = 85) found a statistically significant improvement in teamwork
climate (p = .003) and several items within the SAQ (Abstoss et al., 2011).
Another intervention study (n pre= 585, npost = 334) found learning from nurse
workarounds during medication administration positively impacted nursing perception of safety
culture (p = .029) as measured by the SAQ (Tetuan et al., 2017). There was a small to medium
positive correlation between the SAQ and Systems Thinking Scale (r = 0.297, p < .001) (Tetuan
et al., 2017).
Learning as measured by the SOPS. The SOPS identified organizational learningcontinuous improvement realize an average favorable response among all respondents (72%)
(Famolaro et al., 2018). However, there was a less favorable average response that positive
changes have occurred from mistakes (63%) (Famolaro et al., 2018).
Summary of Learning. Learning from errors has resulted in improvements in safety
culture and safer patient care. The perception of organizational learning-continuous
improvement is one of the most favorably perceived dimensions suggesting organizations have
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focused on learning. However, learning from mistakes continues to perform poorly on the SOPS
suggesting there are underlying factors influencing learning from harm warrants further
exploration. It is necessary to understand what factors support an environment conducive to
learning from failures to further inform interventions to develop a safety culture.
Summary of Review of the Literature
Although the studies to improve safety culture had several methodological weaknesses as
previously described, the most concerning weaknesses among the studies were related to poorly
defined constructs. Although a conceptual model and multiple theoretical frameworks defining
safety culture were presented, the constructs of safety culture and safety climate were rarely
defined and when defined had inconsistent definitions. Only 20 of the studies in the literature
review used a conceptual or theoretical framework to guide research. Eight of the studies
defined safety culture and, among those studies, there were several varying definitions of safety
culture. The lack of consistency in defining the central concept and grounding the study with the
support of a theoretical framework significantly limits the ability to appropriately measure and
compare results across studies. Limitations of generalization include use of multiple different
measurement instruments, cross-sectional, and qualitative nature of the studies.
Although none of the studies could support causality, there were evidence-based
interventions identified that had strong associations with safety culture improvements as
summarized within the safety culture theoretical framework in Figure 4. These interventions
offer management tactics to improve safety culture. The interventions were successful in
improving localized unit, facility, system, and multiple hospital safety culture. In addition,
several large studies identified factors that predict or influence safety culture.
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Behavioral Aspects:
Leadership Styles &
Behaviors, Teamwork,
Communication
Situational Aspects:
Leadership Attention and
Commitment, Manager
Support and Expectations,
Staffing, CUSP,
Organizational Culture,
Learning, Policies and
Protocols

Psychological Aspects:
Safety Culture Assessment
and Improvement, Fear of
Blame

Safety
Culture
Figure 4. A Summary of the Literature
In summary, significant efforts to improve safety culture in healthcare over the past
nearly 20 years have not led to a significant improvement in safety culture or safer outcomes.
The research identified evidence to assist organizations in improving safety culture. However,
the lack of improvement, as measured by the national SOPS survey, suggests there are gaps that
remain unknown and should be explored.
Results of Safety Culture Interventions on Safety Culture and Safe Care
In spite of the activities to improve safety culture, there has been little impact on safety
culture perceptions as measured by the SOPS. There has also been a limited impact of these
activities on safer patient care.
Impact of Safety Culture Interventions on Safety Culture
The most recent 2018 SOPS database, as previously described, identified that nurses,
had the lowest average favorable responses of the 12 composites with minimal to no
improvement over time (Famolaro et al., 2018). Leaders continued to have the highest average
favorable responses of the 12 composites (Famolaro et al., 2018). One particular composite,
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Overall Perception of Patient Safety, assesses the ability of systems and processes to prevent
harm in addition to understanding respondents’ beliefs about the presence of patient safety
problems within the organizational context (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Trends among all
participants over a seven year period in this composite indicate unfavorable perceptions with
minimal to no improvement over time as depicted in Table 4 (Famolaro et al., 2018). This study
uncovered factors influencing these results.
Table 4. Trends in SOPS Overall Perception of Patient Safety Among All Participants
2014

2016

2018

It is by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here

62%

61%

62%

Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done

64%

64%

64%

We have patient safety problems in this unit

65%

65%

65%

Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from
happening

73%

73%

74%

Safety Culture has an Inconsistent Impact on Safer Care Outcomes
Interventions to improve safety culture have not only had a limited impact on safety
culture, safety culture has been inconsistently associated with safer patient care. Safety culture
assessments merely identify how people feel within the organization about safety in isolation of
actual behaviors influencing safer patient care. The inconsistent impact of safety culture on safer
patient care suggests either the approach to developing a safety culture has not been successful or
the theory that a safety culture results in safer care is misguided.
There have been several studies linking the strengthening of a safety culture with safer
patient care. A systematic review inclusive of 62 studies identified a significant improvement in
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decreased mortality, falls, hospital-acquired infections and an increase in patient satisfaction
after strengthening the safety culture (Braithwaite et al., 2017). A descriptive, longitudinal study
identified all hospital harm (p < .01), serious safety events (p < .001), and severity-adjusted
hospital mortality (p < .001) significantly decreased as safety culture, measured by providers and
employees using the SAQ, increased over the 5-year study (Berry et al., 2016). A positive safety
culture has also been associated with decreased falls and compliance with fall prevention
protocols, lower colon surgical site infections, decreased adverse events, and decreased costs
(Brown & Wolosin, 2013; Fan et al., 2016; Thornton et al., 2017).
However, another systematic review indicated that there have been inconsistencies in the
relationship between safety culture and safer patient care. A systematic review of 17 studies,
using various well-established instruments to measure safety culture, identified an association
between safety culture and safer outcomes (DiCuccio, 2015). The safer outcomes included
decreased mortality, increased patient and family satisfaction, decreased readmissions, decreased
patient safety indicators, decreased community-acquired pneumonia rates, and decreased
hospital-acquired pressure ulcers (DiCuccio, 2015). However, four studies found no significant
correlations or unexpected correlations with safety culture including increased hospital-acquired
pressure injuries, falls, and medication errors (DiCuccio, 2015).
In summary, activities to improve safety culture have had a limited impact. There have
also been inconsistent findings relating safety culture to safer care outcomes. This study
explored and described staff nurse and nurse safety culture experiences.
Gaps in Research
The approach to safer care in healthcare has relied heavily on the development of a safety
culture. This approach has proved challenging and has resulted in minimal improvements in
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safety culture and safer care. Inherent challenges to safety in healthcare include the difficulty
identifying non-events, complexity of human disease, specialization in health care, siloed
thinking, agreement of harm and response to error, and routine operational failures creating
workarounds (Vogus et al., 2010). Challenges in the agreement of harm and response to error
and professional cultures focused on blaming and shaming individuals for errors have also
emerged (Vogus et al., 2010). Additional gaps emerged out of the literature review.
Gaps in Understanding Adherence to Safety Interventions
While hospitals have shown some significant improvements in preventable harm through
the creation of safer systems, the lack of adherence to safer systems of care including checklists,
bundles, and care pathways continues to impact safe patient care. These evidence-based
practices are optional for organizations to implement; therefore, gaps in implementation and
adoption of these safety practices exist among organizations. Organizational and workplace
factors limiting the implementation and integration of these safety strategies were identified.
However, what is not known is what is being done to eliminate the barriers to support evidencebased practice. Also, what competing sub-cultures, including organizational and workplace
factors, are preventing adoption of or disregard of safety practices even within single institutions.
Several publicly reported errors resulting from non-adherence to evidence-based practice
were presented; therefore, it is known that there are opportunities for adherence to evidencebased systems and procedures. What is not known is what other factors influence clinicians
choice to comply or to deviate from evidence-based practices, systems, and procedures or to
choose unsafe behaviors. In addition, how is the choice to comply or deviate from evidencebased practices, systems, and procedures justified by the clinician or the organization? While
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evidence-based practice improved safety culture perception and safer care, what is not known is
the impact of standardization on critical thinking and clinician skills over time.
Gaps in Understanding Weakness Within Defense Systems
Weaknesses are inherent in a complex system (Reason, 1997). An understanding of
when and why weaknesses in defenses align to cause harm has not been fully explored. This
understanding could inform error mitigation strategies. There is also a lack of understanding of
what factors influence unsafe acts. The SOPS identified opportunities to improve systems to
ensure patient safety is intentional and not accidental. What is not known are the underlying
weaknesses in the system or defenses that are contributing to a lower perception of overall safety
culture within hospitals. Furthermore, the factors influencing the gap in perception between
leaders and nurses is unknown.
Gaps in Understanding Leadership Impact on Safety Culture
Leadership attention, commitment, styles, behaviors, organizational culture, and leader
rounds have all been associated with safety culture. While there is substantial research linking
leadership to safety culture, several gaps remain. Those gaps will be described.
Gaps in Leadership Attention and Commitment Impact on Safety Culture
The research revealed an association between leader attention and commitment and
improved safety culture. However, factors prohibiting leaders from prioritizing and committing
to safety culture are unknown. Although the SOPS revealed the two leadership composites as
higher performing composites, there is a gap between leader and nurse perception of leadership
composites impacting safety culture. However, the factors creating the gap between leader and
nurse perception of manager/supervisor commitments and actions promoting patient safety and
manager/supervisor support for patient safety are unknown.
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Gaps in Organizational Culture Influence on Safety Culture
One study showed a relationship between type of organizational culture and the impact
on safety culture. However, the factors that facilitate or inhibit complex sub-systems from
working together to create safer care have not been explored. In addition, there was a
relationship between an empowering environment and safety culture, however the relationship
between feelings of empowerment and safety-related actions and behaviors has not been fully
explored.
Gaps in Leadership Styles and Behaviors Impact on Safety Culture
Leadership styles and behaviors showed to have a positive impact on safety culture.
What is not known is the impact of negative leadership styles or behaviors on safety culture.
Nurse leaders include charge nurses and off shift nursing leaders. What is not known is who, if
anyone, emerges as the leader to pay attention to and prioritize patient safety in absence of the
unit leader. A study showed night shift supervisors are seen as champions of patient safety, what
is not known is how night shift supervisors prioritize patient safety and the impact of those
efforts. The role and impact of charge nurses or informal leaders within units or departments in
promoting patient safety is also unknown. Nurses often work autonomously with limited
interaction with nurse leaders throughout a shift. This suggests there is a unit or department
culture that while influenced by local leadership is also influenced by individuals within the
culture. What is not known is the role of nurse leadership styles and behaviors and the impact on
safety culture within a unit or department.
Leadership behaviors such as rounding had inconsistent results on safety culture
perception. What is not known is what factors are necessary for leader rounds to positively
impact safety culture. What is also not known is the dose of leader rounds and the impact on
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safety culture on all shifts. Finally, the factors influencing over a 20% discrepancy between the
perception of leader behaviors supporting a safety culture among nurses and leaders as measured
by the SOPS are unknown.
Gaps in Staffing and Safety Culture
Although having the adequate amount and skill mix of staff have been identified as
factors positively influencing safety culture, there were several gaps identified in the literature.
A gap in understanding available resources was identified that may have influenced the poor
perception of staffing. The factors driving the low perception of safe staffing among leaders and
nurses are also unknown. Evidence is lacking as to why leaders, responsible for prioritizing and
allocating resources, themselves don’t have a favorable perception of safe staffing. The
previously reported low perception of the staffing composite within the SOPS among leaders and
nurses suggests that there may be competing priorities that de-prioritize the commitment and
prioritization of resources; however, those factors are unknown. Finally, evidence was presented
that excess hours worked negatively impacted patient safety. Nurses consistently work shifts
that exceed hours known to contribute to patient harm. What is not known are the underlying
factors influencing nurse scheduling and work hour decisions that are conflicting with safe work
hour recommendations.
Gaps in Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Programs and Safety Culture Impact
CUSPs address safety culture and safer systems simultaneously. Although the naming
convention suggests this is unit-specific, results were realized across units, hospitals, and
countries. What is not known is why these programs, with strong evidence of improved
outcomes, are not embraced more globally and consistently.
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Gaps in Teamwork and Safety Culture Impact
Teamwork was positively associated with safety culture. There were evidence-based
programs to develop teamwork within different environments. Improvements in teamwork
resulted in an improved safety culture. However, discrepancies between leader and nurse
perception of teamwork remain constant. The factors contributing to the discrepancy in
perception of teamwork between leaders and nurses are not known. Teamwork across units is
more problematic than teamwork within units. The factors contributing to the perception that
teamwork across units is more problematic are unknown.
Gaps in Communication and Safety Culture Impact
Communication was determined to positively impact safety culture through speaking up.
Communication between clinicians through handoff was also associated with safety culture.
However gaps remain in understanding communication to improve safety culture.
Gaps in Speaking Up for Safety
The evidence identified fear and other barriers to speaking up for safety. Nurses reported
a low perception of having the ability to question the actions and decisions of those with more
authority as measured by the SOPS. This suggests there are power gradients influencing safety
mindsets that can’t be explored through a quantitative study; however, those factors are
unknown.
Fear of punishment has been identified as a barrier to speaking up for safety. The SOPS
identified a long-standing perception that the healthcare culture is punitive. A punitive response
to errors has remained the lowest scoring composite within the SOPS over time. The SOPS also
identified significant gaps in perceptions within this composite between leaders and nurses. A
punitive culture is a deterrent to reporting safety concerns. There are tools available to leaders to
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assist in guiding a standardized systems approach to errors while balancing individual
accountability. For example, Just Culture is a framework that balances the need for an open and
honest reporting environment to create a learning environment and safety culture with the duty to
hold employees responsible for the quality of their choices (Boysen, 2013). What is not known
is if and how leaders are implementing a systems approach to errors to reduce the perception of
individual blame. Furthermore, what is not known are the factors influencing the perception of a
punitive environment within a culture that implements a systems approach to errors. Factors
underlying a long-standing poor perception of a nonpunitive environment and discrepancies
between leader and nurse perception warrant further exploration.
Speaking up for safety is also accomplished through reporting of safety events. The
SOPS identified a lack of reporting safety events. Lack of reporting unsafe conditions and the
inability to identify dangerous latent factors without direct behavioral observation leaves a gap in
understanding what latent factors are present in the environment that once aligned could result in
harm. In addition, barriers to reporting safety events were described in the literature, however,
what is not known is why clinicians don’t see the value in reporting errors.
Gaps in the Impact of Handoffs on Safety Culture
There was a plethora of evidence-based interventions to improve handoffs. What is not
known is what are the organizational and workplace factors preventing the embracement of
interventions to improve safe handoffs. The consistent lower favorable responses on handoffs
and communication in the SOPS suggest there are deeper factors underlying the inability to
apply the interventions that have shown promising results on safety culture and safety outcomes.
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Gaps in Learning and the Impact on Safety Culture
Learning from errors has resulted in improvements in safety culture and safer patient
care. What is not known is why there is a poor perception that positive changes are being made
by learning from mistakes. The use of individual and group reflection to learn from errors was
not identified in the literature review; however, reflection has been identified as a useful method
to learn from mistakes (Singer & Vogus, 2013).
Gaps in Safety Culture Perception between Nurses and Leaders
The poor perception of safety culture among nurses and the discrepancy in safety culture
perception between nurses and leaders were identified. The factors underlying those perceptions
are unknown. There were no studies that attempted to understand the situational context of
safety culture experiences in medical-surgical acute care units through the lens of staff nurses,
registered nurses, and nurse leaders, supervisors, managers, and directors. This gap is addressed
in this study.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
A comprehensive review of the literature, gaps in the research, purpose of this research,
significance of this research, and research questions for this study were described in the previous
chapter. This chapter describes the research methodology. Research design, research setting,
sample, data collection, data analysis, study rigor, and ethical considerations will be described.
Research Design
An inductive descriptive qualitative research design (Sandelowski, 2000) was used to
explore and describe safety culture experiences of registered nurses, hereafter referred to as staff
nurses, and nurse supervisors, managers, and directors, hereafter referred to as nurse leaders, on
medical-surgical acute care units. This research provided a comprehensive description of the
experiences of staff nurses and nurse leaders on medical-surgical acute care units to enrich
understanding of staff nurse and nurse leader perceptions and behaviors, as well as the safety
culture facilitators, barriers, and challenges to providing safe care. Description of the situational
context allowed a richer understanding of safety culture while helping to prevent a
misunderstanding of the meaning of events by framing individual actions and beliefs within the
specific context that is influenced and influences the meaning of the situation (Miles et al.,
2014). The results informed the developing science of safety culture through ways to either
develop the culture and/or leverage the culture to embrace safety systems and interventions to
improve safety culture.
68
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The inductive qualitative descriptive design informed the understanding of the
situational context of safety culture as thematically described by the participants. Through their
own words, a richer understanding of safety culture on medical-surgical acute care units is
provided. Views and attitudes of those working within the existing situational context uncovered
experiences of safety culture among staff nurses and nurse leaders as well as similarities and
differences in safety culture between the differing roles.
Inductive qualitative description seeks to understand the who, what, where, and why of
the experience (Sandelowski, 2000) and results in a description of experiences, events, and
processes that participants would agree as accurate (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Sullivan-Bolyai et
al., 2005). The data portray beliefs, behaviors, and events to convey the actual reality of what is
really happening (Sandelowski, 2000). The researcher sought to provide a holistic description of
safety culture from the perspective of the participants engaged in the situation (Sandelowski,
2000). This holistic description, grounded in naturalistic inquiry, is described in everyday
language to be understood by staff nurses and nurse leaders (Sullivan-Bolyai et al., 2005).
Despite the plethora of research, measurement instruments, definitions of safety culture
and safety climate, and interventions to improve safety culture there has not been a significant
impact on safety culture and safer patient outcomes. This study was a beginning to identify
themes within and between staff nurses’ and nurse leaders’ safety culture experiences and factors
that facilitate or inhibit providing safer care within the situational context of acute care hospital
medical-surgical units. The poor penetration of safety into the health care culture suggests that
the complexity of safety culture has not been fully evaluated. Given the state of the science, this
inductive qualitative descriptive study was an appropriate design for this research to study
experiences of medical-surgical staff nurses and nurse leaders to understand complex safety
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culture experiences, events, or processes embedded within the situational context of acute care
medical-surgical nursing (Sandelowski, 2000; Sullivan-Bolyai, et al., 2005).
Research Setting
The study site was a 147 bed community hospital located in the Midwest. The hospital,
established over 61 years ago, is located in a community with a population of approximately
75,000 people and serving multiple urban and rural counties of approximately 250,000 people.
The hospital became part of an integrated, not-for-profit healthcare delivery system over 30 years
ago. The healthcare system includes regional and rural hospitals, ambulatory clinics, and postacute care services and is one of the largest employers in the region, employing nearly 7,000
people.
The community built the hospital through fund-raising efforts to fill a gap in healthcare
services within their community. The hospital is a tertiary referral center offering medical,
surgical, and outpatient services and employs 1,184 personnel of which 387 are registered nurses
in staff positions and 18 are registered nurses in clinical leadership positions.
Organization Patient Safety Culture Strategy
The organization hired a new CEO in 2017 who declared patient safety and quality the
number one priority for the organization, encouraging leaders to change their behaviors and
mindsets to support the notion that zero avoidable harm is possible. The organization
implemented safety huddles in 2017 in support of a statewide collaborative initiative to improve
patient safety in healthcare. The purpose of safety huddles is to create situational awareness of
potential or actual safety concerns ensuring a plan to mitigate potential patient safety events in a
brief 10-15 minute standing huddle (“Hospital-Wide Safety Huddles,” n.d.).
The hospital participated in the AHRQ SOPS every two years. As an outcome
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measure, respondents were asked to provide a patient safety grade from A (excellent) to E
(failing). The results included the percent of respondents that selected the patient safety grade.
The results of the 2019 survey (n =437) for the hospital are displayed in Table 5.
Table 5. Study Site Patient Safety Grade
B-Very
Good
51.3%

CAcceptable
25.3%

DPoor
5.4%

E-Failing

Hospital

AExcellent
16.5%

National median

32%

42%

19%

2.5%

0.5%

1.4%

The organization received an acceptable or very good safety grade above the national
median. However, the organization received an excellent patient safety grade less often than the
national median, and received more poor and failing safety grades than the national median
indicating opportunities to better understand safety culture in the hospital.
Shared Governance
A shared governance structure was present within the organization and hospital structure.
Characteristics of shared governance include staff nurse autonomy and independence in practice,
accountability, empowerment, participation, and collaboration in decisions that affect individual
patient care and the practice environment (Anthony, 2004). Shared governance allows staff
nurses the freedom to fully participate in the practice of nursing and shape the work environment
in which patient care occurs (Anthony, 2004). Each facility was represented at the system
nursing shared governance council composed of staff nurses and nurse leaders across the
organization working collaboratively to make improvements within their environments. Each
nursing unit within each facility had a unit shared governance council.
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Sample
A purposive sample of Registered Nurse (RN) staff nurses, including unit-based and
medical-surgical float nurses, were recruited voluntarily. Maximum variation sampling for staff
nurses was sought to represent variations in education level, years of experience as a staff nurse,
average hours worked per week, shift, and unit-based or float staff nurse role. Maximum
variation sampling allowed for the exploration of common and unique manifestations of the
phenomenon across a broad range of demographics (Sandelowski, 2000).
A purposive sample of Registered Nurse (RN) nurse leaders including an interim nurse
director, nurse managers, and nurse supervisors working on or directly supporting the medicalsurgical units were recruited voluntarily. All participants were requested to consent to 1-3
interviews, or as needed, to reach data saturation.
Inclusion criteria included staff nurses and nurse leaders working in medical-surgical
units in the hospital. All participants had to have at least 6 months experience working 50% of
their time on a medical-surgical unit. This timeframe allowed sufficient time for the participants
to complete orientation and to gain enough knowledge about the hospital and its operations to
provide informed answers. Medical-surgical units were chosen because of the lack of
information in the research literature, potential large sample size, similar patient population,
similar staffing model, variation in attending providers compared to specialty units that have a
core group of providers, and willingness to engage in the study as championed by the nursing
shared governance council chair. Other staff nurses that did not spend at least 50% of their time
working in the designated units and students were excluded to provide a richer understanding of
the culture from the perspective of those working within the culture. Licensed practical nurses
and certified nurse assistants were excluded from the study to allow a focus on understanding
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safety culture from the unique perspective of staff nurses and nurse leaders. Although safety
culture incorporates collaboration between multiple disciplines, disciplines other than nursing
were excluded to isolate the unique experiences of safety culture from a staff nurse and nurse
leader perspective. This approach was taken to understand the long standing poor perception of
safety culture that is unique among staff nurses compared to all other disciplines and the
discrepancy in perceptions between staff nurses and nurse leaders.
Recruitment of Participants
After receiving a letter of intent from the hospital Director of Nursing (Appendix C) the
research was approved by the hospital (Appendix D) and University IRB (Appendix E). The
researcher posted flyers in staff lounges and followed up with a recruitment email to a list of
eligible participants provided by nurse leaders using the researcher’s university email address
(Appendix F). The researcher solicited support by attending unit and facility safety huddles. At
the huddles, the researcher explained the study purpose, eligibility requirements, importance of
confidentiality, protection of participants, and provided flyers with the researcher’s cell phone
number and university email to eligible participants. Recruitment continued until data saturation
was reached. Participants included 16 staff nurses and 10 nurse leaders recruited voluntarily for
the study.
Data Collection
The proposed research aimed to answer the following research questions: (1) What do
medical-surgical staff nurses describe as their safety culture experiences in caring for medicalsurgical patients? (2) What do the nurse leaders describe as their safety culture experiences
within medical-surgical units? (3) What are the similarities and differences of medical-surgical
staff nurses’ and nurse leaders’ experiences with safety culture?
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Qualitative description uses data from multiple sources to describe experiences from the
viewpoint of those in the experience (Sandelowski, 2000). Data were collected through
interviews and observations among the staff nurses and nurse leaders. Data were collected until
data saturation was reached. Data saturation occurs when the research questions have been
answered and there is no new information shared by the participants (Miles, Huberman, &
Saldana, 2014). The themes were then reviewed by four nurse leaders and three staff nurses to
ensure the participants agreed with the holistic description of experiences, events, and processes
reflected in the results. Data were collected from February 27, 2020 through September 22,
2020.
Informed Consent
Informed consent was obtained prior to interviews (Appendix G). Participants were
provided a detailed description of the research purpose, design, risks and benefits of
participating, and voluntary nature of the study. Solicitation for follow up interviews, if
necessary, was also sought during the informed consent process.
Interviews
The interviews consisted of semi-structured, open-ended questions to allow for discovery
of the basic nature of participant experiences (Sandelowski, 2000). Interviews allowed the
researcher to attempt to understand the world from the participant’s view to unfold the meaning
of their lived experiences (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Prior to beginning the interview the
researcher contacted the participants by phone or in person to discuss: (1) the focus of the
research and intent of the interview; (2) time commitment involved and preference of location
for the interview; (3) disclose that the interview would be audio taped and transcribed; (4)
informed consent and process for ensuring confidentiality of each participant.
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At the onset of the interview, in order to assure the rigor of the collected data, after
obtaining informed consent the data collection protocol was explained, the participants were
given a participant code to protect their identify, and demographic data were obtained (Appendix
H). An interview guide was also developed to assure the rigor of collected data (Appendix I).
The pilot interview guide was informed by the theoretical frameworks described in Chapter 2.
The pilot interview guide was field tested and refined with two staff nurses and two nurse leaders
who were not eligible for inclusion in the research study. The purpose of the field testing was to
ensure the interview guide was soliciting information that would inform the study research
questions. During the pilot, when asked exclusively about experiences with safety culture,
participants offered minimal to no description of their experiences. Therefore, the researcher
asked about experiences with patient safety and providing safe care in addition to their
experiences with safety culture. This solicited richer descriptions of safety culture experiences
among the participants. The inductive and semi-structured interview guide allowed the data to
emerge and the researcher to gather richer descriptions of consistent themes by paying attention
to group norms, behaviors, artifacts, expectations, and reviewing key documents.
To enhance the credibility of data collection, key policies, protocols, and documents
discussed in interviews were collected and reviewed. The documents collected were used to
inform the study context to better understand the variables impacting culture. Examples of key
documents reviewed include safety huddle agenda templates, stat sheets, fall prevention policy,
medication administration policy, and staffing ratio grids. The researcher also kept a personal
journal to document immediate reactions, impressions, and perceptions experienced throughout
the research process. The researcher’s experiences were also discussed weekly with the
researcher’s dissertation committee chair.
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Interviews were recorded with the participants’ consent to ensure accuracy of the
interview. Interviews were conducted in secure locations chosen by the participants. The initial
semi-structured interviews allowed the participants to share insightful information and
experiences. The initial interviews lasted on average one hour. Staff nurses were interviewed
before worked shifts, after worked shifts, on days off, and during other non-paid times. Several
nurse leaders opted to be interviewed in their office during working hours as they work nonconventional business hours; others chose before or after normal business hours.
Three staff nurses and four nurse leaders participated in follow up interviews. These
interviews were conducted to solicit further description of experiences and to solicit validation,
clarification, or a richer description of the research results. The follow-up interviews lasted on
average 20 minutes. An activities log to track interview activities was maintained (Appendix J).
Audio tapes of interviews were transcribed verbatim. The transcriptions were reviewed
line-by-line and compared to the audio recordings to ensure accuracy and inclusion of
intonations and any contextual information during the interview (e.g. interruptions). A sample of
audio recordings and all transcripts were reviewed by the dissertation committee chair to validate
results.
Observations
Observations occurred in the hospital setting at the unit, facility, and system huddles to
allow the researcher to observe group safety behaviors. The researcher gained entry into safety
huddles by obtaining the verbal approval and support of staff nurses and nurse leaders. The
researcher observed as an observer-as-participant allowing the researcher to be known and
recognized in the researcher role during observation periods (Angrosino, 2007). The researcher
quietly observed the natural process and took notes in an unobtrusive manner to encourage
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natural behaviors and routines during the safety huddles. Observations were recorded on an
observation log including descriptive and reflective notes. (Appendix K). Observations of
patients were not conducted. Observations also allowed the researcher to set the context for
interviews and solicit participants (Angrosino, 2007). Several staff nurses took a recruitment
flyer and participated in interviews.
Observations allowed the researcher to collect data on the phenomenon in the field
setting through the five senses using a systematic process (Creswell & Poth, 2018).
Observations allowed the researcher to gain insight into views on how, when, and with whom
staff nurses and nurse leaders interact to discuss and resolve patient safety and safety culture
issues between units of the facility and across the system. This facilitated the situational
contextual understanding of the study site’s safety culture processes of raising and resolving
patient safety concerns. For example, the researcher witnessed staff nurses and nurse managers
performing safety huddles within the unit. The researcher then witnessed nurse managers
escalate safety concerns and develop plans to mitigate harm with other hospital leaders at the
facility safety huddle. Finally, the researcher observed the director of nursing escalate concerns
from the facility safety huddle to the system safety call. The researcher also observed the
director of nursing share learnings from the system safety call with the nurse managers at the
facility safety huddle which were then shared by nurse managers with staff nurses at their unit
safety huddles.
Conducting observations in a systematic manner and repeated over a course of time
increased the reliability of the process of collecting data (Angrosino, 2007). Observations
improved credibility by allowing the researcher to link the findings to the reality of what was
happening within the situational context to demonstrate truth in the research. For example, the
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researcher was able to cross-check and triangulate interview data and key documents with
observations made in the natural setting to decrease biases from pure observations and pure
interviews (Angrosino, 2007). Observations occurred between February 20, 2020 through April
9, 2020. Six unit huddle observations occurred on four different medical surgical units. Ten
hospital safety huddles and seven system safety huddles were observed. Observations lasted on
average one hour.
Data Analysis
Inductive qualitative content analysis was applied to analyze and summarize information
to describe the phenomenon (Sandelowski, 2000). Content analysis was conducted to ensure the
descriptions represented the perceptions and beliefs of the participants by staying closer to the
surface of words and events (Sandelowski, 2000). Analysis occurred concurrently with data
collection (Miles et al., 2014). The emerging design allowed for the researcher to modify
interview probes to accommodate new data and new insights (Sandelowski, 2000). To answer
the first two research questions:
(1) Staff nurses’ safety culture experiences in caring for medical-surgical patients.
a. Please describe what patient safety means to you.
b. Please describe your experiences working in a safety culture.
(2) Nurse leaders’ safety culture experiences within medical-surgical units.
c. Please describe what patient safety means to you.
d. Please describe your experiences working in a safety culture.
The following five step process was followed to conduct inductive content analysis within each
participant group (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Miles et al., 2014).
(1) Managing and organizing the data: After verbatim transcription, files were organized
into files labeled “RN Interviews” to capture staff nurse interview data and “RNL
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Interviews” to capture nurse leader interview data. It was determined analysis would be
conducted manually by hand to stay near to the data.
(2) Reading and memoing emergent ideas: Transcripts were read multiple times. Phrases
or words within the transcripts were highlighted to assist in identifying initial codes.
These segment memos were written in the margins for easy searchability. Researcher
notes were placed in the margins. Phrases and words were placed on sticky notes for
visual display to assist in sorting and classification.
(3) Describing and classifying codes into themes: In vivo coding was conducted to
cluster similar data to answer the research question on patient safety and safety culture
using first cycle coding. In vivo coding assured that the researcher captured, prioritized,
and honored the participant’s voice within the emerging themes. Consensus of first cycle
codes were agreed upon during weekly meetings with the dissertation chair. First cycle
codes were continuously revised to accommodate new data. Individual documents of
each first cycle code were created containing data from participant interviews,
observations, and key documents review. First cycle codes were placed on sticky notes
for visual display resulting in 20 codes for staff nurses and 17 codes for nurse leaders.
The codes provided data condensation to illuminate the most meaningful material in
readable units to be analyzed. Then, pattern codes were generated through second cycle
coding to identify the emerging themes. Frequency of themes were collected to allow for
analysis of consistency of language and meaning. Language was assessed through the
consistency of and general manner in which words were used. Meaning was assessed
through subthemes. Subthemes provided rich description of participant experiences by
providing quotes, emotions, and context to ensure the voices, feelings, meanings, and
actions of the participants were described in sufficient detail.
(4) Developing and assessing interpretation: Interpretation was iterative. Member
checking allowed for intersubjective validation of interpretation of results at multiple
points throughout the study. The preliminary results were reviewed during second
interviews with three staff nurse participants and four nurse leader participants for
credibility checks. Staff nurses stated that “this is really good, this summarizes it quite
nicely, this is it, you have a good understanding of it, you captured it” (RN02). Nurse
leaders responded similarly stating “this captures everything, I think this is it” (RNL02).
The final results were validated by the organization’s Nurse Practice Council comprised
of system staff nurses and nurse leaders. Interpretation of themes and subthemes were
compared between the researcher and dissertation chair until consensus was reached.
(5) Representing and visualizing the data: Results of the final themes and subthemes
were displayed in a table for each participant group and are displayed in the results
section.
To answer the third question, similarities and differences of staff nurses’ and nurse
leaders’ experiences with safety culture, a modified triangulation six step protocol was followed
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to test for convergence and dissonance of themes between participant groups as follows (Farmer
et al., 2006).
(1) Themes between groups were compared for similarities in language resulting in six
shared language categories between participant groups.
(2) Convergence coding was applied to subthemes due to the variability in meaning
between participant groups. Subthemes were coded as “shared” when meanings were
similar between the two data sets. “Unique” was coded when meanings were only in one
set of results. “Discord” was coded when there was disagreement in or different
meanings between the two data sets. Results were compared between the researcher and
dissertation chair until consensus of coding was reached.
(3) A convergence assessment was completed to provide a global assessment of
convergence between the subthemes of each participant group.
(4) A completeness comparison of the two data sets provided a summary of shared,
unique, and discord findings to answer the final research question.
(5) Analysis results were reviewed during third interviews with two staff nurse
participants and three nurse leader participants for credibility checks. Staff nurses stated
“I feel like you got everything”, “some of the things I might have missed other people
said and it makes sense to me”, “this is exactly it, I don’t disagree with anything, I have
experienced everything on here.” Nurse leaders responded similarly stating “I think you
captured it well”, “you captured it all”, and “you captured it accurately.” The final results
were validated by the organization’s Nurse Practice Council comprised of system staff
nurses and nurse leaders.
(6) Shared themes were then compared to previous findings in the literature to seek
complementarity and to ascertain convergent, unique, or divergent findings in relation to
what is known in the literature.
Study Rigor
Rigor or credibility of the study was established by ensuring the researcher’s ability to
capture the perspective of the medical-surgical staff nurse and nurse leader and portray that
perspective (Milne & Oberle, 2005). Strategies to increase rigor included ﬂexible yet systematic
purposive sampling, ensuring participants had the freedom to speak, participant driven data, data
triangulation, ensuring accurate transcription and data-driven coding, and on-going attention to
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context (Milne & Oberle, 2005). Rigor within a qualitative descriptive study occurs when the
researcher is able to describe data at the surface while capturing all the elements of an experience
(Milne & Oberle, 2005). This was accomplished by selecting participants who provided in-depth
information, sampling until data saturation was reached, and validating the final analysis with
several participants. Rich description, validated by participants, made sure the findings were
transferrable between the researcher and participants (Creswell & Poth, 2018).
Trustworthiness was ensured through bracketing the investigators personal bias and
obtaining final feedback from participants (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The researcher kept a
personal research journal to document the experience and discussed feelings and perceptions
with the dissertation committee chair weekly to manage personal biases during data collection
and analysis. For example, recognizing what is known in the literature, the journal helped the
researcher ensure an inductive coding process. Methodological triangulation by using two
participant groups and using multiple data sources including interviews, observations, key
document review, and the literature helped enrich an understanding of the complementarity and
dissonance both in language and in perspective within and between the two groups. Theoretical
triangulation involved comparing the findings to previous safety culture framework findings.
Investigator triangulation occurred by the researcher and dissertation chair agreeing on the
findings. An analysis protocol strengthened the results of this study by ensuring transparency
and replicability of the analysis.
Timely transcription, re-reading, and comparing transcribed data to audio recordings
were conducted to ensure the accuracy of capturing the participants’ experiences and
perceptions. In addition, the dissertation chair validated transcripts and themes to improve

82
credibility of the interview process, observational process, and data analysis. Auditability was
ensured through an extensive, detailed audit trail kept by the researcher.
Fittingness or transferability will be determined by the reader. Rich description allows
the reader sufficient detail to allow the reader to determine transferability (Creswell & Poth,
2018). The results of the study will be shared with staff nurses at the shared governance council
and the facility nursing leadership team. The results will be published with careful attention to
ensuring confidentiality of participants and the study site.
Ethical Considerations
There were several ethical considerations that were planned for if encountered during this
study. The participants could have experienced a fear of retaliation limiting participation or
information shared. This was addressed by ensuring confidentiality and conducting interviews in
a private location chosen by the participant. Participant names were replaced with pseudonyms
on all recordings and transcripts. To protect confidentiality, staff nurse results were combined
into a general staff nurse grouping to limit the ability to trace results to an individual unit. All
nurse leader results were combined into a general nurse leader grouping.
The researcher could have learned about threats to patient safety or nurse safety during
interviews; however, no active unresolved threats to patient or nurse safety were identified. The
researcher reminded the participants not to disclose any patient-specific identifiers to ensure the
confidentiality of the patient when describing experiences with patient safety. Interviews could
have elicited negative emotional responses from participants that would have required employee
assistance program referral. Although interviews elicited emotional responses from participants,
no referrals were needed.
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Several steps were used to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the data. Audio
recordings were downloaded on a password protected computer. Data was entered as quickly as
possible and tracked on the activity log. Paper copies were stored in a locked fire and water
resistant box. Audio recordings and paper copies will be destroyed, per IRB protocol, after
transcription, data validation, and publication of dissertation.
Another ethical consideration and limitation of the study was the research occurred
simultaneously while the researcher was employed as a vice president of quality role that
oversees overall system quality at the healthcare system corporate level. The researcher is
located in an office located over 10 miles away from the study site and is not in a role of direct or
matrixed authority to the participants. The researcher had limited contact with staff nurses
within the specific hospital setting. Only one staff nurse identified awareness of the researcher
and the researcher’s role in the organization. The researcher had occasional contact with several
nurse leaders in an informal manner without authority in a supportive, consultative manner as a
professional colleague. The researcher lacked decision making authority within the nursing
division. While this could have created a sense of trust and willingness to share information, this
may also have created bias in the data provided by the participants (Angrosino, 2007). This may
also have caused the researcher to bias interpretations of the data. To address this threat, the
dissertation chair reviewed transcription, coding, and analysis of the first three interviews and
observations, as well as a random selection of subsequent data to validate non-biased analysis.
In addition, weekly meetings and journaling encouraged sharing of perceptions and experiences
to reduce researcher bias.

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The research method and design to support the purpose of this study were described in
the previous chapter. This chapter provides a description of the contextual environment in which
the participants were working at the time of the study. Detailed participant characteristics are
also described. Next, the results of the following research questions are presented: (1) What do
medical-surgical staff nurses describe as their safety culture experiences in caring for medicalsurgical patients? (2) What do the nurse leaders describe as their safety culture experiences
within medical-surgical units? (3) What are the similarities and differences of medical-surgical
staff nurses’ and nurse leaders’ experiences with safety culture?
Description of Medical-Surgical Unit Environment
There were five medical-surgical units within the hospital serving adult patients with
medical or surgical needs. The units each had 24 private patient rooms. The medical-surgical
staffing structure and processes designed to facilitate safe care will be described. Finally, the
impact of COVID-19, which occurred during data collection, will be described.
Medical-Surgical Staffing Structure
Patients on medical-surgical units received 24 hour, 7 day a week care by staff nurses.
There were 115 staff nurses considered core staffing working within one of the five designated
medical-surgical units. Staffing was supplemented by a designated medical-surgical float pool
consisting of approximately 150 staff nurses who provided nursing services across two regional
84
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medical centers. The float pool staff nurses were assigned daily to units based on staffing needs
and individual nurse competency.
Certified nursing assistants (CNA) and licensed practical nurses (LPN) were support staff
who assisted staff nurses in providing basic care such as bathing and ambulation. LPNs were
licensed to administer medications to patients. Administrative assistants (AA) provided support
with computer order entry, managed phone calls, greeted visitors, prepared charts, and
disassembled charts upon patient discharge. The medical-surgical staffing model determined the
number of staff nurses and support staff based on the number of patients on the unit as displayed
in Table 6. The staff nurse and support staff to patient ratios for each unit was determined
through consultation with a national comparative benchmarking agency.
Table 6. Medical-Surgical Staffing Model
Patients per
Support Staff6-8

AA

Days: Unit A,C,E

Patients per
Staff Nurse
4-5

Days: Unit B,D

3-4

6-8

0

Nights: Unit A,C,E

6

Up to 12

1

Nights: Unit B,D

3-4

Up to 12

0

1

Each shift had an assigned charge nurse. The charge nurse role was filled by trained staff
nurses or clinical team leads. The clinical team leads were a core group of staff nurses who
performed as charge nurses, took patient assignments, and supported some management
functions such as staffing and scheduling, audit follow up, incident report follow up, and
education support for new policy or process changes. Charge nurses were responsible for
staffing, quality nursing care, and patient flow ensuring timely admissions and discharges during
their dedicated shift. Charge nurses described having either no assignments, partial assignments,
or full assignments. However, they described having full patient assignments more often than

86
not. Charge nurses made nursing assignments based on unit census, nurse staffing, and nurse
competency rather than a patient acuity system.
The medical-surgical units were supported by a nurse manager (n = 4) with two units
sharing one nurse manager. Nurse managers were responsible for the daily business and nursing
operations within a designated unit. The nurse managers were supported by supervisors or
clinical leads as described above. Supervisors were responsible for the same duties as clinical
leads; however, they did not take patient care assignments. There was one nurse director
responsible for nursing operations within the hospital. The house supervisor was a new role at
the facility designed to offer nurse leadership on the night shift and weekends. This role was
vacant; however, on occasion coverage was provided by a house supervisor from another
hospital within the system. Nurse managers rotated call to support staff nurse escalations during
night shift and weekends. Escalations included difficult staff and patient situations, conflicts
with the plan of care, and any situation that may negatively impact staff or patient safety that
can’t be resolved by those working.
Hospitalists were the attending physicians responsible for the care of the medical-surgical
patient while admitted to the hospital. Hospitalists were supported by advanced practice nurses.
Although hospitalists provided the majority of the medical care on the medical-surgical units,
some surgeons and physicians chose to serve as the attending physician responsible for providing
medical care for medical-surgical patients. For example, an oncologist may provide medical
care to their patients while admitted to a medical-surgical unit in the hospital or delegate medical
care to the hospitalist. However, when a patient medical emergency arises in the hospital, the
hospitalist was authorized to administer care for the safety of the patient.
Patients also received care from other disciplines to support their plan of care. Some of
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those other disciplines included respiratory therapists, dieticians, care managers, phlebotomists,
pharmacists, wound care nurses, and rehabilitation and therapy services.
Process Designed to Facilitate Safe Care on Medical-Surgical Units
Staff nurses have several processes to facilitate safe care. The processes included a unit
report, bedside shift report (BSR) with the off-going staff nurse, a brief huddle between the staff
nurse and their nursing support staff team, and accompanying physicians on daily rounds with
patients. Staff nurses had multiple processes available if they had safety concerns including
calling a rapid response team, code blue, staff assist, or security assist. There were also unit,
hospital, and system huddles to facilitate safe care.
Staff Nurse Processes to Facilitate Safe Care
Staff nurses worked 12-hour shifts that began at 0530 and 1730. The shift began with a
brief unit report attended by all staff nurses. Staff nurses described reviewing the patient census,
staffing, and patient safety concerns. Patient safety concerns were described as patients setting
off bed alarms, frequently using the call light, at risk for self-harm, impulsive, at risk for falling,
and high acuity. Staff nurses then proceeded to BSR to receive handoff on patient assignments,
perform a quick patient and environmental assessment, and incorporate the patient into the plan
of care for the day. Staff nurses then conducted a brief report with their teams, consisting of
their assigned LPN or CNA nursing support staff, to share important information, safety
concerns, and develop a plan to keep patients safe.
During their shift, staff nurses attended daily required physician-patient rounds when they
were available or requested to participate. While there were no policies, standard procedures, or
expectations for staff nurses to accompany physicians on patient rounds, staff nurses described
some physicians actively requesting the staff nurse to participate in patient rounds. However,
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they described times when the staff nurse was busy with another patient, off the unit with a
patient, at break, or unaware the physician was on the unit, preventing them from accompanying
physicians on patient rounds. Staff nurses described more often than not, the patient informs the
staff nurse a physician rounded without the staff nurse’s knowledge.
Finally, several interventions were available to staff nurses to facilitate safe care. A staff
nurse may call a rapid response team (RRT) if they have any immediate concerns about a
patient’s condition. A RRT is paged overhead and brings a hospitalist, intensive care unit (ICU)
staff nurse, and respiratory therapist to the patient’s bedside. Staff nurses may also call a code
blue for an immediate medical emergency. A code blue brings the same help as a RRT,
however, if available, an anesthesiologist, ICU physician, and pharmacist also respond. Staff
nurses may call a staff assist when they need extra hands to help move or ambulate a patient to
prevent harm to the staff nurse and patient. Finally, a security assist can be called if a staff nurse
or any member of the healthcare team feels their own safety may be in jeopardy. A security
assist will bring a member of the security team to the bedside.
Unit, Hospital, and System Huddles to Facilitate Safe Care
At around 0800, Monday through Friday, the unit nurse manager conducted a unit safety
huddle on their respective unit. Safety huddles on the unit were observed being led by the nurse
manager, charge nurse, or clinical lead at the charge nurse desk with unit staff nurses and support
staff. All staff nurses and nursing support staff participated in safety huddles unless there was a
patient care priority. For example, if a staff nurse had to take a patient for a diagnostic test
prohibiting participation in huddles. Unit safety huddles took approximately 15 minutes. Unit
huddle agendas prompted nurse leaders to proactively ask for safety concerns with patients,
processes, equipment, or anything in the environment. Information discussed varied by unit,
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however staff shared their patient and staff safety concerns for the day. For example, a staff
nurse described concerns with taking an unstable patient for a diagnostic MRI. The nurse
manager made sure the staff nurse had support and described she would bring the concern to the
facility huddle to coordinate a safe process. The follow up process was witnessed. The nurse
manager asked everyone to help “keep an extra eye” on the staff nurse’s patients when she was
off the unit. Some managers reviewed policy updates and organizational updates during their
unit safety huddle. For example, a nurse manager was quizzing the staff nurses on the policy to
reduce bloodstream infections by asking how often central line dressings and tubing had to be
changed. This policy was reviewed. Although the huddles occurred on day shift, some
managers described coming in early once or twice a week to communicate in person with the
night shift. This process was validated by night shift staff nurses. Information discussed was
also shared by managers at regularly scheduled staff meetings or through either weekly or biweekly newsletters and emails to the unit staff. The newsletters that were reviewed by the
researcher contained safety tips, policy changes, safety incident report trends, and follow up from
concerns raised during huddles.
Following the unit safety huddle, nurse managers met in a hospital conference room at
0830 during the week with the other hospital department and executive leaders for the facility
safety huddle. The huddle started with a member of the quality department sharing the number
of days since the last preventable patient safety event that resulted in death, physical injury, or
psychological injury to a patient. The director of nursing followed a standard agenda to facilitate
the discussion and share system safety information. For example, she shared the system plan to
reinforce appropriate wearing of personal protective equipment to protect staff from COVID-19.
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The unit leaders shared findings and concerns from their unit safety huddles and worked together
to create plans if unit concerns involved other departments or disciplines. For example, the
medical-surgical nurse manager collaborated with the manager of diagnostic imaging to
coordinate a safe plan to complete the MRI for the high risk patient identified at the unit safety
huddle. Another nurse leader identified a high risk medication that was found stored in the
wrong drawer of the automated medication dispenser. Although pharmacy was checking all the
dispensers to ensure appropriate dispensing of medications, nurse managers were instructed to
inform their staff nurses to pay attention to medications removed from the dispenser to prevent
errors. The unit or department manager was expected to bring learnings and communication
from the facility huddle back to their respective units or departments.
At 0905, an executive leader from each of the seven hospitals, clinics, transitions of care,
and key system support areas including lab, pharmacy, rehabilitation services, regulatory,
security, clinical engineering, infection prevention, and a member of the system executive team
participated in a system safety huddle phone call. A member of the quality department started
the telephone meeting by sharing the number of days since the last preventable death or harm to
a patient and details of any new preventable deaths or harms to patients. Each facility reported
out any safety concerns or learnings from their facility safety huddles. Leaders coordinated
across the system if a safety concern impacted multiple facilities. For example, a piece of
equipment had been recalled, therefore the clinical engineering department shared the
information and asked each facility to remove the recalled equipment immediately and report out
on the next system safety huddle call that all recalled equipment was successfully removed.
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Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic
Four participant interviews were conducted prior to the COVID-19 pandemic becoming a
national and organizational focus. Although the hospital did not experience a surge in COVID19 patients during data collection and preliminary analysis, the organization enacted several
measures in preparation for a COVID-19 patient surge after the March 13, 2020 Federal State of
Emergency declaration in response to COVID-19 ("Proclamation on Declaring a National
Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease Outbreak," 2020). The hospital
implemented the winter influenza visitor restrictions and screening of all staff and visitors
entering the building for COVID-19 symptoms. Although staff received annual training on how
to properly don and doff personal protective equipment (PPE) to prevent self-contamination, a
heightened awareness and reinforcement of proper donning and doffing techniques to protect
staff from self-contamination became a priority. The researcher observed nurse managers at
unit safety huddles share what the organization was doing to prepare for a COVID-19 surge,
however there were few if any questions posed by the staff nurses during safety huddles. The
few questions were validating visitor restrictions and appropriate PPE. At the beginning of April
the organization assigned one medical-surgical unit as the dedicated COVID-19 unit in the event
of a surge, however a surge was never experienced during data collection, analysis, or initial
validation. The hospital experienced the beginning of a surge of COVID-19 patients during final
validation with several participants.
Participant Characteristics
Participants included 16 staff nurses and 10 nurse leaders. Detailed participant
characteristics are displayed in Appendix L. An overview of participants will be described.
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Staff Nurses
Of the 16 RN staff nurse participants, (hereafter staff nurses), 87.5% (n = 14) were
female and 12.5 % were male (n = 2). Hospital gender data was not available, however gender
was consistent with the most recent bi-annual state RN demographic survey indicating 92.5% of
all RN’s working in any field were female compared to 7.5% male. There were variations in
nurse experience, education, shift, and hours worked. Staff nurses ranged in age from 25 – 43
years old. Staff nurses all worked in their current unit since they started working at the hospital.
Years of experience as a staff nurse ranged from 7 months to 12 years. There were slightly more
staff nurse participants with a bachelor’s degree in nursing (75%) compared to the rest of the
hospital (62%) and the state (47.5%). This can be explained by an organizational initiative that
financially supported staff nurses to earn a bachelor’s degree in nursing in support of the IOM
recommendation to increase the number of RNs with a bachelor’s degree in nursing by 2020
(IOM, 2010).
Nurse Leaders
All 10 nurse leaders were female. The most recent state bi-annual survey indicated
females were more prominent in nurse leadership roles (92.7%) than males (7.7%). Nurse
leaders were younger (39.4 years) than the state average (44.7 years), ranging from 28 – 62 years
of age. Nurse leaders also had a higher percentage of bachelor’s degrees in nursing (90%) and a
lower percentage of master’s (10%) and associate degrees (0%) in nursing compared to the state
bi-annual survey data indicating leaders had a bachelor’s degree in nursing (48.4%), associate’s
degree in nursing (36.4%), and a master’s degree in nursing (10.3%). The minimum of a
bachelor’s degree in nursing was a requirement for a nurse leader role at the facility. The range
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of years nurse leaders were RNs was between 5 – 30, and years as a nurse leader ranged from 221.
Although nurse managers (n = 5) worked during the day shift, they were available to their
staff nurses on off hours and weekends by telephone. Several units had nurse supervisors (n = 4)
who did not take patient assignments that were included in the nurse leader sample.
Staff Nurse Results
The following results answered the research question describing medical-surgical staff
nurse safety culture experiences in caring for medical-surgical patients. The staff nurse
experience is described in six themes including: Time to “know my patient” to keep them safe,
“using my gut” and nursing interventions, extra eyes on the patient, not always having what is
needed to provide safe care, organization prioritizes patient safety, and learning: “Have our
backs.” Subthemes are presented within each theme to support the meaning of the theme
through rich description (Figure 5). Within each theme, subthemes are bolded and italicized.

Figure 5. Staff Nurse Results
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Time to “Know My Patient” to Keep Them Safe
The theme time to know my patient to keep them safe is defined as the process of
obtaining information about the patient and using nursing intuition, guided by experience, to
understand the patient’s risks and keep them safe (n = 16). Staff nurses’ subthemes described
needing time to “know my patient” by reviewing the electronic medical record (EMR), “getting
eyes on my patient” through bedside shift report (BSR), bedside risk assessments supported by
“going with my gut”and frequent rounds to understand patient health and safety risks. “I think
it's really knowing the patient, the individual patient, and then identifying risks in that patient
depending on what they are here for” (RN02).
Providing safe care required “having the right amount of time to take good care of the
patients” (RN01). Time emerged as the most significant barrier to “know my patient.” When
staff nurses did have the right amount of time this allowed them to:
Look at the chart to understand the whole picture, spend time talking with the patient to
understand more than their physical symptoms, and being able to do all our medication
checks and put into place the interventions such as bladder scanning every eight hours if
they [the patient] is not voiding and doing vital signs as we should be. (RN01)
Time to “Know My Patient” by Reviewing the EMR
The subtheme time to “know my patient” by reviewing the EMR is defined as resources
and processes that staff nurses used to obtain information about their patient’s history and status
that facilitated determining patient risk. Reviewing the patient’s history in the EMR helped staff
nurses know their patient because the EMR is the “hub to gather the information you need”
(RN02). “When I come in I sit down immediately and start looking up my patients and wait for
the off-going nurse to give me report” (RN04). “I review the whole chart as much as I can from
vitals, to I’s & O’s, to mentation” (RN05). In addition to vitals, staff nurses reviewed doctor’s
notes and the patient’s history and medications. Time to sit down and look at the chart before
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they do their assessment helped staff nurses prepare for interactions with the patient or family.
When they had time to review the EMR “then I'm prepared when I come in so if a family
member or the patient asks me questions I’m not trying to dig through their chart while I'm
trying to do their assessment” (RN02). Reviewing the EMR was beneficial when the staff nurse
couldn’t depend on the patient to share their history because of cognitive impairments such as
“confusion because they can’t communicate with me.”
Staff nurses didn’t always have time to review the EMR because the “computers are so
slow” and they had to meet the off-going staff nurse to receive bedside shift report. It was also
“hard to review everything when I have a full team of 3-4 patients” (RN05). The EMR was a
source to gather the patient’s history, however there were times when information was inaccurate
or missing. Information was missing from the EMR because outside records from clinics or
agencies may be on paper or in a different hospital EMR and the staff nurses can’t see it causing
potential unsafe care. For example, RN01 discovered a situation that would have caused a
patient to receive a double dose of antibiotics, “we actually had duplicate antibiotic orders put in
because they [the physician] didn't know they [the patient] had already gotten them at the outside
hospital.” Although the EMR offered a synopsis of the patient’s history and clinical status, the
best way to know the patient and assess a patient was “being in the patient’s room and actually
interacting with the patient” because “you can look at the numbers all you want, labs, vitals but
going to see the patient with your eyes on that first assessment is what helps paint the picture”
(RN02).
“Getting Eyes on My Patient” through Bedside Shift Report
The subtheme “getting eyes on my patient” through bedside shift report (BSR) is defined
as a patient handoff process that allowed the oncoming nurse to conduct a patient assessment,
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environmental assessment, and a safety assessment with input from the off-going nurse and
patient to determine patient risk and understand the plan of care. “Getting eyes on my patient”
was one of the most important means of keeping patients safe because it allowed the staff nurse
to conduct a brief visual baseline patient assessment. Bedside shift report (BSR) helped staff
nurses “get eyes on my patient.” Staff nurses needed more time for “getting eyes on my patient”
to get to know their patient to understand their needs and risks.
After quickly reviewing the EMR, the staff nurse met the off-going staff nurse or the staff
nurse from the transferring department at the patient’s bedside to conduct BSR. BSR helped
staff nurses “get eyes on my patient” to “make sure I have the correct information and things in
place” (RN10). “Just laying eyes on your patient you can tell if they look really weak, medically
unstable, if they’re more of a safety risk” (RN03). Staff nurses shared “what happened over
night or during the day, this is what we did, make recommendations like hey that patient was
really jumpy overnight let’s put him on alarms and we’ll just continue that” (RN10). BSR also
established a baseline to help staff nurses identify a change in a patient’s condition. For
example, “you physically lay eyes on the patient while you’re both in there [on-coming and offgoing staff nurse] and verify yes this is how it’s looked or been the entire shift, or there’s been a
change all of a sudden” (RN11).
BSR also allowed the patient to be involved in their care. Staff nurses found it very
helpful to involve the patient in their care. “You’re going over the plan of care with the
patientnso everybody’s on the same page and there’s no surprises. They can listen to the plan
and how they are supposed to use their call light” (RN14). Involving the patient allowed patients
to “chime in and say you forgot this about me” and allowed them to share “their plan for today,
questions for the doctor, what they want to accomplish” (RN08).
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Staff nurses conducted their first environmental safety assessment during BSR. “When
you're in the patient’s room you can check to see that all those safety things are in place before
it’s noon and you’re like oh they don't even have a fall wristband or gripper socks on” (RN03).
Getting eyes on their patient early through BSR reassured staff nurses their patients were safe
before they got too busy. “If you don’t get eyes on them in the morning then it’s like is that my
patient, where did he go, what do they look like” (RN08).
BSR was helpful when nurses are doing it accurately. However, BSR was done
inconsistently. Not conducting BSR posed a safety challenge because staff nurses weren’t
“making sure we’re double checking orders or we have a full understanding and picture” before
taking over care of the patient (RN04). For example, “you can catch misses or make sure they
are breathing, fluids are running, or if they’re saying they are alert and oriented, you walk in and
they’re droopy or mumbled, OK when did this happen” (RN06).
There were many reasons for not consistently conducting BSR. Staff nurses working
various shifts described not wanting to wake up patients especially if “the patient was up all
night and they finally fell asleep” (RN05). BSR took too long and potentially caused staff nurses
to get behind early in the day because they could get stuck in the room if the patient needs
something. “Sometimes you go into a patient's room and you wake them up and you don’t have
enough staff to be in there all the time or they can suck you in for 45 minutes and you are trying
to get out” (RN06). Staff nurses also had limited time to conduct BSR. “We have technically a
half hour to give report and kick out the other nurse, so when you got nurses that are here for like
45 minutes or sometimes an hour after they are supposed to it’s like get out of here” (RN10).
Other reasons for not conducting BSR included: staff nurses don’t like it or are not comfortable
doing it in front of the patient; the patient may not want it; staff nurses don’t want to share
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confidential information or unknown diagnoses in front of the patient; the patient is in isolation;
or the patient is confused. BSR didn’t always happen when a patient was being transferred from
other departments within the hospital due to “workflow challenges because they are busy and
trying to move patients out of their departments” (RN11). For example, a potential patient safety
issue occurred when a patient was transferred to the floor from a procedure without bedside shift
report between the two departments.
A patient returned from a procedure. No communication was given to the staff that the
patient was up on the unit. The patient was left on the gurney, not even the regular bed.
Rails up, no lights on in the room, no call light given to the patient, and the patient was
just left there. They just had an amputation, a fresh surgical wound, needing post-op vital
signs. The nurse bringing the patient up from surgery had called to the floor to say I’ll be
coming shortly with the patient but never actually let anyone know that they had brought
the patient back up. (RN04)
Bedside Risk Assessments Supported by “Going With My Gut”
After reviewing the EMR and BSR, staff nurses needed time at the patient’s bedside to
conduct risk assessments including “head to toe assessments” and risk screens. The subtheme
bedside risk assessments supported by “going with my gut” is defined as combining physical
assessments and risk assessments embedded in the EMR with nursing judgment to determine the
patient’s health and safety risk to guide nursing interventions. “Making sure I’m doing risks
screens for fall risk, skin, head to toe assessments, looking to see if anything changed for them
that I need to get a provider for” (RN04). Head to toe assessments identified a change from a
patient’s baseline. However, individual patient factors such as behaviors that were “combative
and aggressive because you need to keep a safe distance” prevented staff nurses from conducting
a thorough assessment (RN10).
Risk screens provided an electronic patient risk score alerting staff nurses of their high
risk patients when combined with nursing judgment, guided appropriate nursing interventions to
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keep patients safe. “There are fall risk screens we go through within two hours of our shift that’s
supposed to help us decide who’s a fall risk” (RN08). For example, risk screen scores guided
nursing interventions to “ensure they have interventions in place for fall risk, for their skin when
we’re doing the Braden scale, venous thromboembolism (VTE) risk” (RN06). Risk screens were
conducted throughout the patient stay to determine a change in patient risk. “We look over and
document whether it’s [risk screen] on admission or a change in circumstance, like an RRT or
code, a transfer from another floor or procedure, so maybe before they weren’t a fall risk, but
now they are” (RN10). Staff nurses continuously assess and reassess their patients for safety
risks throughout their shift.
“Going with my gut” was supported with nursing experience and judgment to supplement
assessments that more accurately identified patient safety risk. For example, “I have something I
call the eyeball test, [pointing to stomach area] and if you don't pass it you’re in trouble. I might
not know what's wrong but I see something is wrong. That triggers me to look into what could
be causing issues” (RN02). Going with my gut was necessary because risk screen results had the
potential to conflict with nursing judgment, causing staff nurses to over or under-utilize nursing
interventions.
You do the screen and I’ve looked over it three times and I'm like nope. If they’re greater
than 50 then they are considered the greatest fall risk and I've had a patient where they
are consistently scoring a 35 but when you physically look at them, you are like this
patient is going to fall. Sometimes that score doesn't actually match up with how they’re
presenting. (RN03)
Risk assessments had a potential to provide a false sense of safety for the patient because
they were “just a point in time” and couldn’t “reliably predict a fall” (RN11). For example, a
patient with a low fall risk score “randomly fell by passing out in the bathroom. That couldn’t
have been predicted because it was a sudden condition change” (RN11). Risk screens, at times,
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prevented the development of critical thinking because staff nurses “focus on the score and don’t
use their critical thinking” (RN03). Risk screens that conflicted with nursing judgment created a
challenging situation because staff nurses weren’t sure if they should follow the intervention
embedded in a legal policy or use their judgment to keep the patient safe.
If for instance the patient comes in and they use a walker at home but they’re independent
at baseline they get scored higher on their fall risk screen because they use a walker but
that doesn't mean that they’re unsafe with the walker. So they may score high enough to
require a floor mat in the room, a low boy bed, a whole bunch of interventions that they
may not necessarily need just because the risk screen says they need it. (RN04)
Although staff nurses needed time at the patient’s bedside to get to know their patient and
complete assessments, they didn’t always have time because they “are so busy and have so much
to do” (RN01). Inadequate staffing and workload contributed to being too busy. Interruptions
also contributed to not having time for “getting eyes on my patient” and is why it was so
important to get eyes on the patient first thing in the morning before the interruptions caused by
phone calls, patients talking, and getting patients ready who are going for tests began.
Frequent Rounds
The subtheme frequent rounds is defined as a process nurses used throughout their shift,
whenever they have extra time, by walking the halls and going into their patient rooms to check
on them and make sure they were still safe. This allowed staff nurses to continue to get to know
their patient by talking with them to provide and reinforce education. Frequent rounds allowed
staff nurses to “get eyes on my patient” and “make sure they’re still where I left them” (RN13).
Staff nurses rounded every two hours on nights and hourly on days to “make sure the patient’s
breathing, the room is safe, alarms are on, you hear moaning, someone’s in pain, you hear
wrestling, you prevent a fall if they’re trying to get something in the dark” (RN13). Frequent
rounds kept patients safe because ”we go into the room, check the environment making sure it is
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safe, ask if we can get them anything so they have everything right by their side so they don’t
have to reach and then fall out of bed” (RN08). Staff nurses checked equipment and looked for
safety interventions in place during frequent rounding. “I press a button to make sure the bed is
in the lowest position. I look for floor mats, yellow socks, and their call light is in place”
(RN16).
Frequent rounds allowed staff nurses time to talk with the patient to get to know them
throughout their shift. Staff nurses liked being able to talk with their patients. “I love talking to
patients, I love getting to know them” (RN10). Patients were the best source of information
because “they know themselves and their body better than anyone” (RN11). Talking to patients
allowed staff nurses to pick up on cues they wouldn’t otherwise see.
“You get to know them a lot when you sit and talk with them. If a patient is telling you I
don't feel right, something is not right. A lot of times we can step in and prevent
something from happening before even the systems trigger from EPIC” (RN12).
Patients “have the right to be involved in their care” (RN09). Involving the patient in their care
helped “make sure everyone is on the same page” (RN14). Patients served as “another set of
ears” to provide “input into the safety of their care by letting us know if we missed something or
correcting us if we are wrong” (RN13).
Staff nurses involved patients in their care by making sure they were educated throughout
the shift because sometimes they don’t understand why they are considered a risk. For example,
“they will say I was at home walking fine, well maybe but it’s a different situation when you’re
here for a heart condition that causes you to become dizzy or lightheaded” (RN10). Therefore,
“reiterating” and “reinforcing” the risk to the patient and family facilitated involving them in
their care (RN10). Involving patients helped prepare patients for discharge. “Sometimes we’re
going to send people home on antibiotic treatment or whatever so just having them understand
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why we’re doing what we’re doing” helped prepare them for a safe discharge (RN01).
Continuity of care assisted in getting to know my patient because “when you have the same
patients over and over you build rapport that helps make better decisions because you know the
patient, their plan of care, why they’re here, and what may or may not make them safe” (RN10).
Staff nurses wished they had more time, uninterrupted time, to spend with each
individual patient to get to understand more than just the physical symptoms they’re having. For
example, a day shift nurse with 10 years experience explained the impact of not having time to
get to know a patient.
When I was a nurse starting out you really liked the one on one time you would get. You
would hear stories of the war times and their past history. Now I don’t have time so
here's your pills and if you are lucky I will see you in an hour. I don’t think that’s
nursing at all. I think we should be able to pull up a chair and sit with them and talk to
them. What are your goals while you're here, what are your goals when you want to get
out of here, what can we do today to get you further to your goals? I don't know
basically anybody’s goals other than I want to get out of here. There's no bonding, there's
no communication. I mean I really miss that bonding with the patient. I just don’t think
we have time to do that. (RN08)
Staff nurses got to know their patients by reviewing the EMR. Then they “got eyes on
my patient” by conducting BSR. After getting eyes on their patient through BSR, they needed
time at the bedside to conduct risk assessments supported by their nursing gut to determine the
patient risk. Frequent rounds throughout their shift allowed staff nurses to keep “eyes on my
patient.” After having time to “know my patient to keep them safe”, staff nurses “using my gut”
and nursing interventions kept their patient safe.
“Using My Gut” and Nursing Interventions
Once staff nurses knew their patients, they applied their nursing judgment and nursing
interventions. The theme “using my gut” and nursing interventions is defined as evidence-based
standards of care that staff nurses applied in conjunction with their nursing gut, or intuition based
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on experience, to keep patients safe (n = 16). Staff nurses’ subthemes described appropriate
nursing interventions, alarms, warnings, checklists, and safety checks, and workarounds
facilitated safe care for the busy staff nurse. Time and staff nurses being busy emerged as a
significant barrier to putting nursing interventions into place.
Appropriate Nursing Interventions
The subtheme nursing interventions, defined as policies and protocols, were deemed
appropriate if they allowed sufficient autonomy for staff nurses to use their clinical judgment to
make safe decisions to keep the patient safe. Nursing interventions were designed to keep
patients safe by supporting autonomous evidence-based decision making backed by nursing
clinical judgment. Nursing interventions were developed by nurse leaders and staff nurses on
shared governance councils. Policies outlined “the standards of care in place for different skills
we have to perform” (RN01). For example, when reviewed, the medication administration
policy directed staff nurses to administer medications safely by following steps to administer
medications to “the right patient, right dose, right strength, right medication, right route, so you
don’t give someone a rectum med when it should be oral” (RN10). The fall risk policy, when
reviewed, guided nursing interventions based on the fall risk score. For example, patients with
higher fall risk scores received “yellow socks and floor mats to prevent falls” (RN03). Staff
nurses looked up policies when they were “looking to do a certain care like a chest tube or trach
that we don’t see that often” (RN03). Protocols were approved by physicians to allow staff
nurses to use their clinical judgment and “autonomy to put an intervention in place without
having to call the doctor for everything” (RN10). For example, the central line removal protocol,
when reviewed, allowed staff nurses to use “clinical judgment if we don’t think they need a
catheter anymore we have the autonomy to take it out on our own to prevent a bloodstream
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infection” (RN10). The foley protocol allowed staff nurses to attempt “straight cathing a patient
before placing a foley catheter” to prevent urinary tract infections (RN04).
Policies and protocols readily available at the point of care facilitated safe patient care
because staff nurses “can’t know everything all the time, but I need to know where my resources
are so that when an issues comes I can get the answer I need quickly” (RN02). If staff nurses
were unaware if a policy or protocol existed or they couldn’t find it “we use our experience or
what we remember, or we reach out to a coworker to help us find it” (RN04). Although policies
and protocols directed nursing interventions they weren’t always accessible or up to date, lacked
nursing input, conflicted with nursing judgment, individual patient factors made interventions
challenging to implement, and staff nurses lacked time to implement nursing interventions
creating potentially unsafe situations.
Although staff nurses relied on nursing interventions to keep their patients safe, nursing
interventions weren’t always easily accessible or up-to-date. A staff nurse with 5 years
experience knew where to find information in a timely manner because he knew where to look,
however “the search system isn’t intuitive, and many people [staff nurses] probably don’t know
what’s out there or where to look” (RN02). The nursing intervention search engine was also
slow and if a staff nurse needed to quickly pull the policy on providing “trach care you type in
trach and 17 different policies show up and maybe only one applies to you and half of them
haven’t been updated in 3-4 years, so how do you know which one you’re supposed to follow”
(RN03).
Nursing interventions may be confusing or hazardous because they “don’t have enough
staff nurse input” or may “conflict with nursing judgment” (RN06). Staff nurses described a
discrepancy in “what nurse leaders think is going on and what is happening on the frontline”
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resulting in the creation of nursing interventions that “add extra steps that won’t improve patient
safety” (RN06). For example, during a safety huddle observation, staff nurses expressed the
manager was “going too far to the extreme for safety” when the manager reviewed a 17-page
falls policy (RN12). Rather, the nurse explained that “bringing it back to nursing for staff nurse
input” would help because “the culture of safety for the higher ups doesn't translate very well,
there's not a lot of connection to nursing opinions or thoughts. Things are implemented really
quickly without discussion of how it will actually affect the floors” (RN12).
Nursing interventions designed without staff nurse input caused non-value added extra
steps that contributed to staff nurse busyness without any benefits to patient safety. When
nursing interventions are written to be so black and white, staff nurses had to do more or do less
than the patient needed to be safe. For example, interventions actually increased risk of harm,
specifically “fall mats create more of a tripping hazard for patients and staff nurses” (RN08).
Not only were they a tripping hazard they were an infection concern, “we are constantly picking
them up, which is gross, moving them to the side while people [patients] are getting out of bed to
work with therapy, IV poles get stuck on them, they are more of a hassle than they are worth”
(RN08). During a safety huddle observation, two staff nurses came out of a room giggling
because they both tripped over the floor mats. An example of non-value added extra steps was a
patient that was “20 years old and gets 20 points for having an IV not running or slipping on ice
6 months ago. I don’t think that’s a cause for falls [laughing]” (RN09). These scenarios
increased fall risk and the patient should have been “ad lib, instead we are supposed to have floor
mats and everything else” causing the staff nurse to provide extra care to an independent patient
(RN09). Over-utilizing interventions contributed to not having the resources needed such as
sitters.
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Nursing interventions were designed to keep patients safe by supporting autonomous
evidence-based decisions backed by nursing judgment. Nursing interventions conflicted with
nursing judgment at times because they were written “to be so black and white” (RN12).
“Sometimes the score doesn’t actually match up with how they’re [the patient]
presenting and it’s hard for people to sometimes use their critical thinking and get away
from the tool because it’s nice but it’s also not black and white. You can deviate from
that if you think your patient is a fall risk.” (RN03)
When nursing interventions are written to be so black and white, staff nurses had to do more or
do less than the patient needed to be safe. Staff nurses perceived nursing interventions as
“taking away from nurse discretion and it’s more laid out black and white but, it’s not always
black and white sometimes it’s grey” (RN12). This caused staff nurses to get “zoned in on the
number” and “won’t deviate from the score” to put the entire clinical picture together with the
patient to determine the safest interventions (RN02). For example, following the pain
assessment scale did not allow for nursing discretion and judgment. The patient had “been
taking ten oxy to finally get to a controlled pain level, but then you give five of oxy based on
their pain rating, their pain shoots back up and they have to wait another hour for their pain
meds” (RN12).
Nursing interventions rely on nursing judgment, however nursing judgment posed
challenges because “the individual [nurse] and how they go about things” or a lack of nursing
judgment (RN01). Variation in nursing judgment, or the way individual staff nurses go about
things, was caused by staff nurses not understanding the why behind interventions. “I think
sometimes when change is implemented it’s easier to accept when you understand the “whys”
(RN02). A lot of times the “whys aren’t fully explained and it just comes off as the organization
is making us do this” (RN09). This contributed staff nurses not following the nursing
intervention.
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A lack of nursing judgment was attributed to lack of experience. For example, a staff
nurse with 5 years experience attributed inexperience to a lack of nursing judgment because
“newer people don’t have critical thinking or are building it, they’re too scared to say they [the
patient] scored a 35 but I have all these interventions in place because I really think they're a fall
risk” (RN04). Staff nurses may also rely on the judgment of other staff nurses causing too many
or too few interventions. For example, an assessment was done “5 days ago” and “I’m walking
into the room not seeing what this patient needs to keep them safe, why weren’t we looking at
the risk screen and double checking, we’re trusting they [previous staff nurse] did their necessary
due diligence but we need to trust and also verify” (RN04).
Individual patient factors or patients not agreeing were barriers to implementing nursing
interventions. Individual patient factors including patient’s on a detox protocol, aggressive,
mentally disabled, cognitive issues like Alzheimer’s, dementia, or sundowners were challenges
to involving patients in nursing interventions. Staff nurses “worry about them falling or pulling
out their lines” (RN01) and “lack [of nursing] knowledge to care for these patient” were
challenges to implementing nursing interventions (RN04). Sometimes patients “think they can
do more than they can causing an unsafe situation” (RN14). Language barriers were challenging
because staff nurses needed “people to understand” and that is difficult if they “don’t speak
English or are mentally disabled” (RN15). Educating patients was challenging “because it takes
time and you want to make sure they understand so you can’t rush something like that” however
the staff nurse doesn’t have time to be in a room “for an hour” to reinforce education (RN10).
Sometimes patients didn’t agree with the nursing intervention or just didn’t do it. A night shift
staff nurse with 6 years experience “educates patients that don’t want to brush their teeth on how
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important oral care is when you have a central line, but some patients don’t care and won’t do it”
(RN14).
Staff nurses also didn’t have enough time to implement nursing interventions. Not
having time to implement nursing interventions was described by a rotating shift staff nurse with
2 ½ years experience. “I don't have the time needed to focus on the amount of care the patient
requires, it is not feasible, there’s just not enough time in a day” (RN01). Time barriers included
phones ringing constantly, patients talking, and just endless interruptions.
Lack of time prevented staff nurses from “doing our medication checks and putting
interventions such as bladder scanning every 8 hours or doing vital signs as ordered “(RN01).
Being busy because of the workload contributed to staff nurse inattentiveness or forgetfulness
causing staff nurses to “read orders wrong or not pay attention that a dose was already given”
(RN11). For example, staff nurses were “forgetting to unroll roller clamps so antibiotics didn’t
get infused on time” (RN11).
Alarms, Warnings, Checklists, and Safety Checks
The subtheme alarms, warnings, checklists, and safety checks is defined as system design
features within the environment or embedded in the EMR that provided alerts, guides, or forcing
functions to support safe decision making. These facilitated safely implementing nursing
interventions when staff nurses were too busy. They also alerted the staff nurse when there was
a situation increasing safety risk for the patient.
Alarms and warnings helped busy staff nurses prioritize and respond to safety risks.
Alarms included “bed alarms and chair alarms” that “may not prevent a fall but it gets us in
there” (RN16). Warnings were described as alerts in the computer that pop up to preventing
giving a narcotic too early, Rothman index or sepsis BPA [best practice alert], new lab results,
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critical lab results, and visual cues to help. Warnings helped prevent harm when there was a
lack of communication. For example, “an LPN will give pain medicine but won’t tell you and
you will try to give the pain medicine and the patient tells you I already had it. Now the EMAR
[electronic medication administration record] will tell you it’s not time to do it” (RN15). One
staff nurse cautioned that staff nurse reliance on alarms and warnings can impede the
development of nursing judgment:
They've taken away nurses’ discretion so much and they put these alarms in which I think
they're great because sometimes when you are pulled in different directions those alarms
do trigger and they save patients. With experience you just learn that and I think with
newer nurses they rely on those alarms because you don't necessarily know what those
signs are yet, you haven't seen it. So I think you rely on that because everything is
spelled out for you on the screen. I think people just rely a lot on it and aren’t able to
connect those dots on their own with those systems in place. (RN12)
Alarms had unintended consequences such as alarm fatigue creating a situation where
staff nurses don’t respond to alarms. Alarm fatigue occurred from staff nurses responding to
faulty alarms or over use of alarms because “we pretty much put everybody on a bed alarm”
(RN10). This contributed to alarm fatigue because “some of the interventions may be over used
to the point where nobody pays attention to them” (RN10). Alarms may also give a false sense
of security because staff nurses rely on them to keep patients safe but have found broken alarms,
faulty alarms, alarms not turned on because staff nurses were too busy and forgot, or because the
alarm was found to contribute to harm by agitating the patient.
Checklists helped busy staff nurses remember by identifying key interventions to keep
patients safe and “laying out accountability for what I need to do quickly on this patient”
(RN04). Checklists were “great reminders in all the craziness to remember to keep your eyes
and your mind focused” to provide safe care (RN03). Checklists didn’t always facilitate the
implementation of nursing interventions because staff nurses became “more focused on checking
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off the checklist” and “not focused on the interventions” (RN02). Staff nurses also checked off
items that were not completed which could pose a safety risk if they forgot to go back and
implement the intervention.
Safety checks also facilitated the implementation of nursing interventions because they
didn’t let the staff nurse proceed with an unsafe act. Safety checks such as the barcode scanning
system, dual sign off for high risk medications, and pain pump double verification prevented
unsafe acts when they didn’t allow the staff nurse to override the double check. Safety checks
required time and in certain cases finding another staff nurse to perform a dual verification. Staff
nurses didn’t always have “time to do double checks” because “everyone is so busy it’s not easy
to find that second nurse to double check” (RN10).
Workarounds
The subtheme workarounds, or short cuts, is defined as knowingly eliminating or not
following steps in an established policy or protocol. Staff nurses conducted workarounds to
provide safe care in a timely manner. Time barriers and nursing interventions developed without
staff nurse input placed staff nurses in a position to develop workarounds to get the patient what
they needed now. For example, a day shift staff nurse believed “we always have the best
intention of doing things to benefit the safety of the patient, but there are times when they [the
patient] needs something now and a 7 step process for doing something won’t cut it” (RN04).
When a patient needed antibiotics in a timely manner to treat sepsis, staff nurses had to complete
a cumbersome “22-step process” that required staff nurses to “walk four or five times between
the medication, IV pump, and patient to scan per policy” (RN04).
Staff nurses used workarounds because “at the end of the day things need to get done and
you need to find a way to get things done” because staff nurses were busy and need to save time
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or don’t understand the why behind the intervention” (RN02). Examples of workarounds to get
through all the work done by the end of the day included not scanning the IV or saline flushes,
not doing medication checks every time, not charting everything, and putting on an external
catheter because we don’t have time to get the patient to the bathroom. Staff nurses also
described how they “print extra patient labels or wristbands and leave it by the computer so they
can just go in the room and do the scanning and not wake the patient up” (RN09). Staff nurses
have “workarounds for anything” because “at the end of the day we need to get things done”
(RN02).
Staff nurses were aware they were “increasing the risk to the patient” but sometimes “the
process is not correct or you are either not understanding the reason or the reason isn’t good
enough” (RN02). Staff nurses rationalized a workaround as “I wouldn’t do it if I thought it could
potentially harm the patient” (RN01); “they don’t understand the purpose or what they are trying
to prevent” so they think they are removing steps that are not valuable (RN02); and “you should
skip something if you feel it’s safe to do so” (RN15).
Staff nurses described knowing their patient and understanding their risks. They then
used their gut and nursing interventions to keep patients safe. Then they described leaning on
others or escalating to get “extra eyes on the patient.”
“Extra Eyes on the Patient”
The theme “extra eyes on the patient” is defined as a process staff nurses used to get help
when they were in a situation that was outside of their expertise or when the patient’s condition
deteriorated requiring immediate assistance and additional resources from others to keep the
patient safe (n = 16). Staff nurses’ subthemes described staff nurses got “extra eyes on the
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patient” by leaning on others for their expertise and escalating to keep the patient safe. They
escalated when they weren’t getting what they needed for their patient.
Leaning on Others for Their Expertise
The subtheme leaning on others for their expertise is defined as a process in which staff
nurses leaned on each other for their expertise to get “extra eyes on the patient” when they were
in a situation they had not previously experienced. Staff nurses learned through experience and
“gathering experiences from other nurses and talking through with other nurses to try and think
of new things” (RN02). Having experts to lean on guided safe care for new nurses as they
gained experience. A staff nurse with 1 year experience described how he depended on others
with more experience to supplement his lack of experience.
A lot of the judgment for me comes from experience and talking to other nurses.
Sometimes I might see something and yeah I’ve seen this before let’s do this, other times
I’m like this is kind of murky what should we do and that’s when I lean on someone
when I’ve never seen it before and everyone is always just willing to jump in and help me
make that safe decision. (RN10)
Staff nurses “bounce ideas off each other” to “exhaust all our resources” before calling a
physician “so we don’t get doctors angry” by paging them with something that isn’t “pageworthy” (RN14).
Staff nurses not only relied on each other for their expertise, they also relied on their
charge nurses, clinical leads, nurse manager, and night shift supervisor when they had one. A
night shift staff nurse with 7 months experience “pulls on the lead charge nurse and manager for
extra eyes” if she doesn’t know something which helped her provide safe care because “I’m
never in a situation where I can’t ask anyone because I won’t do something that I’m not 100%
comfortable with” (RN15). Charge nurses and clinical leads conducted proactive rounds to get
extra eyes on patients to make sure they were safe. Through safety huddles and shift report they
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became aware of the high risk patients and challenging patient assignments allowing them to
“get extra eyes” on those patients and assignments. For example, a day shift charge nurse, “asks
each team for a brief summary of their patients, barriers for discharge, or high-risk patients
safety wise so we can keep a closer eye on them, listen for their alarms, or take a peek in the
room real quick” (RN03) to make sure they are safe.
However, the charge nurse, as a resource, was not always available because they were
busy helping someone else or having a patient assignment. Even though charge nurses had more
knowledge than less experienced staff nurses, a staff nurse with one year experience encountered
challenges with “being comfortable and able to collaborate with a charge nurse based on prior
experiences” (RN01). A prior negative experience included making a staff nurse “feel bad
because I should already know this” when they reached out for help (RN01). Some staff nurses
may not ask questions or may not know when they should ask questions. A day shift staff nurse
with 12 years experience felt safer when she was training newer nurses who “ask questions”
(RN05). She encouraged asking questions by sharing “we’re all learning every single day” and
she “worries about new nurses that don’t ask questions” (RN05). A day shift staff nurse with 1
year experience didn’t understanding at times when he needed extra eyes or “admitting you need
help” as challenges new nurses face (RN10).
Staff nurses leaned on other disciplines for their expertise. A day shift staff nurse reached
out to “the experts around me when you’re not the expert” (RN02). Those experts may be
pharmacists, physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech, physicians, quality coordinators,
nurse practice specialists or “anyone, there are a lot of experts in areas that can help you do your
job better” (RN02). A day shift staff nurse with 12 years experience leaned on pharmacists for
their expertise. “I don’t really know interactions with meds but the pharmacists are a great tool

114
and resources especially when we’re running IV drips and different IV medications. If I have a
question I'll call a pharmacist and they are always very helpful” (RN05).
Escalating to Keep the Patient Safe
The subtheme escalating to keep the patient safe is defined as a process staff nurses
employed to get different or extra resources at the patient’s bedside when they were facing
barriers in getting what they believed their patient needed or when their patient needed
something immediately, such as when a patient’s condition was declining. Staff nurses escalated
to nursing leadership or by calling a rapid response team (RRT). For example, “if we’re not
getting what we want there’s an escalation process, we can escalate to the lead, house supervisor,
it goes higher than that, it could go to the CNO but we have a nice process” (RN10). A night
shift clinical lead with 5 ½ years experience identified her role and challenges when staff nurses
escalated to her.
Anytime a patient is declining or [we’re] spending a lot of time [providing care], I page a
provider to see the patient and get stat orders, because this one [patient] is not doing well
and there can be barriers with physicians seeing the staff nurse’s perspective. (RN03)
When staff nurses were “seeing or hearing something they don’t necessarily agree with”
they went the next step “reaching up the scale to find the next person they can get to help”
(RN03). However, at times staff nurses “go to the charge nurse and the charge nurse says there’s
nothing I can do, they reach out to the manager, the manager is not available” (RN03). When
staff nurses were constantly escalating they began to “question themselves of do I need to take
the next step if no one else is finding it as important as I am” (RN03).
When a staff nurse had an immediate clinical concern they wouldn’t hesitate to call a rapid
response team (RRT) to get what the patient needed immediately. Staff nurses described calling
a RRT when they weren’t getting what they needed to keep their patient safe usually from an
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inadequate or lack of physician response. For example, a staff nurse with one year experience
called a RRT because she was worried about decline in the patient’s status and called to get
“more eyes on the patient” because “I felt like the doctor wasn’t too concerned” (RN01).
The staff nurse role as a patient advocate facilitated not hesitating to call a RRT. For
example, a day shift staff nurse with 2 years experience used to be afraid to call a RRT but no
longer hesitated because “if I need help I’m gonna get the help because everyone shows up,
everyone is there for you, doesn't matter whose patient it is, some provider is going to be there
and it's a great resource” (RN06). A day shift staff nurse with one year experience had a positive
experience calling a RRT for a declining patient.
The patient was septic and I wasn’t getting ahold of the doctor, so our sepsis protocol
allows us to call an RRT if we can’t get ahold of the doctor that’s taking care of the
patient. So that automatically got a hospitalist here, they ordered the labs that were
needed, they ordered the bolus of fluid, and you know we were able to at least make the
patient better for the mean-time. So my experience in helping other people with their
RRT it’s very good just to have that quick response of a doctor there. The admitting
doctor will always get a page that says that their patient is having a RRT. Just to get that
initial doctor, the more experienced personnel there, in a quick timely manner that always
will prevent a patient from declining too fast then something might happen like a code.
(RN10)
Sometimes staff nurses really pushed for advocating for the patient because others didn’t
agree with the staff nurse. The specialties can come in and say “why are you calling this, help
me understand what you feel like you need in this situation” (RN04). Staff nurses also received
“pushback from the ICU trying to understand why we feel like this patient needs to be escalated
to a higher level of care” (RN07). This can be challenging for staff nurses because “it doesn’t
feel good when you don’t have that backup support” (RN04). Experiences with getting scolded
or questioned for calling a RRT could have potentially caused staff nurses to delay or question
getting extra eyes on a patient in the future. For example, a day shift staff nurse with 12 years
experience noted “fear of the unknowns or a new nurse lacking confidence in their assessment
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skills or critical thinking just doesn’t know if they should call or not [a RRT]” because they’ve
heard “horror stories of times this nurse got yelled at or made to feel belittled or discredited” for
calling a RRT (RN05).
Negative experiences with calling a RRT caused confusion in staff nurses by sending
mixed messages. “If you are a new nurse you’re impressionable. We have things in place for
safety, a RRT, people will call but they will get scolded or reprimanded from different people
like why did you do this” (RN02). Other challenges when calling a RRT included a delay in
response from other disciplines because they’re busy. “They’ll just come strolling up, not in any
hurry and I’m calling a RRT because I need resources now” (RN16).
Staff nurses needed time to know their patient and understand their risks. They used their
gut and nursing interventions to keep patients safe. They leaned on others or escalated to get
extra eyes on their patients to keep them safe. They then described having what they needed to
provide safe care.
Not Always Having What is Needed to Provide Safe Care
The theme not always having what is needed to provide safe care is defined as a situation
when staff nurses didn’t have resources or relationships they relied on to provide safe care (n =
16). Not always having what is needed to provide safe care was described within the subthemes
included inadequate staffing contributes to unsafe care; supplies and working equipment are not
always available; we don’t always work together as a team; and “more respect from physicians
would be appreciated.”
Inadequate Staffing Contributes to Unsafe Care
The subtheme inadequate staffing contributes to unsafe care is defined as the perception
by staff nurses that the staffing model did not support the workload to keep patients safe.
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Staffing was identified as either the most frequently experienced challenge to providing safe care
or the main contributor to the most unsafe shift. “I would say at this point the general overall
consensus will always be staffing. I think that will always be a theme that comes through”
(RN04). This was observed during safety huddles when over 50% of safety huddles described
having to force over staff nurses for four hours due to staffing shortages or sitters not available
for patients who needed them. A nurse manager thanked two night shift nurses for being forced
over for four extra hours in addition to their already worked 12 hour night shift. One staff nurse
who was forced over was visibly concerned sharing about leaving a new puppy at home alone for
16 hours.
Charge nurses attempted to proactively plan for safe staffing by using a staffing
algorithm to determine staffing needs. It was helpful when “the shift before you says it was
really busy, I got you an extra support person or I made smaller teams” (RN03). Charge nurses
also attempted to create safe patient assignments by right sizing teams to distribute acuity across
the teams so “nurses with high acuity patients had smaller teams” (RN03). A day shift staff
nurse suggested right sizing teams doesn’t always occur. “I have had times where I have had the
easiest assignment, just the easiest, and one of my coworkers is drowning all day because they
drew the short end of the stick. I know I've advocated that this team needs to be split up”
(RN06). Charge nurses worked with staffing resources and bed placement to coordinate safe
staffing and patient assignment, however the process was described as frustrating at times for
charge nurses. “It’s frustrating when you talk to staffing and you give up a nurse for night shift
and hang up the phone and 15 minutes later you are getting two transfers” (RN09). Even with
proactive staffing, staff nurses didn’t always have the right staffing resources creating decision
challenges.
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There’s been a few times when our staffing hasn’t been even to where it is supposed to be
and we’ve had patients that had been confused and needed a sitter. We either pull the
staff that we have on the floor, helping all the call lights, helping all the other patients and
have them sit with the patient or we just try to do frequent checks. It puts you in the do I
do this and risk all these other patients or do I risk this patient and see if they are stable
enough or do I let the family in the room watch the patient, are they qualified to do that,
are they smart enough to do that, are they safe enough to do that? (RN08)
Staff nurses were put in an unfair situation when having to make decisions based on rationing
resources as they felt they were jeopardizing safe care. “There’s a lot of judgment calls that are
grey and if you don’t have the staff for it it’s your decision. I don’t think that’s fair and we
would be yelled at if the decision turned out poor” (RN08).
A day shift staff nurse felt “inadequate staffing set the tone for the day” and was “visible
the minute you step off the elevator” to start your shift when “call lights are in overtime and
you’re thinking you just know census is high, more patients and fewer nurses, then it feels like
it's not as safe” (RN05). A day shift staff nurse with 8 years experience felt high needs and high
acuity patients, lack of support staff, and the geographical placement of her patient assignment
contributed to her worst patient safety experience.
If I am looking at a full team of patients, they have multiple two assist or let’s say they
are a hoyer lift or even an easy stand, those all require multiple staff members to be
involved in that care. If I have someone who was a complete feed so that takes time and
you have to be in that room. Usually when they are a total feed they have a reason for
that, either they can't mechanically do it or there is something with their swallowing
that’s an issue. If I have patients who have significantly high risk medications that
they're running that can all add up to the acuity of the team. If maybe you were spread a
little thin if we don't have the support staff or a good ratio so two nurses maybe they are
taking half a floor. If my patients are distributed across a larger unit in multiple areas so I
have to run further distances to take care of them. If I am in an area that I can’t hear their
call light from across the unit that would be a concern for me. (RN05)
High needs patients and high acuity patients will be described.
High needs patients. High needs patients that posed a staffing challenge were confused,
combative, impulsive, detox because “they may pull their lines out or get hurt and we have to
constantly monitor them” (RN04). Physically hard to move, admissions “because there’s so
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much to do and a lot of documentation to answer all those questions” (RN02), incontinent
patients, and a complete feed posed challenges because they required time and staffing resources
that weren’t always available. Supplies to help manage incontinence saved staff nurses time and
were helpful to keep patients dry. Patients frequently on call lights consumed a lot of nursing
time. Patients that are on the call light every half hour and “you constantly go in there and
you’re like do you need anything else and they’re like no and you go sit down at the computer
and they’re already putting on their call light because now they need water. It’s timeconsuming” (RN04).
Staff nurses relied on support staff to assist with high needs patients. Support staff was
defined as either a CNA or LPN. Patient companions helped with impulsive patients. They were
“not CNAs but extra hands to help” (RN10). Having inadequate support staff made caring for
high needs patients challenging. Inadequate support staff occurred even when the unit was fully
staffed because everyone was busy. For example, a day shift staff nurse with 10 years
experience had a situation she will never forget:
I had a patient who fell and broke his head. The patient was very anxious and confused
and we were short staffed too or maybe the patient needed to be a one to one and he
wasn’t put on one at that moment, which it could happen if we were not short-staffed. It
was at the time we were doing meds, everybody was in a different room. I think that’s
what contributes more when everybody is in a different room. I think that falls happen
between shift change or when we’re giving meds, or the CNA’s are washing people and
nobody is on the floor, or the moment you can’t leave what you’re doing and run if you
hear a bed alarm because you’re trying to get another patient to the bathroom. So if you
leave that patient, that patient can fall. I guess sometimes it’s just inevitable. (RN15)
Inadequate support staff impacted staff nurse “ability to perform as a registered nurse
because I’m doing hygiene or getting them to the bathroom” (RN01). This left staff nurses
feeling unsupported and contributed to “missed interventions” and “feeling like a crummy nurse”
(RN10). When staff nurses didn’t have the support of a CNA or LPN they got “easily in over
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their heads” (RN10). “A lot of times you can’t do certain things like you want to walk them just
see how their ambulation is but if you’re so busy you just start prioritizing things and certain
things are always going to hit the bottom of the totem pole” (RN10). Extra staff to answer high
risk alarms and call lights were beneficial. Night shift staff nurses had unique challenges to
managing high needs patients because “higher staffing ratios on night shift” means they had “less
staff available to help compared to day shift” (RN13).
The time required to care for high needs patients impacted staff nurses’ ability to provide
the care they felt their other patients required. For example, when caring for a high needs patient
a staff nurse can be in their room “four or five hours of the day” and you finally get into a
different room and “it makes you feel like crap because I haven't been there for you all day, or
the sweetest patient ever and their light is in overtime for five minutes trying to just go to the
bathroom because no one’s available” (RN06).
High acuity patients. Patients requiring many interventions, intense monitoring, or were
borderline ICU status were described as high acuity patients due to the intensity and frequency of
nursing care delivered to keep them safe. “You can have one person firing for sepsis, one person
tanking, and most likely you have somebody getting a blood transfusion product. If you are
having a good day, you only have two people tanking at once” (RN08). Stable patients that “turn
into your heavy, most critical patient” posed a different challenge because the staff was not
prepared to handle the increased workload, especially “on night shift because we can’t call
anyone in to help” (RN11). A night shift charge nurse with 6 years experience shared the impact
of acuity changes. “Status changes quickly, they’re good then something happens because their
pressure goes way down, and now we’re doing drips things like that” (RN14).
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In addition to the increased amount of care high acuity patients required, staff nurses also
had to take the time to facilitate or negotiate getting the patient to a higher level of care.
Although a charge nurse described “doing a pretty good job of expediting patients out to a higher
level of care” (RN05) staff nurses didn’t necessarily agree. Sometimes patients couldn’t be sent
to a higher level of care because there were no beds or competent staff available to receive the
patients or the physician lacked capacity to see the patient because they were admitting a patient
or providing care to a high acuity patient. A full-time night shift charge nurse described the time
and effort it required when escalating to a physician that a patient required a higher level of care
as “trying to persuade somebody here’s all the evidence” (RN14).
There was a lack of consistent agreement on criteria for level of care between staff nurses
and physicians. “I don’t think the patient is safe for this floor but the physician does” (RN03).
Night shift staff nurses perceived physicians who “don’t want to pull the trigger on night shift
and then all of a sudden they get whisked to the ICU on day shift” (RN11).
Staff nurses also experienced the ICU not seeing the patient as sick as the medicalsurgical staff nurse did “giving pushback because they see higher acuity patients all the time”
(RN07). However, staff nurses also pushed back when they needed to because they felt they had
more knowledge of what the patient needed. This required them to have to push for
interventions because physicians don’t have as much knowledge as the staff nurse due to the
disproportionate time a physician spent with a patient compared to a staff nurse. A day shift staff
nurse described this as “pushing for something that you are seeing throughout your shift or
throughout your stretch of shifts that the doctor might not see in his five minutes of being in the
room” (RN06). A day shift charge nurse described lack of physician knowledge on what level of
interventions medical-surgical nurses can and can’t do on the floor because each floor is different
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as the barrier. “They don't know we have five patients. If you tell them I have four other patients
I can't be in this room all the time sometimes they're like then they do need that more
individualized care” (RN03).
The labor-intensive time spent with one or two high acuity patients created an
environment in which staff had an “inability to provide safe care to their less acute patients
placing their other patients at a safety risk because they won’t be able to get eyes on their other
patients” (RN06). This situation made staff nurses feel really bad. Inadequate staffing due to
high acuity patient demands also caused missed care because when there wasn’t enough staff
“falls happen, infections happen, you’re missing things, not giving good baths. I feel really bad
when I walk into a patient’s room and they didn’t even know I was still here” (RN06). A day
shift charge nurse with 8 years experience described the challenges with having high acuity
patients on the floor and her most unsafe shift because “I have four other patients to take care of,
maybe the doctors aren’t responding or we call a RRT and the patient ends up staying on the
floor, you still don’t have resources for five patients and one is acute” (RN07).
Supplies and Working Equipment are not Always Available
The subtheme supplies and working equipment are not always available is defined as a
situation when staff nurses didn’t have patient care supplies or working equipment used to
deliver or support care readily available at the bedside to keep the patient safe. Staff nurses
needed supplies and working equipment at the bedside to provide safe care. Staff nurses used
equipment such as low boy beds, hoyer lifts, bladder scanners, and pain pumps to provide safe
care. A day shift charge nurse described her safest shift:
Having all the correct supplies. Going into an isolation room there's gowns, there's the
big isolation garbage right next to the door, the stop sign is out. Having the correct
supplies at the bedside like in our servers and not having stuff missing. Having the gait
belt and the walker if it's an impulsive patient in case if they do start getting up without
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you they at least have that assistive device there. It’s not always the best for them to get
up without you but at least if they do it’s there. I think that’s when you just know it's
going to be a good day when you don't have to run all over the unit to find these things
when they are already set up for you when you walk in. (RN03)
A safe day was also “having the right syringes in the nurse sever readily available, briefs
readily available when I’m trying to change someone quickly if they are impulsive” (RN04).
Not having supplies at the bedside placed patients in an unsafe situation because “if I can’t get to
those supplies immediately they are at risk for falling before I can get them what I need” (RN04).
Staff nurses got the supplies and equipment they needed, however supplies and working
equipment were not always readily available at the bedside. For example, sometimes there
wasn’t enough equipment because “everyone is a fall risk” (RN10). “If I have a fall risk patient
coming in I have to search the entire floor for a chair alarm and sometimes when I’m busy I
don’t have time to do that” (RN16). Broken equipment put patients and staff at risk. For
example, hoyer lifts provided a safe mechanism to lift patients to prevent staff nurse and patient
injury, but “when we go to use them and their batteries are dead, they are not useable. Even
though there are eight machines, not one works” (RN08). Alarms not working or the inability to
distinguish where the alarm was coming from posed challenges for a timely response to the
patient. The control panel on the beds were often broken. Staff nurses needed supplies from
other departments sometimes causing an unsafe situation. There was a delay in receiving
medications due to internal safety check processes such as “needing lab or pharmacy to do their
checks before we can get a medication” (RN01) causing delays in treating patients. Searching
for equipment and supplies took nurses away from the bedside and patient care because they
“constantly go in and out of the rooms for supplies that aren’t at our fingertips” (RN02). This
created an unsafe patient situation.
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I can’t tell you how many times that they shuffled these things with no clinical input and
you can’t find the things you need when you need them. A patient who is in an emergent
situation but we can’t find stuff to start an IV, we can’t find tele pads to hook them up to
the defibrillator those things delay care. Someone is aspirating and they’re seizing and
we can’t find a working suction regulator, that causes issues. It comes down to
availability and accessibility. If we can’t find it when we need it, it doesn’t matter if we
have 500 of them sitting in our basement somewhere. (RN02)
We Don’t Always Work Together as a Team
The subtheme we don’t always work together as a team is defined as a situation when
staff nurses didn’t receive the help they relied on and needed from their colleagues to assist in
keeping patients safe. Working together as a team on the unit contributed to the best safety
culture experience. “The big thing is coworkers, especially on our floor, you become a really
tightknit group because you have to rely on each other for everything, I rely on my coworkers a
lot” (RN12). A night shift staff nurse with 1 year experience relied on “the people who are
around me, if you ask for help it’ll get done, I always feel like someone has my back and can
help me” (RN13). Working together as a team on the unit alleviated staffing and workload
challenges helping staff nurses get through the day. “The nurses on our floor are great. If you
get in a bind, you call anybody, they'll drop what they’re doing to help. If we didn’t have such
great nurses and everybody pulling their weight, it wouldn’t happen” (RN08).
Staff nurses “communicate and set expectations with my team” because “good teamwork
is communication” and without it “you can’t advance the patients plan of care” (RN10). Their
team consisted of either a CNA or LPN when they had one. Communication occurred by doing a
team huddle or a “brief huddle with my team and other nurses on the unit after the previous shift
leaves” (RN04). Team huddles helped a staff nurse understand “my team is this way, their team
is that way and we need to look out for each other” (RN04). Team huddles increased safety by
ensuring everyone knew the high risk patients on the floor and helped “identify important safety
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information missed during handover” (RN04). Team huddles also helped charge nurses set
expectations with the entire team. “We have high risk patients, I don’t want anyone to fall so
answer the call lights or fall alarms. That might not be your patient but that nurse might be
taking care of other patients or stuck in another room” (RN03). The huddle with their team
consisted of sharing with the CNA or LPN “how we are going to keep our fall risk patients safe,
who’s going to take turns sitting outside the room, somebody is impulsive so everyone knows
and is aware” (RN11).
Attitudes or the mood of co-workers impacted working together as a team predominantly
by day shift staff nurses. Attitudes that facilitated teamwork were described as a good work
ethic and a positive attitude. Conversely, attitudes and moods such as cranky, not open, and
negative were challenging. Co-workers with a crabby attitude were not perceived as available to
help others as well as deterred a staff nurse from wanting to help them. “As you walk into a day
and you’re the crabbiest person on earth you are not going to be a delight to work with. I know
you're not gonna help me, it's gonna make it harder for me to help you” (RN06).
Having an established relationship with or trust “with staff co-workers we’ve already
worked with” facilitated working together as a team because this allowed staff nurses to know
who is going to help out and who they can lean on and trust (RN05). A day shift staff nurse with
one year experience had to get to know people to build relationships and understand who would
work together as a team because “when I first started there was a few I was intimidated by”
(RN16). “Just getting to know them. I’ve been on the unit for one year working with the same
staff and nurses, you get to know them, their work ethic, the things they are good at and things
they struggle with” (RN16).
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Staff nurses relied on teammates that are willing to get up and help. Teammates that are
willing to get up and help allowed the staff nurse to remain and focus on a patient when they
were busy in a patient’s room and not worry if their other patients were unsafe. For example, “If
you have teammates that are willing to get up and move, if you're in a different room and you
hear a bed alarm going off you’re confident that somebody else is getting that bed alarm and you
can stay in the room” (RN03). However, this was not consistent and “sometimes she is worried”
so if she heard an alarm go off she would leave the patient she was caring for to go check on
another patient whose alarms was going off.
The most challenging day was “not having what I need from the rest of the team”
(RN04). The impact of not having the team working together was “more stressful, it definitely
adds a lot more stress. You walk on to the floor and you’re like okay well I guess I’m in this by
myself tonight [laughing]” (RN12). There were times when coworkers were unwilling to help,
especially if it wasn’t their patient. “That’s not my job” was a point of contention for staff
nurses (RN09). Most staff nurses were willing to answer other nurses’ call lights, however the
same few rarely will help.
Staff nurses were “being encouraged to confront people” who weren’t helping or
answering call lights by nurse leaders (RN16). They struggled with this because working
together as a team and answering call lights should be known expectations. For example, “when
I came here it was an expectation that when the light goes up I help out” (RN06). Two staff
nurses had challenges with having conversations with their co-workers if they were not working
together as a team because they wanted to maintain personal relationships. The difficult balance
between “wanting to be friends” and “needing to make sure everyone is doing their job” was
“hard to do” (RN03), however “doing it in real time is better.” A night shift charge nurse with 5
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½ years experience described a typical conversation as “hey I know 704 isn’t your patient but the
call light was in green and I walked by and you were sitting there, was there a reason that
prohibited you from helping to answer that” (RN03). She also acknowledged she wouldn’t have
been comfortable having those conversations when she was new.
A lack of follow up and accountability from nurse leaders caused staff nurses to believe it
was a “waste of time” for staff nurses to address co-workers who are not working together as a
team or answering alarms and call lights because “it’s the same people and their behaviors don’t
change” (RN06). “I know we’re all adults and we should be able to handle this in an appropriate
way, but it’s always the same people and you tell them over and over but it doesn’t change”
(RN16). There were many reasons attributed to preventing working together as a team on the
unit (Figure 6), busy and tired will be described.
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Staff nurses too busy or tired to work together as a team. Being busy was a barrier to
working together as a team due to “high acuity and not having extra hands to help out” (RN12).
Staff nurses were so busy with “their own list of a million things to do” that they couldn’t always
answer call lights or it would “put me behind” (RN09). Staff nurses “they’re tired, I’m tired”
prevented working together as a team because “we are just done” (RN08). Shift length and
number of shifts in a row contributed to being tired. “Twelve hour shifts can be a long time day
after day, a couple in a row, it’s exhausting” (RN08). Staff nurses were tired because of the
physical, mental, and emotional impact of providing nursing care. “When everyone leaves here
everyone is exhausted mentally, emotionally, physically. I am 32, I have a 45 minute drive,
some days when I got out of my car I can barely move, I have bursitis in my hips, my shoes are
worn out, it’s just physically demanding” (RN12). Not having staff available to help or nurses
that were new or new to the floor contributed to being busy and tired because “either they are
new or they’re not used to this floor or they just don't understand how to care for certain
patients” (RN10). Staff nurses would not lean on staff nurses they didn’t trust to “do the job to
my standards” (RN16).
“More Respect From Physicians Would Be Appreciated”
The subtheme “more respect from physicians would be appreciated” is defined as
disrespectful interactions between staff nurses and physicians that inhibited staff nurses from
providing safe care by increasing the staff nurse workload or by not incorporating the staff nurse
perspective into the plan of care. Although staff nurses worked collaboratively with many
different disciplines, they all specifically described a lack of respectful, collaborative
relationships with physicians as impacting their ability to provide safe care. Staff nurses felt
“more respect from the physicians would be appreciated.” Staff nurses responded by pounding
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their fists and rolling their eyes as they explained being frustrated when physicians were not
being there for the patient like they are there for the patient, as well as not respecting the staff
nurse’s knowledge about the patient and patient needs.
Be there for the patient like I’m there for the patient. Staff nurses expected
physicians “to be there for the patient like I’m there for the patient” (RN06). Staff nurses had to
“really push” physicians to “oversee and initiate” care for the patient (RN01). Staff nurses were
frustrated with feeling like physicians were relying on them to double check and remind
physicians to put in orders wondering who is “owning the buck here” (RN04). A day shift staff
nurse shared a post-procedure patient situation that really bothered her.
When the patient returned the orders were put in on the wrong patient, so I didn’t have
post-op orders, when that was fixed he orders incorrectly and some orders were missing,
so I had to page over six times, multiple different nurses from the cath lab, the provider
from cath lab, and the provider who was overseeing the patient on the floor, which also
had a midlevel so there were two of those providers to try to get the situation sorted out.
Meanwhile the patient is on the floor and they need care pre-op and post-op so a ton of
barriers, a ton of confusion, and just overall these providers are missing a lot of orders.
Then we have to cover and check constantly to say okay we don’t have this and I need
this and they are literally asking us well do these orders look correct. (RN04)
This caused staff nurses to take extra time to follow up with missing orders. A day shift staff
nurse made an error when she was new because she didn’t know it was her role to remind a
physician to put in an order to hold anticoagulation before surgery because usually the doctor
doesn’t do it. “I made the mistake when I was first on the floor because they have heparin, I
gave it, they were going to pull the epidural but they didn’t tell me so I feel like that’s a barrier,
but after that I learned” (RN15).
Night shift staff nurses were frustrated with having to wait until day shift to address
patient needs because non-urgent patient needs didn’t get addressed on night shift instead being
told we’ll wait until the morning. For example, “they have a headache at two in the morning and
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this patient is still here and you're still on call as a doctor so you need to address it” (RN12).
RN09, a day shift staff nurse, was frustrated with pushing physicians because she was “unable to
give the patients what they need because it is not in her scope of practice.” She can’t “put in
orders, I don’t know how to intubate, I can’t say what they need, all I can do is push and try to
get the help they need.” For example, this caused night shift nurses to have to “get creative” to
meet their patients’ needs and “give ice chips instead of medication for pain” (RN12).
Staff nurses advocated for the patient or pushed to get what the patient needs; however,
the amount of push seemed “too much” (RN01). “It’s fine that we have to ask for interventions,
it’s our job to be knowledgeable, but it’s also their job to oversee their care and initiate things”
(RN01). Staff nurses were really bothered by poor relationships with physicians; however,
focusing on the role as a patient advocate helped staff nurses cope with their disappointment and
frustration. “I’ve gotten to the point where it doesn't bother me anymore. I'm here to do my job.
I'm here to provide safe care to my patients and advocate for my patients and so I’ll get what I
need” (RN16). “Building thick skin” (RN01) or “having a backbone” (RN06) helped staff
nurses build courage to question a physician to advocate for their patient. A day shift staff nurse
didn’t question an intervention because it was coming from the doctor and realized she should
have questioned him because her gut told her not to give the medication causing patient harm.
[The patient] was already on a nitro drip and I had given him hydralazine about five
minutes earlier and he said give this Nitro. I learned a lot from that situation because I
now know just because they are telling me to do something, I know in my gut I shouldn't
do it and that was a good experience for me because I learned just because they are
telling me to do something I’m not going to do it in the future and I think that's a good
teaching point for new nurses is you can have a backbone and I should've had a better one
in that situation. (RN06)
The ability to question a physician develops over time; however, it was stated that “some
nurses just won’t question physicians” (RN07). A day shift staff nurse learned over time to
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question physicians and this prevented an intervention error. “One day I had sepsis protocol
come up on my patient and I paged the doc asked did you just see this person because I saw him
20 minutes ago and they were fine, [the doctor said] oh my God I ordered that on the wrong
person” (RN08).
Rounding with physicians facilitated being there for the patient like I’m there for the
patient. When physicians got to the floor they could “call and say hey I’m going to see 503 do
you have time” (RN09). This helped make sure everyone understood the plan because
sometimes physicians “sneak in and out and you have no idea unless the patient says something,
there’s no note, you have no idea. He said I can eat, really, how do I know” (RN09). When
physicians asked staff nurses to round with them it “significantly reduced questions, the pages,
issues with providing patient care” (RN04). “You don’t feel dismissed when you have a clear
plan, they validate your concerns, and you know what we’re doing, you know when to call back
with clear parameters” (RN11). Rounding with physicians can be challenging when physicians
are rounding at the same time preventing the staff nurse from participating.
Physicians don’t respect staff nurses. Staff nurses did not feel respected by physicians
when they didn’t get a response or they got an inappropriate response. Inappropriate physician
response or lack of response to staff nurse suggestions made them feel “bad about our actions as
a nurse in trying to keep our patients safe” (RN01). “If you're asking for certain things, I
understand they are not always necessary, but just to have more of a willingness from them to be
more involved” (RN01). Staff nurses didn’t feel as if they were taken seriously by physicians
even though “we’re at the bedside more than them, we see more than them, so I guess maybe we
advocate a little bit more for them than the doctors” (RN01).
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Not getting a response from physicians when staff nurses had questions contributed to
staff nurses not feeling respected. Although there were multiple communication tools to contact
physicians, they didn’t know if the physicians were even getting the message because they didn’t
always respond. Staff nurses used “secure chat only because you can at least see if they read the
message” (RN07). RN10 didn’t repeat pages because “I am assuming they just look at it and
they are like no this can wait until morning and they don’t respond so as a nurse you just kind of
sit in limbo.” Other staff nurses repeatedly tried to contact the physician “making them [the
physician] angry” (RN11). Although staff nurses were unsure of why physicians didn’t respond
they may have had the wrong number, physician was busy or forgets, or the physician was
sleeping were potential reasons the physician didn’t respond. Staff nurses contacted physician
assistants and nurse practitioners because they knew they would get a response.
Inappropriate physician responses contributed to staff nurses not feeling respected. There
were certain physician’s staff nurses wouldn’t call because “they know they are going to get
screamed at or hung up on” (RN11). Lack of respect was described as being “looked down on
by physicians as one of those intimidation things” (RN10). “They are a doctor and I’m [puts up
quotation signs and rolls eyes up] just a nurse” acknowledging “more respect from the doctors
would be appreciated from the nurses” (RN06). A day shift staff nurse witnessed a recent
experience with an inappropriate physician response.
Just yesterday there was a newer nurse on the floor and this patient just came back from
getting a heart cath and she's complaining of left flank pain and then tele called and she
was in some junctional rhythm so I said okay page the doctor who did the cath. She
wasn't getting back to her and she just wanted to make sure that everything was okay
because she is still complaining of this pain. So I said well page the hospitalist that's on.
So she did and then the hospitalist responded by paging the doctor who did the heart cath
and then that doctor called that nurse and reamed her out for why would you page the
hospitalist. I thought it was fair game and I told her she should do it because she needed
the confirmation on what to do and she wasn’t getting it so I think the escalating is
appropriate. (RN06)
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Newer nurses in particular don’t feel respected by physicians. A new day shift staff nurse
described:
There’s a lot of providers that come in and almost look down and not just me but other
nurses as well and I don't know if it’s because I’m a newer nurse or if it's just a
personality. I don't really know but I feel like I've gotten to the point where it doesn't
bother me anymore. (RN16)
Physician behaviors weren’t always addressed “same doctors, same poor behaviors”
(RN11). “It’s like you don’t feel like you’re part of a team, you start to feel like you’re the
annoying nurse and it’s the almighty doctor” (RN09). Showing respect was also listening,
however listening wasn’t always respectful. A day shift staff nurse described the differences in
how physicians listen to staff nurses:
Some of them show great I'm looking at you. I think honestly the lack of eye contact has
a lot to do with it. There’s tons of the doctors who you will be talking to them, they
won't look at you, are they even listening to me, I don’t know, watching cartoons on their
phone, mutual respect needs to be had in order to have good communication.” (RN06)
Staff nurses wanted to be trusted as the eyes and ears for the physicians. A day shift staff
nurse with 5 years experience acknowledged it’s nice when “the provider is available and
responsive and is actually listening to what I’m telling you. Some providers trust nursing.
Responsiveness is relying on me as your eyes and ears, don’t walk in here like you know it all”
(RN09). Building rapport and trust facilitated respectful, collaborative physician relationships.
Trust and rapport within the nurse-physician relationship developed over time. For example, “I
feel like it's getting a lot easier, they know me. In the beginning it definitely was a barrier, they
don't know who you are, the lack of trust, the lack of building that rapport is a barrier” (RN16).
Staff nurses’ fear of physicians resulted from lack of staff nurse confidence because they
were “unsure of what I know, my knowledge of things, and not confident in what I wanted to ask
them for” (RN06) and afraid of physician response based on experiences with “getting yelled at”
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(RN07). An experienced day shift charge nurse worried about the impact on safety when staff
nurses were afraid to collaborate with physicians:
It doesn’t go anywhere and then it just makes you feel really uncomfortable too. I mean
especially providers they talk down to you. It makes you feel like you don't want to call
them for things and that is a big barrier. Especially new nurses will ask me as the charge
nurse before they call the doctor. Do you really think I should call them about this? And
I will say yeah you need to even though they might yell at you. Certain doctors they’ll
page about anything, other doctors they won't because they’ve had terrible experiences
with them, hanging up on them, telling them not to page for that anymore and stuff like
that. (RN09)
Consequently, staff nurses “delay calling so they won’t get the doctors angry” (RN14).
Staff nurses described needing time to “know my patient to keep them safe”, “using my
gut” and nursing interventions to keep patients safe, and leaning on others or escalating to get
“extra eyes on the patient.” They described not always having what they needed to provide safe
care. They then described needing the organization to support patient safety as a priority.
Organization Prioritizes Patient Safety
The theme organization prioritizes patient safety is defined as a directive from the top
executive of the organization that patient safety is the overarching goal for everyone working in
or practicing in the organization (n = 16). Safety culture began with the “CEO setting the tone
that patient safety is an organizational priority” (RN02). The CEO shared the organization
vision that zero harm to patients was possible. Zero harm was communicated as a
“nonnegotiable” (RN02). Sharing the vision of no harm changed how staff nurses though about
patient safety by putting it in the forefront and changing their thought process.
Every open-heart patient had a triple lumen in from when they got into the OR to when
they went home and we just draw right off it. No one was trying to create harm but when
we were having CLABSI’s [central-line associated bloodstream infections]...hey maybe
we should get these lines out earlier. That question wasn’t asked because quality and
safety wasn’t in the forefront at that time and just getting to that point is a huge increase
in the quality of care and safety we are providing to our patients. (RN02)
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Staff nurses received the message that patient safety was a priority when the organization
communicated about safety all the time as described by the subtheme “sharing the numbers and
keeping us updated.” Then the organization tried to better itself by having a proactive plan
around safety as described by the subtheme “giving nurses a voice in making improvements.”
“Sharing the Numbers and Keeping Us Updated”
The subtheme “sharing the numbers and keeping us updated” is defined as a process in
which the organization provided transparency of patient safety data and new interventions
deployed to keep patients safe with all members working and practicing within the organization.
Sharing the numbers to provide transparency of data helped staff nurses understand the current
state of patient safety. For example, RN02, a day shift staff nurse with 5 years experience
reflected on his thought process prior to learning of stories and the number of preventable patient
harms shared by the executive leadership team. “I assumed we were providing the best care in
the country” because they had “no way of knowing any better because we hadn’t heard
otherwise” (RN02). This was observed during unit, facility, and system safety huddles when the
number of days since the last preventable harm event were discussed and posted on unit bulletin
boards. The nurse manager also shared the number of preventable harm events. For example, the
nurse manager shared a patient was diagnosed with a hospital-acquired catheter-associated
urinary tract infection on their unit. She reviewed the misses in peri-care and lack of
documentation of the daily catheter indication that could have contributed to the infection. Staff
nurses described challenges with patients refusing peri-care. The nurse manager asked staff
nurses to share different successful approaches they used to encourage a patient to participate in
peri-care. One staff nurse described explaining to the patient why peri-care was important to
prevent an infection. The nurse manager informed the staff nurse she was going to ask the legal
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team if patients should sign a refusal to participate in care document. She wrote the follow up on
a sticky note and placed it on the bulletin board under the commitment section to provide
transparency and accountability for the follow up.
“Sharing the numbers” not only helped staff nurses understand the current state of safety,
it also helped them understand expectations of “where they needed to go and what is most
important to prioritize” (RN04). “Laying out the expectation of what quality metrics we need to
follow to ensure we’re putting the patient first and getting those metrics met has been a huge
impact” (RN04). For example, at daily safety huddles “we share our goals of preventing central
line infections and foley catheter infections, and we are aware of the progress we’ve made”
(RN13). Staff nurses were observed sharing nursing intervention misses that could have caused
a patient harm during safety huddles. For example, they shared missed daily baths that were
outlined on the checklist to prevent surgical site infections. They shared a lack of support staff
as the reason and brainstormed solutions with the manager to prioritize daily baths by using the
bath kits to save time.
While “sharing the numbers” was important to staff nurses, leaders using the numbers to
make policy decisions without understanding what is going on at the frontline was explained as
“pure frustration” for staff nurses (RN06). A day shift staff nurse described frustration with
leaders creating a RRT protocol for sepsis patients to improve sepsis mortality outcomes “adding
extra steps we don’t need” because “it’s so hard because it's a double-edged sword, they are
seeing the numbers and the statistics and we’re not seeing necessarily that but we are seeing the
real-life what is going on” (RN06). The protocol required staff nurses to call a RRT for a patient
“firing a sepsis alert in the EMR” to initiate sepsis care quicker. However, this was “a waste of
resources, you don’t need all those resources there” and when you really need a RRT people
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were going to “take their sweet time because it’s another sepsis RRT and RRT needs to be
reserved for when you need it” (RN06). The protocol was reviewed and the requirement for staff
nurses to call a RRT for a sepsis alert was validated.
In addition to knowing the numbers, staff nurses needed the organization to keep them
updated on “everything we are trying to do to fix” patient safety (RN03). For example, the
organization shared new interventions to prevent harm from patient falls including “gait belts
and walkers” at the patient’s bedside (RN15). The organization shared “when people are
catching incidents before they become incidents, so near misses, and they give people incentives
for putting that in and looking more closely for them” (RN07). For example, during a safety
huddle a staff nurse reported finding a medication in the wrong drawer of the pyxis that could
have caused a patient harm if they were busy or didn’t follow the medication administration
policy. The drawer was immediately checked to make sure the drawer had the correct
medication and the nurse manager brought the near miss to the facility huddle for pharmacy to
follow up. Surveys were identified as another method of how the organization communicated
about safety by one staff nurse, however noted “I don’t ever really know what they do with those
surveys” (RN12). The unit safety culture results were posted on the unit improvement boards.
Staff nurses described “appreciation” for the organization sharing daily updates on what
“they are doing to keep us and patients safe from COVID” by reinforcing the appropriate
personal protective equipment and enforcing the influenza season visitor restriction policy
(RN03). “They are trying to provide us with the most up-to-date information and making a good
plan to provide safe care to everyone” (RN05). When the organization communicated with staff
by “providing information to help us make sure we can take care of our patients the best, safest,
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and easiest way possible” it made a day shift staff nurse feel like “they care, they’re doing
something, and they’re actually listening” (RN03).
Staff nurses described emails or newsletters, website, meetings, videos, safety huddles,
and executive rounds as effective communication methods to keep them updated about safety
issues and new interventions. Safety huddles were observed as a 10-15 minute standing meeting
with unit staff and unit leaders where they openly talked about patients that were most at risk for
harm, plans to keep patients safe, staffing concerns, and policy reviews. For example, staff
nurses shared having multiple impulsive patients that should have sitters per the falls policy.
However, there were no sitters available so they brainstormed how to geographically place the
patients so staff nurses could try to observe the patients while charting in the nurses station to
mitigate patient falls. The nurse manager discussed calling around to try to find sitters to help
staff nurses keep their impulsive patients safe.
Huddles focused on “anything going on, updates on current situations, changes to policies
or procedures, and any new information, which is nice to all be on the same page” (RN10). For
example, a nurse leader was observed reviewing a new fall intervention policy that required the
use of floor mats for high risk patients. The staff nurses described their concerns with placing
floor mats as patients and staff were tripping on them. The nurse leader supported staff nurses
by asking them to use their clinical judgment to keep patients safe until the nurse manager could
escalate their concerns with the new falls policy to the facility safety huddle. The nurse manager
then shared the staff nurse concerns with the director of nursing at the facility safety huddle. The
director of nursing referred the concern to the system falls committee for resolution. When staff
nurses perceived leaders as actually listening, understanding their perspective, and helping them
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work through their barriers it “significantly helps in the way that we feel and the way that we are
able to provide care for the patients that is safe” (RN04).
Although staff nurses “liked” huddles, huddles longer than 10-15 minutes “cause
anxiety” that they were missing something in patient care (RN04). “Lack of leadership follow
up” when “things are brought up but you never know what the follow up is or they will take it
off-line. How are the rest of us supposed to learn from that” (RN09) were barriers. For
example, when staff nurses escalated concerns to their manager at huddles “sometimes we hear
feedback but a lot of times we don’t, our manager tries to bring it back to our meetings or put it
in our newsletters, but that’s only occasionally” (RN16). Night shift staff nurses identified
huddles didn’t occur on night shift, but information gets passed along to night shift through email
or the charge nurse.
Staff nurses who experienced executive rounds felt they were effective mode of
communication because it “connects staff nurses with upper leaders.” “The CEO comes to the
floor, we discuss our goals and what we’ve accomplished. It’s great out of their busy days they
come to the floor, get to know who works on this floor, hears what’s going on, and asks what can
we do for you” (RN13).
Staff nurses relied on nurse leaders to keep them updated suggesting “the organization
does a really good job of getting out there and spreading information” (RN10), however
communication caused confusion for staff nurses and prevented them from understanding the
whys. This was caused by communication that was frequently changing, inconsistent messaging
by managers, and “ineffective delivery so we don’t know the whys” (RN04). For example,
“when they released the expectations for CHG [skin preparation to reduce surgical site
infections] the information changed six times within less than one year” (RN04). This created a
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barrier for staff nurses “wanting to do the right thing, wanting to make sure we were using on the
right patients at the right time, but then constantly having to readjust and rethink does this patient
qualify or not” (RN04). In addition to the frequent changes causing confusion, inconsistent
messaging by managers created confusing, mixed messages as described by a float pool nurse:
Directives that they [the managers] get sent down, every single manager interprets and
applies that differently and that causes a lot of problems especially when you have nurses
that go to multiple floors. They are needed on this floor and then they are not needed on
this floor, well are they needed? What’s best for the patient? So when you don’t have a
clear and concise message that causes issues and sends mixed messages. (RN02)
Ineffective delivery was also described by staff nurses because “a lot of time those whys
aren’t fully explained and it just comes across as the organization is making us do this now”
(RN09). A part-time night shift nurse had concerns with ineffective delivery of messages
because night shift doesn’t hear about “new things coming out as much as days” causing her to
potentially “not be doing something correctly or per policy or protocol” (RN12).
“Giving Nurses a Voice in Making Improvements”
The subtheme “giving nurses a voice in making improvements” is defined as involving
staff nurses in improvement teams to proactively design interventions that kept patients safe.
The organization prioritized patient safety by sharing the vision, numbers, and communicating
about safety regularly. Then the organization used that information to try to better itself by
having a proactive plan around safety and “giving nurses a voice in making improvements.”
“It’s one thing that I’ve always liked about the organization. There's always change and they’re
always looking to improve on things to better safety for patients” (RN12). Having a proactive
plan around safety was the organization coming up with new ways to keep patients safe. For
example, “they try to come up with new things to avoid the patients to fall and from the
beginning when I first started working here we didn’t have the floor mats” (RN15). The
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organization came up with new ways of improving patient safety through nursing governance
councils and improvement teams. These councils and teams “give nurses a voice” into
improvement interventions (RN02).
Nursing governance councils and improvement teams had representation from the
nursing units. The nursing governance council was described by a night shift staff nurse with 7
months experience as a “ system wide council with unit representatives, not exactly sure how it
works, but they attend monthly meetings talk about this stuff [patient safety issues] and our
representative comes back to our floor and discusses it with everyone, hears our concerns, and
brings them back to the group” (RN14). Nursing governance talked about “patient safety
numbers, issues, and how we are going to fix things all the time” (RN02). RN05 shared her
experiences as a previous member of nursing governance, “they talked about safety, staff injury,
and patient falls.”
Improvement teams reviewed quality data, evidence-based practice, and provided staff
nurses input into interventions to improve safety and quality data. For example, the falls
improvement team “evaluates falls, the risk, what happened, and what we should be doing”
(RN15). The unit falls team champion “tries to stay on top if it [falls prevention] and reads up on
articles” and then they “implement things to prevent falls” (RN08). A day shift staff nurse with
8 years experience was “fortunate to participate in shared governance” as it allowed her to “reach
out to other councils for questions or answers” (RN04). Specifically, when she had concerns
about the new falls policy she was able to “talk extensively with the falls committee about the
risk screen and what the expectations and barriers are.”
Although staff nurses described nursing governance councils and improvement teams as
a method to give staff nurses a voice in making improvements, staff nurses didn’t have time to

142
participate in councils, councils don’t prioritize important things, and needed more staff nurse
input. A day shift staff nurses stated “I’m personally not on any nurse councils so I shouldn’t be
complaining because I could have a voice but I don’t have time” (RN06). Nurse governance
councils were not perceived as always focusing on what is most important. For example,
councils prioritized “colored scrubs for nurses” without addressing “not enough staff to handle
the workload” explaining “what good is nurses wearing the same colored scrubs when we don’t
have enough nurses to take care of patients” (RN06). “I really wish we had more staff nurse
input” on nursing governance councils was communicated by a day shift staff nurse who served
as a unit representative on nursing governance (RN04).
Staff nurses got to know their patients to understand their risk and used their gut and
nursing interventions to keep patients safe. They didn’t always have what they needed to
provide safe care. The organization prioritized patient safety. Finally, staff nurses described
needing time to teach and learn in a nonpunitive environment.
Learning: “Have our Backs”
The theme learning: “Have our backs” is defined as a structure and process that
supported staff nurses to learn in a nonjudgmental, nonpunitive environment where they felt the
organization would support their decisions (n = 16). Staff nurses’ subthemes were described as
time to teach and learn from experience, learning from mistakes, and we don’t always learn from
audits as mechanisms by which they learn.
Time to Teach and Learn from Experience
The subtheme time to teach and learn from experience is defined as having time for
experienced staff nurses to teach new staff nurses and time to learn from each other by sharing
experiences. Other nurses’ experiences built nursing experience and judgment because staff
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nurses learn from their experiences. Lack of experience was described as potentially unsafe
because they don’t know or understand. Staff nurses learn through conditioning. “Last time I
had a person whose pressures were in the 70s, we didn't do anything about it so I'm going to
apply that to all the scenarios because that's what I've learned from what they have taught me”
(RN02). This put staff nurses at risk for “bad outcomes” (RN02). A day shift staff nurse with 1
year experience described why learning through experience was so important. “This position is a
lot of learn on the job versus school, school prepares you to be a nurse, but it doesn’t prepare you
for real life experiences and I will always be learning” (RN10). Staff nurses learned from
experience especially when it was supported by education or “making sure I have all the
necessary information” and “reinforcement” (RN10). Fundamental barriers to learning started in
nursing school by “not sharing wrong answers or mistakes” to facilitate learning because “if you
never got corrected how do you know, how will you fix that for the next time? The only reason I
knew that I wasn’t doing anything wrong was because no one pulled me into their office so it's
very hard to learn from your mistakes” (RN02).
Staff nurses debriefed and reflected as methods to learn from experience. Debriefing in
real time or as close to real time as possible created learning by “going through this chart, their
oxygen needs went from X to Y what do we do differently, what did you do, nothing, now it’s
the next morning they are on 12 liters on the oxymask, what happened” (RN02). Reflection
helped new nurses build nursing judgment because after they have had a few experiences “a new
nurse should be able to reflect back and say I have seen this before I see where this is going and
what to do to mitigate harm to the patient” (RN02). Time and stress prevented learning from
experience especially when helping newer staff nurses “build those foundational skills and
critical thinking to foster and develop those skills in them” (RN02). A charge nurse, out of
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adrenaline, kicked a new nurse out of a code because “during a code there’s no time so we go for
quick fixes as opposed to taking time to build foundational knowledge. We don’t debrief or
replay those scenarios close enough real-time where people can actually reflect” (RN02).
Learning from Mistakes
The subtheme learning from mistakes is defined as a process in which nurse leaders
provided timely, nonjudgmental, nonpunitive follow through and shared learnings from reported
safety events. Sharing safety events helped staff nurses learn from mistakes. This learning
began when nurses’ had a willingness to report safety incidents. Staff nurses reported safety
incidents through the incident reporting system or at huddles. Staff nurses needed to believe
their nurse leaders “have our backs” and “fight for us a lot” to encourage reporting (RN09). “If
you feel comfortable to voice a concern around here it gets somewhere” (RN13). However, fear
of repercussions was a perception that a staff nurse would get in trouble based on “incidental
stories heard on the unit or in nursing school” (RN09). A day shift staff nurse experienced fear
of incident reporting because:
I don’t know why everyone thinks that they're going to get in trouble. I know that is a big
thing with nursing. I don't know if it comes from years back where you did something
wrong you were punished or if it's like the horror stories that you hear in nursing school
of nurses who hang the wrong thing and then they kill somebody and then they are on
trial and losing their license. I don't know if it's like a combination of all of that or if it's
just the being responsible for somebody else’s life probably plays a big role into it.
(RN09)
Staff nurses, as previously reported, needed to maintain relationships with their colleagues to
support working together as a team. Staff nurses feared jeopardizing those relationships because
of “repercussions for reporting somebody or having those things come back on me.”
A focus on fixing the process and not blaming the person facilitated learning, especially
because “everyone is doing their best to provide safe care” (RN02). Not blaming occurred by
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“listening, making sure it’s not going to get written down, it’s safe, it’s confidential, and she’s
going to take care of it and get back to me” (RN03). When staff nurses were not afraid they
gained “confidence to be able to talk about patient safety with anyone” and “empowerment to
feel like you can bring things forward without repercussion” (RN04). Root cause analysis
focused on fixing the process, however it was also perceived as punitive. A day shift staff nurse
had a positive experience being part of a root cause analysis after she made a mistake:
When I was fairly new I had a patient on a PCA. I programmed the pump incorrectly.
There was another nurse there that verified the pump with me and signed off on it. It
went over night and I came in the next day I found out that it was programmed
incorrectly and the patient’s respirations were down to like six and she needed Narcan
and I was like oh my God I almost killed her. It scared the crap out of me and I beat
myself up about it but this organization didn’t. This organization made me feel like they
were going after the process and the equipment. You can have accidents, we’re all
humans, humans make accidents, and to not feel like you're being targeted or
discriminated against for making a mistake. They changed the settings on the PCA and
we do PCA vitals every four hours now, licensed staff are the only ones who can do that
because they had found from that that CNAs were going in and taking vitals and just
charting them and walking away and not even really noticing the trends sooner. So
there's some good things that came of it. (RN09)
However, RN08, a day shift charge nurse, was involved in a root cause analysis that she felt was
“punitive” because she was “new” at the time even though she “learned that you need to look at
patient histories” and the organization “improved the double verification process for PCA
pumps.” Positive learning experiences from reporting also facilitated continued reporting.
“When you put in an incident it’s a positive learning experience. Nobody feels like they can't
put incident reports in or feels like I’m going to get fired. If they make a mistake they realize
that it’s more of a learning thing” (RN11).
After a staff nurse reported safety concerns, they needed leaders to listen, do something
about it, and share learnings with the whole floor as loop closure and feedback. A day shift staff
nurse described “good feedback from our leaders as to what we should be doing differently,
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certain incident reports, make sure not to call out individuals but make sure those things aren’t
reoccurring, bring those forward so that all staff is aware” (RN01). A “friendly” approach to
feedback facilitated a positive feedback experience (RN14). Staff nurses needed to be “willing
to accept feedback to improve” and described developing “thick skin to accept feedback and
experience” to learn (RN01). RN06 needed leaders to provide “anonymous” feedback because
she felt “everyone just slides right by.” However, RN10 felt staff nurses needed to have follow
up conversations with each other “to ensure safety.”
Leaders didn’t always follow up. For example, after a staff nurse entered a safety
incident, “I don't really know what becomes of them after we put them in [laughing], I don’t
know what anyone does about anything, especially if it’s behavior-wise with a doctor” (RN08).
Lack of leader follow up was “discouraging” and after time with no follow up you stopped
reporting because “I would identify safety things and nothing was done and there was no loop
closure so I didn’t feel like I was being heard so after a while what ends up happening is you stop
saying stuff [looking down and shaking head]” (RN02).
We Don’t Always Learn from Audits
The subtheme we don’t always learn from audits is defined as a process in which nurse
leaders have charge nurses or clinical leads audit nursing interventions to identify staff nurse
compliance with nursing interventions to facilitate learning and compliance. Experienced staff
nurses did not find value in audits. Staff nurses didn’t believe nurse leaders followed through
with audits to facilitate learning and compliance.
Nurse managers had staff nurses and charge nurses complete audits for learning. Audits
helped because “then the manager can follow up with the staff nurse so it is not a nurse on nurse
thing (RN01).” A day shift charge nurse described how charge nurses used audits to facilitate
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learning. “If there's any themes we are seeing a lot of, for example a lot of missing I’s & O’s
documented, going back and saying this is what happened, this is the result, that makes people
think about things in a different perspective” (RN02). “Talking through audits as a conversation
helped make sure the behavior was repeated and became second nature” (RN14). Two staff
nurses, with 1 year or less of experience, found value in audits because the charge nurse would
double check and make sure they were doing what they were supposed to and gave feedback to
improve. Audits also helped hold staff nurses accountable because “it keeps everyone
accountable for you didn’t do it, what can we do to make this better or why are we not doing it,
what are the barriers of doing it” (RN13). However, charge nurses identified inaccuracy of how
the audits were being completed because they “can see things clearly haven’t been addressed”
(RN07). Charge nurses witnessed staff nurses being more focused on completing the audit than
using it as a learning tool or understanding why the intervention was so important.
I remember as a new nurse they would get preoccupied with things that were being
audited. So what people would be concerned about was whether there was stat locks on
IV’s and I never really understood it because I wasn’t worried about that I'm not sure
why you are. Now looking back the ultimate goal of that was to prevent that IV from
moving and to have it in place and to keep it stabilized but if you would have asked
anyone I don't think any of the nurses could've told you why they were doing it. (RN02)
Nurse leaders didn’t doing anything with audits preventing staff nurses from learning because
“many nurse leaders struggle holding nurses accountable” (RN04). For example, “like today the
missing ID bands I talked about. That is very dangerous and it frequently comes up on our
audits, but why does it keep happening? People need to be held accountable” (RN04).
Summary Staff Nurse Results
In summary, staff nurses’ experiences with safety culture were described in six themes.
Staff nurses needed time to “know my patient to keep them safe.” “Using my gut” and nursing
interventions were applied after knowing the patient to keep patients safe. They leaned on others
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or escalated to get “extra eyes on the patient” when they weren’t getting what they needed for
their patient. They didn’t always have what they needed to provide safe care. They needed the
organization to prioritize patient safety. Finally, learning: “Have our backs”, they needed time to
teach and learn in a nonpunitive environment.
Nurse Leader Results
The following results answered the research question describing nurse leader safety culture
experiences within medical-surgical units. The nurse leader experience is described in six
themes including: making sure staff nurses are keeping patients safe, making sure nursing
interventions are in place, making sure staff nurses have what they need to provide safe care, “I
expect staff nurses to stop things or escalate when they feel uncomfortable”, organization
prioritizes patient safety, and making sure staff nurses are learning and growing. Subthemes are
presented within each theme to support rich description. Within each theme, subthemes are
bolded and italicized (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Nurse Leader Results
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Making Sure Staff Nurses are Keeping Patients Safe
Nurse leaders made sure staff nurses were keeping patients safe (n = 10). The theme
making sure staff nurses are keeping patients safe is defined as setting expectations and holding
staff nurses accountable for gathering information from and about their patients and ensuring a
collaborative plan to proactively keep patients safe. Nurse leaders’ subthemes were described as
knowing the patient by reviewing the EMR, BSR to know the patient and “catch things
upstream”, and making sure there is a clear plan to keep patients safe.
Knowing the Patient by Reviewing the EMR
The subtheme knowing the patient by reviewing the EMR is defined as the process staff
nurses used to make sure patients were safe by gathering information about the patient by
reviewing the EMR. “We have access to outside [patient] records which helps with patient
safety” (RNL01). Even though there was “more compatibility with the way computer systems
speak” (RNL05), the EMR to know the patient had challenges. The EMR wasn’t always
working properly and it slowed the nurses down. There’s a lot of information in the EMR,
however it required the staff nurse to do “a lot of digging around to find information” (RNL01),
“information doesn’t flow from the clinics” (RNL05), and computers were slow. Information
not flowing from the clinic to the hospital posed safety issues. “A patient had implanted an
intrathecal medication that was administering and the nurse didn't know that the patient even had
one and there's nothing on the EMR [from the clinic] that would help show that they had this
medication” (RNL05).
Inefficiencies in the EMR and documentation burden took the staff nurses’ focus away
from the patient. There was a “plethora of patient information” in the EMR, however staff
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nurses were “so focused on documenting at the computer and not focused on the patient”
(RNL10).
BSR to Know the Patient and “Catch Things Upstream”
The subtheme making sure patients were safe required knowing the patient through BSR.
This is defined as a handoff process between staff nurses and the patient to support patient
involvement in the plan of care while allowing the staff nurse to conduct a baseline assessment
of the patient and environment to catch care that was missed to prevent an error. A nurse leader
with 2 years experience as a nurse leader described why BSR was so important:
It makes a big difference because you [staff nurse] can look in a computer and do bedside
handover outside, they [the patient] can look like junk on the computer and then you can
go and it’s like wow they’re walking independent, they are doing great or it could be the
opposite they look great in the computer and then after your handover is done you know
not at the bedside you go in and they're not looking good. So doing bedside handover
lets you check the environment, there’s not spilled water on the floor, they have their bed
alarms on, the white board is updated because that is what other people who answer our
call lights would go to, can the patient have water, can they walk, what are they here for.
So making sure the whiteboards are checked and then checking the medications that are
running, that’s bedside handover because you can’t do that at the computer. Is it the right
medication, is it actually connected to the patient, and is it running what it's supposed to.
So you are doing all your double verifications on the patient which is all safety things.
They are not going to fall, they are getting the right meds and they know the plan of care.
If the patient knows the plan of care with the two nurses and what is expected on the next
shift they’re [the patient] not gonna try to get up out of bed because you just said you
can’t get out of bed on your own but you walked with one assist, you just told the nurse
that so I think it prevents a lot of errors moving forward and helps with safety. (RNL07)
BSR caught things upstream before they could cause patient harm. “When we receive a
patient we have expectations that things are done by the book and if they are not we stop it right
there at handover, try to address it” (RNL02). For example, “a patient didn’t have a DNR band
on and performing our handover at the bedside to standard and catching it right away and say
how do we not miss a step to catch it upstream” (RNL05). Not conducting BSR could have
posed challenges for the staff nurse because “if you don’t do handover and the IV rate is wrong,
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you have an infiltrated IV the previous nurse maybe was part of and now you can’t even ask
those questions and you’ve got to try to explain the situation” (RNL05).
Nurse leaders described BSR as being conducted inconsistently and not to standard.
Reasons staff nurses didn’t conduct BSR included staff nurses were busy and didn’t have time
for a needy patient, they didn’t understand the why or the benefit, not wanting to wake up the
patient, staff nurses didn’t like change, or were not comfortable in front of the patient. Staff
nurses not comfortable doing BSR in front of the patient was because they lacked competence or
confidence they wouldn’t know the answers. “I think a lot of it is honestly confidence. I think
they think if I'm saying this in front of the patient I don't want to be corrected or I don't want to
use my notes in front of the patient” (RNL09). Time pressure to move patients quickly from the
post-anesthesia care unit to the floor to keep patient flow moving was a barrier because “if the
room is not clean they sit there [in hall] and something can happen to them while in the hall and
you miss handover because they are rushing to get out of here” (RN03).
Nurse leaders ensured BSR was conducted by holding staff nurses accountable and
sharing stories to help staff nurses understand the why, or benefit, because staff nurses learn
through experience. Sharing stories helped staff nurses because “we explain it, audit it, but they
[staff nurse] haven’t walked into a room and the patient was dead or their IV isn’t hooked up.
We can preach and say it’s important, but until they’ve had an event they don’t believe it”
(RNL07). RNL01 shared stories to help staff nurses understand the importance of BSR:
A big thing too is helping people see the why. One example would be handover.
Recently the rest of the inpatient managers have really wanted to make this a clear
expectation which I’m totally onboard with and they sent out an email with all the whys
[giggling}about why we should do this to share with our team which was great but like I
said we were already there so I was just previewing what they had sent out and the bullets
are about expectations and you will be placed in corrective action and came down that
path and less time spent on could we talk about a story where somebody didn’t do
handover and what happened to the patient. I remember a story where a nurse didn't do

152
handover, terrible situation for the patient and the position it put her in. She will never
forget so she is adamant to do her handover because she's seen and experienced what it’s
like when you don't follow through on some of those things. (RNL01)
Making Sure there is a Clear Plan to Keep the Patient Safe
Nurse leaders made sure staff nurses knew their patients through the EMR. They then
made sure staff nurses were conducting BSR to know their patient and “catch things upstream.”
Then nurse leaders made sure there was a clear plan to keep the patient safe. The subtheme
making sure there is a clear plan to keep the patient safe is defined as a collaborative plan of
care with a clear understanding of that plan between the patient, nurse, and all members of the
healthcare team to prevent harm to the patient. The safest care was described by a nurse leader
with 10 years of leadership experience:
I feel like the best is when the patient is admitted there is collaborative, effective
communication with all care team members from the provider to care management to
nursing, pharmacy, the patient to understand really what is the plan of care along with
expected time to stay in the hospital, so everybody can do their work with the patient to
accomplish that. There's a plan of care to also keep the patient safe whether it's
preventing falls, preventing any kind of harm from an SSI [surgical site infection], VTE
[venous thromboembolism], CAUTI [catheter-associated urinary tract infection],
CLABSI [central line-associated bloodstream infection]. To make sure that we have the
best standards in place to prevent that from that patient. (RNL04)
These were the days RNL01 didn’t worry about patient safety.
It’s when we have the hospitalist team doing rounding and conversations are [happening]
with input from the doctor, input from the nurse, this is what we want to do, these are the
expected outcomes. I know there’s a clear plan. I know the nurse understands the plan
and knows what outcomes to look for. (RNL01)
A safe day for RNL02 was when “the nurse and provider created a clear plan, this is what we are
going to do, the nurse and the patient understood the plan. At handover the nurse, patient, and
oncoming nurse, knew where we were and what was happening.” Everyone involved in the plan
also included “security, physician therapy, other disciplines really pulling together and having a
really good plan” to keep the patient safe (RNL01). A clear plan included following orders and
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policies. Lack of relationships with physicians, unclear physician orders, and rounds on a need
to know basis only made having a collaborative plan challenging. The multidisciplinary team
was also not open to collaborating. For example, “it requires close collaboration using evidencebased care and I think there's a lot of opinions among the healthcare team along the entire way
and that's where our barriers come into play” (RNL10). Staff nurses being busy and not having
time made collaborative multi-disciplinary rounds challenging as it is not easy for a staff nurse
to” pull everyone together with everyone’s schedules” (RNL05).
Staff nurses reviewed the EMR to know their patients. Nurses leaders made sure staff
nurses conducted BSR to know their patients and “catch things upstream.” Then they made sure
staff nurses had a clear plan to keep the patient safe. Once there was a plan, nurse leaders made
sure staff nurses implemented nursing interventions to keep the patient safe.
Making Sure Nursing Interventions are in Place
Nurse leaders made sure nursing interventions were in place to keep patients safe (n =
10). The theme making sure nursing interventions are in place is defined as setting expectations
and holding staff nurses accountable for conducting assessments to guide nursing interventions
and implementing the nursing interventions to keep patients safe. Nurse leaders’ subthemes
were described as nursing interventions “for nurses to follow”, setting expectations and holding
staff nurses accountable for following nursing interventions, alarms, warnings, checklists, and
safety checks, and workarounds to keep patients safe.
Nursing Interventions “for Nurses to Follow”
Nursing interventions “for nurses to follow” is defined as risk assessments, policies, and
protocols developed for staff nurses to follow to guide safe patient care. Nurse leaders
referenced the board of nursing and professional organizations to develop nursing interventions
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that were evidence-based and followed nursing standards of care. For example, to understand
what “nursing practice should look like we’re beginning to look at our professional organizations
like NLN or med-surg nursing organizations to really understand what should nursing practice
be” (RNL04).
Risk assessments were nursing interventions that identified risk for falls, then based on
nursing judgment and the risk screen score directed nursing interventions. Risk assessments
were “fall risk assessments and VTE assessments that nurses completed to determine a risk
score” (RNL03). Nursing judgment supplemented patient assessments to ensure appropriate
interventions were placed based on that individual patient’s needs. Nurse leaders then made sure
patients were safe “by looking at the score and going back to understand if we [staff nurses] are
meeting all the interventions required” (RNL01). Interventions based on risk assessment scores
were “gait belts, walkers, and safe shoes for the patient at the bedside” (RNL04) to keep the
patient safe if they had a high fall risk score.
Policies and protocols outlined nursing interventions to keep patients safe. Policies were
a way to standardize safe care by developing evidence-based standards of care for staff nurses to
follow. Policies referenced were the falls prevention policy, IV medication policy, medication
administration policy, and escalation policy. Policies, such as the medication administration
policy, provided five rights to “make sure we’re giving the right medication, right dose, and the
medication is truly needed and ordered right” (RNL07). Protocols, or order sets, were “clear
physicians orders” a staff nurse or physician could implement for patient conditions such as
“sepsis, an MI, required chemotherapy, a foley catheter, or central line” (RNL04). Protocols
provided direction to staff nurses. For example, if a “patient fires for sepsis” the staff nurse
“called a RRT” (RNL08) to get resources at the bedside to make sure the patient received the
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standard of care. Protocols provided staff nurses with “standards to do your foley care or
someone could get a CAUTI, following the hypothermia protocol or someone can have an SSI
[surgical site infection], doing what’s best for patients” (RNL07).
Although nursing interventions guided safe patient care, nurse leaders needed staff nurses
to anticipate what might happen to a patient by understanding patient specific needs and
interventions to individualize and proactively provide safe care using nursing judgment. “It's not
they’re a cardiac cath patient, I’m going to do the same thing for every cardiac cath patient, but
what might happen to this patient. That's what a good day looks like. They’re anticipating
things that might happen” (RNL03).
Building relationships with patients can compensate for gaps in critical thinking,
especially with novice nurses. “A novice nurse can compensate for gaps in critical thinking with
the relationship they build with that patient because they trust you and they believe in you
because you are kind and listening to them” (RNL04). She also described how experienced
nurses could benefit from building relationships with patients because “you could be an excellent
nurse but they [the patient] think you suck because you won’t talk to them and they don’t trust
you and you’re not communicating effectively with them” (RNL04).
Policies and protocols assisted staff nurse and nurse leaders to “prove to the doctor it’s
the right thing to do.” For example,
I feel like the IV policy is more detailed and it’s definitely a reference that my nursing
team utilizes day in and day out as a great reference and then they can escalate when they
feel uncomfortable giving an IV medication. For example, recently there was another
unit that wanted to transfer a patient who was on a nitro drip for high blood pressures that
needed to be titrated. Currently our team is not competent in that nor are we staffed to
take care of that acuity to make sure that we are monitoring that patient safely. So they
were able to use that policy and stop it right there and try to figure out a different plan to
keep that patient safe along with being respectful towards throughput at the organization.
(RNL02)
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However, not all medications were part of the policy, therefore, because the policy was
“grey” the unit was taking patients with titratable medications not appropriate for the floor
(RNL03). This identified a discrepancy between nurse leaders on whether policies were either
too grey and not prescriptive enough or too black and white not allowing for nursing judgment.
For example, nursing judgment was needed to appropriately apply policies based on the
situation. “You need to look at the risks and benefits around the patient. If this patient is going
to fall and that’s a bigger risk than having a family member [sit with patient] staff nurses need to
do what is safest for the patient” (RNL10). However, policies and protocols were so “black and
white, they numb people to not think. You [staff nurse] can apply evidence-based care that might
not be exactly what a policy says, but they are written so stringent that it doesn’t allow you to
think and provide individualized care” (RNL10).
Policies were too complicated, confusing, and unrealistic and ever-changing. Policies
were also not easy to find, outdated, and interpreted differently. Policies weren’t always
communicated to staff nurses or staff nurses were not educated on policy changes. RNL03
communicated differently and changed her approach when she became aware staff nurses were
unaware of policies or policy changes.
I think education was not the best form to make sure that people understood so what
we've typically done is a policy is pushed out and they need to read the policy. I know
the fall risk one how that was rolled out was not helpful. So they took an e-learning that
based on your answer it took you to a different way, so each nurse could have gotten a
different pathway that they answered so it doesn't help them when they just have to read a
policy. We need critical thinking situations. Give them a patient and what should be in
place. And what I did is actually sat down with the nurses and talk through some of those
policies and then I've been printing a policy every two weeks to go through on the unit
that are the high-risk ones that a lot of people don't know or understand. (RNL03)
Staff nurses not using or following policies “for whatever reason is a risk to patient safety”
(RNL05).
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So patient is septic, we didn’t use the sepsis order set [protocol], now as the nurse I've got
to worry about I know they [patient] are going to need this, this, and this because we
didn't use that order set now I have to watch to make sure if this happens that I’m going
to have to call back and get this in place. If their lactic is greater than 4 I’m going to have
to call back and get a second lactate ordered instead of being able to use the order set and
progress the patient through those phases of care. (RNL01)
Protocols weren’t always clear, however “pharmacists partnered with us [staff nurse] to
help us catch those [unclear orders] before they reach the patient” (RNL04). Sometimes,
protocols weren’t available. For example, a patient who was very angry and very aggressive,
“we didn’t have good protocols for that situation, the patient ended up pushing one of the staff
members, then a staff member got on the elevator with the patient, thankfully nothing happened,
but my heart sunk” (RNL01).
Policies should be developed with staff nurse input and “anybody who is going to
participate in that policy should at least review, or put their eyes on it, before giving it to
somebody to follow, like a fall policy that inhibits critical thinking, it’s like 15 pages and I don’t
get it” (RNL10). When policies were developed without staff nurse input extra work that didn’t
benefit the patient was created. For example, a nurse leader described a “22-step process for
hanging medications” with a carrier fluid to ensure “every bit of medication” was administered:
We make things more complicated than they need to be. It takes away time from things
that might be more important [laughing]. If they have a patient on multiple antibiotics it
takes a long time with the carrier fluid, then you got to label all your tubing, put all your
green caps on, changing administration sets every couple hours, and every time you
disconnect it’s 24 hours the tubing is only good for. If you think about the process versus
the benefit of not losing how many cc’s are in there when you're not using the carrier
fluid. What’s the risk for just putting the bag on to get it through? Then you're orienting
a new nurse and you’re spending day after day trying to get them used to figuring out
how to hang antibiotics versus talking about critical thinking and SBAR [situation,
background, assessment, recommendation] and creating the plan of care that's effective
and specific to this patient to progressing their care and building a relationship with their
patient because they’re stuck focusing on how to hang their antibiotic. It takes them 15
minutes to hang an antibiotic and then you have a patient that is on two or three different
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things and you are in there like every other hour doing that. Is that time valuable
[laughing and shrugging shoulders]. (RNL04)
Committees provided staff nurses an opportunity to provide input into nursing
interventions. “One CAUTI team really worked on setting the goals, investigating different
products, different interventions, different tools we could use to decrease the risk of infection”
(RNL01). However, staff nurses weren’t always heard on committees or their ideas got shot
down or they were criticized. For example, “so we have said we want front-line nurses on
councils and in project groups yet they are the severe minority and they are not listened to”
(RNL08). There were also “not enough staff nurses or the right people at the table making
decisions”, and “no training of the staff on the committees how to use evidence-based practice or
training in working as a group and group conflict” (RNL08). RNL05 had a staff nurse that was
frustrated because of lack of frontline representation on councils, “they are the only one there for
a seven hospital system” so the people making the decisions “are doing the best they can because
they have to move forward with the work.” For example, “I would have a hard time believing
anyone is following the fall policy. There’s things in there not available to nurses. I don’t even
know where they would find a helmet or yellow gowns, but that’s in our policy [laughing]”
(RNL04). Lack of representation was because nurse leaders didn’t “have the ability to send a
nurse and make that a priority” and “you have to have a nurse that cares and wants to come in on
their day off” (RNL04). When nursing interventions came out that staff nurses didn’t believe in,
it caused “distrust and disengagement” with leadership and was viewed as “a negative”
(RNL08).
“Engaged” staff nurses facilitated their involvement in “doing the improvements” and
developing policies and protocols (RNL02). Departments working together also facilitated
developing nursing interventions that kept patients safe. “We built a relationship with PACU
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and the surgical floor that helped dramatically get the patient through phases of care safely”
(RNL02).
Setting Expectations and Holding Staff Nurses Accountable for Following Nursing
Interventions
Once nursing interventions were designed with staff nurse input, nurse leaders set
expectations and held staff nurses accountable for having nursing interventions in place. The
subtheme setting expectations and holding staff nurses accountable for following nursing
interventions is defined as a process nurse leaders employed to make sure staff nurses understood
expectations through consistent, clear communication from nurse leaders followed by auditing,
rounding, and feedback to ensure learning and compliance. “You know as a leader I am
responsible to hold my team accountable” (RNL06). A nurse leader was excited when all the
nurse leaders finally agreed to hold staff nurses accountable. “Finally we all agreed between the
hospital leadership we are really going to hold people accountable. So you can't turn your head,
we’ve got to hold people accountable [slamming fist in hand]” (RNL06).
Nurse leaders believed that staff nurses did not implement nursing interventions because
they didn’t know they were supposed to do something and didn’t understand it was an
expectation and the rationale behind the expectation. Nurse leaders stated they “didn’t always
share stories to help staff nurses understand the why” (RNL01), instead they set expectations and
moved right to a punitive response. For example, RNL01 disagreed and was disappointed with
the approach to improving compliance with BSR by communicating to staff nurses “you have to
do it and if you don’t I’m going to write you up approach versus getting people to see the value
and rationale of why they would want to do it.” Nurse leaders had expectations that handover
was to be “done by the book” (RNL06) and asked staff nurses to put in an electronic safety event
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to help improve the process. The nurse leader would then follow up with the person who didn’t
conduct BSR and address it in the moment. A transparent incident reporting system helped with
accountability and follow up.
A nurse leader with 30 years experience as a nurse leader took a direct, honest approach
to address accountability and educate in the moment. She had a nurse who ran in a room to help,
there were 2 other nurses in the room and “he went racing in the room and tripped on a cot and
sheet on the floor but didn’t take time to move them so no one else got hurt” (RNL06). After the
situation she asked him if he really needed to run into the room and why he didn’t take the time
to make the room safe “so the patient or someone else wouldn’t get hurt” (RNL06). RNL10
stated people didn’t follow certain standards or policies they were supposed to follow and “they
just choose not to and the organization has not taken a stance on that and it’s hard when people
don’t follow the rules and you may be seen as negative when you hold people accountable.”
Therefore, consistent messaging by leaders was so important because “if managers get
information out and then the telephone line changes the message, somebody is doing something
that they shouldn’t be doing because they think they should be” (RNL06).
Nurse leaders had staff nurses and clinical leads conduct audits to make sure nursing
interventions were in place and to support “learning and growing.” “There's audits we do that
we follow up to make sure that the safety measures have been put in place and the protocols are
being followed and then we talk about it as a team” (RNL08). Audits, “although they are
retrospective, help build knowledge.” For example, “Our leads do most of our audits, if there
was a miss they follow up with the staff so at least we know follow up is being done so we get
ahead of it [the misses] at some point with knowledge” (RNL09). For example, leads “audit
lines, tubes, high-risk VTE, high risk falls. They pull up the chart, look at the charting [to
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identify evidence-based bundled intervention compliance]. So they ask the questions [audit] and
have them [staff nurses] answer and use the audit to huddle with the staff” (RNL03). They make
sure “sequentials are in place for high risk VTE” (RNL03). RNL06 described frustration with
the ongoing lack of staff nurse compliance with nursing interventions. After tracking and
coaching “for so long” staff nurses “veer away from standards and have lost sight of, it’s about
the patient, because they are so overwhelmed and overworked” and nurse leaders are “getting to
their heads and not their hearts.”
Nurse leaders rounding and on the floor facilitated setting expectations and holding staff
nurses accountable. Every morning RNL01 completed leadership rounds:
I check with patients but also check in with my team to see how they’re doing, if there’s
any support I can do. I touch base with the clinical lead right away in the morning,
complete a stat sheet to understand who they’re worried about, safety, quality issues that
need real time follow up. We complete our incident reports with real time follow up as
much as we can. If there’s a concern, pulling the right people to help support that
whether it’s pharmacy or providers or escalating chronic trends of poor practice. I
monitor for on a daily basis. (RNL01)
When RNL06 walked on the unit she could see “somebody doing something you think, not good,
they walk in to answer a call light and there’s clearly isolation signs.” Nurse leaders had “an
EPIC list of patients so we can see our high risk VTE, CAUTI, CLABSI to help focus where
we’re going to round” (RNL03). A nurse leader rounded on her team “to make sure they
understand, tell me about one of your patients, just understanding their process, thinking, so we
can help ensure they have the resources in place they need” (RNL05). Nurse leaders on the floor
changed staff nurse mindsets.
A provider ordered a medication indicating it was for renal protection, however if you
truly looked at it, it was for blood pressure. So kind of just talking through that with that
nurse, why do you really think we started this medication? Do you think this was
appropriate for this patient to stay on the floor? Just sitting down and giving them a
different perspective helps them. I touch base with the nurses every morning, which are
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your high risk, why are they high risk, what can we do for them. We had a patient
yesterday who I called the charge nurse from the ICU to come lay eyes on. (RNL03)
Staff nurses were perceived as not implementing nursing interventions because they were
too busy and forget. Not having enough time and being too busy emerged as the most frequent
barrier to implementing nursing interventions. Alarms, warnings, checklists, checks, and safety
checks facilitated busy staff nurses in initiating nursing interventions and keeping patients safe.
Alarms, Warnings, Checklists, and Safety Checks to Help Busy Nurses
The subtheme alarms, warnings, checklists, and safety checks is defined as visual or
audible cues or processes that alert the staff nurse when there is an increased patient risk, guide
evidence-based decision making, and decrease the risk of errors from occurring.
Alarms and warnings alerted staff nurses to subtle change and patient risks of harm.
Alarms included bed alarms, chair alarms, and call lights. Warnings were alerts from the
computer of subtle changes in a patient’s condition to “trigger the nurse of patient deterioration
through the Rothman” (RNL09). However, better technology was believed to be available. For
example, when the existing call light system alarmed “staff nurse didn’t know which room to go
to” because “you [staff nurse] don’t know if call light A is needing Kleenex or is ready to jump
out of bed because they are having so much pain or need something where they may be at risk
for falling” (RNL01). This caused a lot of “manpower” because the staff nurse had to go to the
room to “seek to understand what the patient needs” (RNL01).
Everyone was expected to respond to alarms but there were times when alarms went
unanswered. Not responding to alarms would require “a change in culture to say there’s an
alarm going off everyone answer it” (RNL09). The current culture created was “PT, OT,
pharmacists, care managers, anyone sitting right outside a room and alarms going off and they’re
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not responding” (RNL09). Nurse leaders witnessed staff nurses not responding to alarms
because they were too busy or on the phone with a physician. Although nurse leaders described
no reasonable barrier for not answering alarms they identified “socialization takes priority over
patient care” (RNL10) and “they [staff nurse] spaced out and didn’t hear it. I don’t know how
they space out but they do” (RNL08).
Checklists and safety checks facilitated nursing interventions. For example, “we have
bundles [checklists] that identify the standard of care” that staff nurses followed to “meet the
standards of care to provide quality care to these patients and it gives specific things to carry
out” (RNL04). Checklists helped staff nurses assure they were doing the right thing. Checks
and double checks “stop us from doing it or makes us double check if there's some discrepancy”
(RNL02). Barcode scanning for medication administration, IV pumps that were programmed for
safe medication administration, and physician order entry were some of the technology the
organization provided to facilitate safe care. However, when the equipment wasn’t working
right staff nurses were “monkeying around [laughing] and you’ve got a med and all of a sudden
the barcode is not working, so you’re working around that and we can’t stop practicing so you
create those workarounds” (RNL04).
Workarounds to Keep Patients Safe
The subtheme workarounds to keep patients safe is defined as a decision making process
staff nurses employed to eliminate or not follow all steps as directed within an established policy
or protocol. Staff nurses being busy and not having time also contributed to staff nurses creating
workarounds. Checklists and safety checks added to staff nurses not having time and being too
busy as did slow computers and staff nurse documentation burden. Staff nurses “socializing”
(RNL10) or “searching for equipment because it’s broken or not working” (RNL04) also
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contributed to staff nurse not having time and being too busy. Not having time and being busy
contributed to staff nurses not completing assessments on time and “workarounds.”
Workarounds as a response to real or perceived time pressure were necessary to “make
sure everything we do kept patients safe” by “keeping the patient at the center of everything we
do” (RNL04). Workarounds occurred because staff nurses thought it was quicker or easier
because they were busy and had no time, staff nurses thought they were doing the right thing,
lack of staff nurse knowledge, and lack of accountability. For example, “the medication process
has really clearly identified steps, but if I know I can do it quicker by eliminating a step oh yeah
absolutely they will do that” (RNL06). The policies created barriers for doing the right thing to
keep the patient safe, therefore supporting workarounds.
The nurse had to give this medication, it was a hospice patient who was in a lot of pain
and needed morphine. She would scan it, she did her five rights, and it gave her an error
and she called me to just override it. I was like why are we overriding something that’s
in place because something is not right and she tried to override it and yup it’s not letting
me override. I said so something is actually wrong with this. So her being busy, she got
an alert, read it, and still felt it was okay and then was just going to override it. When we
are rushed people tend to just OK this is the quickest thing. If you're busy and just want
to get it done and the patient needs it so you do it. I mean it’s not right by any means but
I think that some people do and it’s a safety issue, it could have been the wrong med or
the wrong route. (RNL05)
Nurse leaders made sure staff nurses were keeping patients safe. They also made sure nursing
interventions were in place to keep patients safe. Then they described making sure staff nurses
had what they needed to provide safe care.
Making Sure Staff Nurses Have What They Need to Provide Safe Care
The theme making sure staff nurses have what they need to provide safe care is defined
as the role of the nurse leader in securing appropriate resources to keep staff nurses at the
bedside while cultivating collaborative relationships to ensure safe patient care (n = 10). Nurse
leaders’ subthemes were described as balancing financially responsible staffing and patient
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needs is challenging, supplies and working equipment aren’t always available to keep staff
nurses at the bedside, the whole team doesn’t always work together, and we don’t have great
relationships with our physicians. Each of these posed challenges to making sure patients were
safe.
Balancing Financially Responsible Staffing with Patient Needs is Challenging
Making sure staff nurses had what they needed to provide safe care was financially
responsible staffing while being able to meet the needs of the patient, however this was
challenging for nurse leaders. This subtheme is defined as the process nurse leaders used to
develop staffing models that supported safe patient care within their staffing budgets while
managing safe, and efficient patient placement. “Certainly we have targets to meet to be
financially responsible to our community so balancing that with the needs of the patients can be
challenging” (RNL01). However, inadequate staffing was palpable when you walked on the
unit. “The call lights are going off, people are running around. You talk to them, how was your
day? I’m busy. What does that mean? Some of those are those trigger words to say I'm going to
keep an extra eye” (RNL05). Having a good mix of staff nurses contributed to the safest
experience and was “not a right number because sometimes our algorithm is just right,
sometimes it’s not enough, but the right amount of people to the patient acuity and mix”
(RNL04). However, one nurse leader struggled with staff nurse perception of unsafe staffing
because she felt “the ratios really are appropriate” (RNL10).
Not having the right staffing mix and staff resources was the most unsafe safety culture
experience and a risk to patient safety because staff nurses weren’t able to implement their
interventions or perform basic care. Nurse leaders were challenged with balancing meeting the
health needs of the community and safely staffing.
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If we don't have staff and there’s patients that need help you are in a bind, what do you
do because the organization is here to serve the community but if there is not nurses to
take care of them, what do we do? In the past it’s been just take more patients and that
makes a nurse feel like it's unsafe. We take 4 or 5 if we need to take a sixth that's okay
but if there is no nurses do we have to take seven, eight, where do you stop? (RNL07)
Not having the right staffing mix made staffing challenging. Skill mix barriers were
“whether you have more new nurses on who are less comfortable, take longer, are less
autonomous, and less confident” (RNL04). “Quite often you walk on and you’ve got all agency
on other than one core staff member or you've got all nurses who are six months or less of
experience so that can be a big factor too” (RNL09). The right mix was “the experience level of
the nurse, the ratios, knowledge, education, orientation, the emotional and mental status of the
nurses feeling overwhelmed” (RNL06). Having the right staff on the unit was very complex.
“We had over 50% of our staff with less than 2 years experience and you can’t really have a
great mix so you’re doing the best you can” (RNL04). When RNL09 walked on the unit she
became concerned for patient safety because they had “agency on the floor and all nurses who
are 6 months or less of experience.” Low staff nurse turnover and decreased vacancies
facilitated having more experienced staff nurses on the unit. Staff nurses helped develop new
staff nurses to alleviate the impact inexperience had on workload.
The patient mix and managing patients who needed a higher level of care made staffing,
even with the appropriate ratios, challenging.
There was a day this week we had a patient with active chest pain, many drips going and
another patient having multiple pauses. Cath lab was backed up and we couldn’t get
those patients to the ICU it was full. So we’re trying to manage two critical patients on
the unit on one nurse’s team. So the charge nurse and I [nurse manager] helped facilitate
both critical patients to keep them stable on the floor until they can get to cath lab. So
those other teams of nurses we were not able to support. On that day I really don’t know
what happened with all the other patients on the floor. (RNL03)
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Having and following appropriate admission and level of care guidelines helped manage
the patient mix. Guidelines had failed getting the patient to the right level of care in the past.
“We had a hypotension protocol that was supposed to help us if they’re hypotensive for this
much time they go to the unit [ICU], but then that’s only for certain cases” (RNL09). Getting
patients to the ICU posed a workload challenge. “So helping others see in our eyes what is going
on to get them down to the ICU is really my biggest barrier” (RNL03). High acuity patients and
the challenge of getting physicians to see “from our eyes” (RNL01) that the patient needs a
higher level of care was challenging:
If we have patients that probably need a different level of care, a nurse managing a
patient who's on the fence, do they need the ICU, don't they, and really helping the
provider see. Sometimes in their mind they just think that patient doesn’t need the ICU,
but yet it's not the right environment where they are either. Helping them understand that
the nurses capacity to carry out the interventions they are asking them to do. (RNL01)
Nurse leaders believed staff nurses spent time “helping them [physicians and ICU] see
the staff nurse capacity from our eyes” (RNL01)and spent more time “trying to make a case to
get something for the patient” (RNL02). Sometimes physicians didn’t know the level of care
criteria and other times nurse leaders “didn’t push back when physicians were admitting patients
who required a higher level of care” (RNL04). Managing high acuity patients and negotiating
with physicians to get patients to a higher level of care contributed to “crappier care to the other
patients that burns them [staff nurses] out, it breaks down relationships and some nurses are
resilient and they just keep escalating and some I’m afraid they don’t escalate next time because
what’s the point” (RNL04).
Other factors contributed to staffing challenges such as “how fast are discharges going,
how fast are admissions coming” (RNL06). High needs patients described as two-assists,
isolation, challenging family dynamics, many drips, and one on one patients that challenged
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workload. Patient location, family dynamics, and patient personalities all contributed to staffing
challenges. The “right people not performing the right role” (RNL06) also challenged staffing.
For example, “the nurse transporting a patient for discharge removes that person from the unit”
because they didn’t have a transport team (RNL01). Nurse leaders would have enough staff
nurses if they had an IV team, a transport team, or other support so nurses could focus on giving
direct care. Technology such as “telesitters” (RNL01) to provide one to one monitoring for
patients at risk for harm and call lights that alerted staff nurses to patient needs could alleviate
staffing challenges.
The best safety culture experience was when patient assignments dispersed acuity
throughout the unit. Creative assignments, reaching out for extra staff nurses, and nurse leaders
helping alleviated staffing challenges. Other tools nurse leaders relied on to ensure safe staffing
included working with the staffing and patient placement department, an escalation process,
forcing a nurse over after 12 hours to fill staffing gaps, agency, traveling nurses, and recognizing
nurses by showing appreciation. “Forcing nurses over” was not necessarily the safest thing to do
but it alleviated gaps in staffing (RNL01). Forcing over was observed routinely during safety
huddle observations.
Inadequate staffing caused staff nurses to have a negative perception of leadership
because “they don’t think they can give safe care because they think the organization is going to
give bad staffing or keep giving us patients” (RNL07). She also described a negative perception
of leadership on the night shift. “Our night shift has a huge problem with respecting leadership
or understanding why they do things and they voice it, this is just unsafe staffing, the
organization doesn’t care” (RNL07). However, staff nurses didn’t always know the entire
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picture because “there might've been sick call-ins that they [staff nurses] don't know about”
(RNL07).
Supplies and Working Equipment Aren’t Always Available to Keep Staff Nurses at the Bedside
Nurse leaders worked to make sure staff nurses had the supplies and working equipment
to provide safe care. The subtheme supplies and working equipment aren’t always available to
keep staff nurses at the bedside is defined as the inability for nurse leaders to ensure staff nurses
had the appropriate patient care supplies and working equipment readily available to keep them
at the patient’s bedside. When staff nurses had supplies and working equipment at the bedside
they were “coming to work and feeling like they can keep patients safe and have the resources
they need to keep them safe” (RNL08). “We are fortunate we get the equipment and supplies we
need” (RNL07). They never had supplies to prevent a “CAUTI, so now we have external foleys”
(RNL01). “We haven’t had a ton of equipment issues recently, we’ve been fortunate, it’s if
something breaks you might not get it fixed right away and we can’t stop practicing so they [staff
nurses] create workarounds” (RNL04).
The right supplies at the bedside were “making sure that you have the right tools in place
as simple as gait belts, walkers, and safe shoes for patients” (RNL05). “The floor is stocked,
they have what they need. If we didn't have the code cart or have medication stocked in the
Pyxes our patient care wouldn’t be safe, that would be a concern” (RNL07). Equipment was
broken or not working and nurse leaders struggled trying to get supplies to keep staff nurses at
the bedside. “We’re trying to change the culture that nursing is here 24/7” in an attempt to get
other departments to make sure staff nurses had what they needed to provide safe care because if
they didn’t “it really pulls away from taking care of the patients which that's what we need to be
doing” (RNL02). RNL04 described staff nurses needed equipment and supplies right there and
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working to “not slow nurses down with their processes so they’re not having to create
workarounds” and also to make sure they “have the right things in place to carry out their tasks
efficiently without having to take more risk or unnecessary risk.” Nurse leaders knew there was
better equipment out there. For example, “there has to be a better way for us to be able to see
that patient’s rhythm when we’re doing any sort of medication changes, drip changes, anything
like that” (RNL03).
The Whole Team Doesn’t Always Work Together to Keep the Patients Safe
Making sure staff nurses had what they needed to provide safe care was working together
as a team. The subtheme the whole team doesn’t always work together to keep the patients safe
is defined as when nurse leaders observed any member of the healthcare team or other
departments not responding appropriately or working together to make sure the patient was safe.
“An alarm goes off and everyone responds” (RNL04). “Everyone is working together to keep
the patient safe” (RNL04). “How the team interacts with each other and supports each other
really helps with safety culture” (RNL03). A nurse leader moved her office so she could hear
what was going on with her team. “I hear every day how are you doing, can I help you? Is there
something I can do for you? Did you eat yet? What can I do for you so you can go? That’s
everybody to everyone” (RNL04). A nurse manager heard the charge nurses communicate with
the staff nurses “we have to work together as a team” (RNL06). The whole team being aware of
risks on the floor helped keep patients safe. Staff nurses worked together as a team to support
new staff nurses. “A third of my RNs have started within the last year. They are doing things
five years ago would take four years to develop. It's pretty cool to see the help of the team
surrounding them and helping coach and mentor” (RNL02).
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Working together as a team was facilitated when the CEO created the vision and aligned
goals. Other facilitators were positive attitudes, being approachable, reliable, and a good
communicator. For example, “keeping a positive attitude, because if the patient can’t get up by
themselves, if you’re not approachable, I’m not going to come ask you. You need someone who
is approachable and respectful so you [staff nurse] can ask freely” for help (RNL07). Leading by
example facilitated the team working together. For example, “well I think as a leader I have to
lead by example. I can’t be walking by call lights and not responding to alarms because it
wouldn’t look like a priority” (RNL04).
Although nurse leaders described their team as working well together, they
acknowledged not all departments worked very well together. It was uncomfortable for nurse
leaders to work with other departments because they didn’t have relationships with other
departments. Developing a relationship with the operating room and PACU facilitated safe
patient care. “It has helped dramatically for the nursing leaders to come together because we
need to for that patient to go through phases of care safely. We have a shared understanding and
a shared goal” (RNL02). Other barriers were a lack of understanding of roles and
responsibilities because “people just don’t appreciate or understand what other people are tasked
with” (RNL04), teammates not being helpful, they just don’t care, staff nurses are “so busy and
rundown” (RNL09), “not speaking up that they need help and being a martyr” (RNL04), and
staff nurses are here to socialize. Socializing occurred when staff nurses were on their cell
phones, “on Facebook” (RNL09), and having conversations with other staff on the unit when
there’s other things they could be focusing on” (RNL09). A nurse leader believed it was a
“major issue on the unit” and it’s because “they [staff nurses] are so busy and rundown, I have to
breathe, I don’t even want to do any work stuff, I want to chitchat and have downtime” (RNL09).
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We Don’t Have Great Relationships With our Physicians
The subtheme we don’t have great relationships with our physicians is defined as the
challenges and unprofessional exchanges nurse leaders observed or were made aware of between
staff nurses and physicians. Not having great relationships with physicians was the most
negative safety culture experience after staffing. “We really don’t have a great partnership with
our providers and getting them to partner with us for what they [patients] need” (RNL04). Nurse
leaders felt staff nurses couldn’t “pick up the phone and get what they need without being
unprofessionally challenged” (RNL01). Having great relationships required the building of
relationships and professional, respectful communication between physicians and nurses.
A nurse leader saw conversations go much differently between physicians and staff
nurses who had developed a relationship. “I see that same provider with a different nurse have a
very different conversation about the same thing. Establishing those relationships is huge”
(RNL01). An ideal relationship between a physician and a staff nurse was:
I am envisioning he [physician] comes onto the floor, greets everybody, calls everybody
by first name. If he does not have to be about business right from the start because there
is not something specifically going on it usually involves a little bit of how’s the day
going, how are your kids, that sort of thing. So there is definitely an obvious developed
relationship there. When they are rounding, it’s conversation, it's asking for input. The
provider will present this is what we’ve got going on, this is the diagnosis, and will say to
the nurse what do you see, what are your concerns for this patient today? Asking for that
input. It's a very different conversation. And then if I [nurse] need something I’m
picking up the phone to call and I know I’m going to be able to make a recommendation
and get what I need or they are going to come to the floor and we are going to have a
conversation about it with the patient. Looks very different. (RNL01)
Relationships were challenged because “some providers have attitudes and they want it
the way they want it and are not seeing the perspective of others. A lot has to do with their
attitude and their demeanor when they walk on the unit” (RNL03). If staff nurses and physicians
“don’t have a foundational relationship than we can’t respectfully work side-by-side and learn
from each other and I don’t see us moving past it” (RNL01).
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Professional, respectful communication occurred when physicians were “engaged with
the team [nurses], answering questions, providing education to nurses on different treatments and
procedures” because it helped form “an integrated care team that helps develop nursing along the
way” (RNL10). However, unprofessional physician communication occurred and was very
challenging to overcome. “The tone they use, if nurses feel belittled they aren’t going to bring
something up if they think someone is going to put them down” (RNL03). “We get pushback,
they [staff nurses] don’t want the doctor to yell at them and say why are you calling” (RNL07).
Some of them “get angry if you communicate to them in the wrong way. If they’re in a good
mood they’re going to do whatever you want them to do and if they’re in a bad mood, you’re not
getting anywhere with them” (RNL09). With the ones who were consistent and “even if you
don’t like it they explained it and helped you understand that feels better to our staff versus I
never know what I’m going to get from this guy or gal” (RNL09).
Unprofessional, disrespectful communication occurred when physicians didn’t respond to
staff nurses. “Sometimes we have trouble getting a hold of physicians. Just not getting a
response, you either don’t know if they got the page or if they got the information and they don’t
need to change anything but there’s no confirmation coming back” (RNL08). For example,
physicians had to sign a discharge summary otherwise the patient couldn’t be discharged to a
skilled nursing facility. However, “sometimes it won’t happen and you’ll call their office 5, 6, 7
times with no response. It takes up our beds, we can’t help new people, and those patients just
sit there longer” (RNL07). Physicians didn’t respond on nights because “they couldn’t hear their
pagers when they were in a room and won’t look at their pagers because they are focusing on
that patient” (RNL03). The hospitalists on nights also struggled to “manage all their admissions”
that created a situation where staff nurses “were entering protocols or taking verbal orders
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because they don’t feel like there’s a better option even though they might not necessarily feel
comfortable” (RNL04).
Not listening to staff nurse suggestions posed a safety concern because staff nurses “have
been with these patients at the bedside and know how they have been for the last day or two and
it’s the first time the physician is seeing the patient” but physicians “don’t always listen to the
staff nurse perspective” (RNL07). Listening to the staff nurse was provider dependent “a nurse
says I need to give Lasix because we fluid overloaded them, they [provider] will say that’s a
great idea let’s check a blood pressure first, but there’s others unless they came up with the idea
may not suggest that” (RNL07). They also acknowledged that “not that they have to say
everything a nurse says goes, but it is good when they listen to feedback not just nope this is
what we do” (RNL07). Sometimes staff nurses didn’t know who to call impeding professional
physician communication. “If we have a heavy volume of surgical patients, not knowing who’s
going to come see the patient, who am I going to be able to get ahold of today to help” (RNL03).
Staff nurses learned through experiences and those challenging relationships and
communication with physicians created fear in nurses. The fear was created by past experiences
and “certain physicians that made staff nurses feel like they don’t know what they’re doing”
(RNL03). This created an unsafe situation that could result in a delay in care because “staff
nurses will wait or not call the doctor because they don’t want the doctor to yell at them”
(RNL07).
Nurse leaders tried “to create bonds between physicians and staff nurses” by letting
physicians know “I’m the manager up here, if you ever need anything let us know, give us
feedback” (RNL04). They also cultivated relationships and professional, respectful
communication between physicians and staff nurses by role modeling. They role modeled by
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building relationships with physicians that come to the floors and having professional
conversations with them. A nurse leader heard a phone conversation that didn’t go well between
a new staff nurse who was trying to get her patient to a higher level of care and the physician.
However, the clinical lead called the physician to the bedside and role modeled a completely
different approach to get the patient the care they needed. “The clinical lead called the provider,
asked the provider to come to the unit and then led a conversation that was very different than
what had occurred between the nurse and provider” (RNL01).
Not following up with physician behaviors was a barrier. “If it’s a one-time thing our
nurses don’t care, everyone has a bad day. It’s when it’s consistent, repetitive behavior, it’s just
a slap in the face from the physician and the organization” (RNL09). The organization told staff
nurses and nurse leaders “we shouldn’t have to deal with this [physician behaviors] and to have it
constantly ignored on all levels is just a slap in the face” (RNL09). It could take “6 incident
reports saying a provider is still doing this until it gets escalated” (RNL07). The organization
was perceived as “not wanting to get rid of doctors because they need the resource and are afraid
of losing them” (RNL04). Nurse leaders addressed physician behaviors by “going to the doctor
and having difficult conversations or escalating to higher leadership to address the behavior”
(RNL02).
Nurse leaders made sure staff nurses were keeping patients safe. They set expectations
and held staff nurses accountable for making sure nursing interventions were in place to keep
patients safe. They had challenges in making sure staff nurses had what they needed to provide
safe care. Next they described expecting staff nurses to stop things or escalate when they felt
uncomfortable.
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“I Expect Staff Nurses to Stop Things or Escalate When They Feel Uncomfortable”
The theme “I expect staff nurses to stop things or escalate when they feel uncomfortable”
is defined as nurse leader expectations that staff nurses stop anyone from doing anything unsafe
immediately and reach out to others with more expertise when they are in an unfamiliar situation
or when the patient’s condition warrants additional immediate support (n = 10). Stopping things
or escalating took staff nurses having no fear, and having courage. A vision of the best safety
culture was:
No fear. I [staff nurse] wouldn’t think twice about stopping somebody from doing
something if I felt it wasn’t the right thing. I hear people talk about it, so somebody will
tell me I saw so-and-so do this and I’ll probably say how did they react when you let
them know. Of course the answer I get is ‘I didn’t’. Not having that fear would be a safe
culture. They have the power to do it, I don’t think they always believe they have the
power. (RNL01)
Nurses leaders’ subthemes described “I expect direct conversations about safety” and get the
“right eyes on the patient.”
“I Expect Direct Conversations About Safety”
The subtheme “I expect direct conversations about safety” is defined as speaking up
immediately to anyone at any time to keep the patient safe by stopping unsafe practices. “I
wouldn't think twice about stopping somebody from doing something if I felt it wasn’t the right
thing” (RNL01). Nurse leaders supported staff nurses to change their approach to direct
conversations about safety. “When they see poor practices or disrespectful behavior from
anybody instead of internalizing it, verbalizing it’s not right, because it’s the right thing to do for
the patient” (RNL02). “Ideally it’s to talk right away to that person, say hey you’re making me
feel this way and I don’t feel that’s right, right away figure out why that happened so it doesn’t
happen again” (RNL05). However, staff nurses needed assistance because “it’s hard when
people make them feel that way [bad] and it’s hard to speak up” (RNL05). Escalating when staff
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nurses felt uncomfortable was “they could escalate to a house supervisor and when I’m on call if
they need to pull me and even if I'm not on call or available to call me to do what is right for the
patient at the time” (RNL02).
Staff nurses didn’t always speak up. “I think personally people aren’t willing to have
face-to-face conversations or take the time, everything is so rushed, it doesn’t take that long to
pick up the phone and have a quick conversation” (RNL10). Staff nurses would describe a
situation that wasn’t right, but they wouldn’t stop the behavior. “I’ve had nurses that will sit on
nights all weekend long and have certain people that they feel are not helping or being a good
teammate and they would rather be miserable than speak up to them or say something” (RNL04).
A nurse leader closed her eyes, shook her head, and remembered her worst safety culture
experience that occurred when staff nurses delayed speaking up:
There was a patient who came to us post-op from a complex surgery. The patient was
having significant abdominal pain, which they had an abdominal surgery and the patient
was very tachy[cardic]. The provider was notified because the orders that we had for
postop pain were not sufficient enough. So we call the provider, it took over an hour to
get a hold of the provider. After three hours patient’s pain was still not controlled.
Patient was still tachycardic and blood pressures were slightly dropping. The provider
was notified and came to the bedside they thought it was just pain issues as well and it
continues throughout the night. We ended up calling a RRT within about eight hours of
receiving the patient from surgery because we did not feel like there is something right
with the patient. The patient didn’t do well. So we ended up doing a root cause analysis
and the hard thing was that the nurses weren’t able to have at that point a difficult
conversation with providers saying this is not right. I’m uncomfortable and did not
escalate sooner their gut feeling. (RNL02)
Staff nurses needed assistance having direct conversations. Nurse leaders coached to
encourage speaking up. RNL04 brought in a coach through a training program because
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“people don’t like to talk to each other.” Nurse leaders provided encouragement to staff nurses
to encourage speaking up. “Encouragement and creating a culture of making sure it's okay that
they say if something isn't right so they bring it forward so that we can make it better” (RNL05).
They also provided encouragement by “thanking them for escalating because it really is the right
thing at the moment if they feel like it is to encourage that behavior” (RNL02). Leaders role
modeled speaking up to encourage staff nurses to speak up. “It's demonstrating to my nurses
how you have that conversation and you really try to put it into that light of learning. If people
don't know they don't do, but learning to have those conversations, model them” (RNL01). One
nurse leader experienced staff nurses “not having confidence to speak up and feeling there is a
reprimand and it delayed the patient from getting a chest tube” (RNL02). Nurse leaders
empowered staff nurses to speak up. Empowering staff nurses was “having a voice, feeling like
the fear will go away, feeling empowered to do the right thing, knowing we are here to do what’s
right for our patient, our profession” (RNL10). Nurses leaders had an open door policy and
made time to show speaking up was important. For example, “my team, brought a concern
possibly in regards to a doctor [rolls eyes up, smiles, and giggles] which then I would go to the
doctor and have difficult conversations and escalate to higher leadership if needed to address the
behavior” (RNL02). However at times there were no leaders to support having direction
conversations because “we don’t usually have a house supervisor on night shift” (RNL07). Even
though there was an escalation process to support having direct conversations “at the time” the
staff nurses knew the resource was available but didn’t “always have confidence to use it” to
escalate and support direct conversations (RNL05).
Fear prevented having direct conversations. “I think not having that fear would be a safe
culture” (RNL03). Fear was because staff nurses “didn’t want to look like they don’t know
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what they’re doing and hierarchies with physicians. Nurse leaders believed staff nurses feared
“jeopardizing relationships with physicians” and “they don’t want the physician to get mad or
yell at them” (RNL10). To alleviate fear in nursing the CEO tried to empower staff nurses and
communicated to the organization staff nurses know what’s going on; however, physicians didn’t
always support the initiative to empower staff nurses. RNL07 described the condescending
manner some physicians responded to the call to empower staff nurses. “Can we all agree in this
room that no one needs or wants an EKG [rolling eyes and talking on the behalf of a physician],
you’re kind of putting someone in place that if they want it you’re already saying that your
agreeing no one wants it” (RNL07).
Supporting a culture that will speak up, nurse leaders had to make sure they supported
their team through escalation when they faced challenging behaviors by following through.
Following through was “making sure by following through to say okay has it gotten better
because really that's not acceptable” (RNL05). Nurse leaders had challenges with following up.
“With staff discipline or follow-up you can't go back to the other staff member and say yup just
so you know they got written up, so I think that part’s difficult” (RNL09).
Get the “Right Eyes on the Patient”
The subtheme get the “right eyes on the patient” is defined as staff nurses using their
resources around them to keep patients safe in situations where they lacked experience or were
unable to get what they need to keep the patient safe. Nurse leaders expected staff nurses to
“escalate if you have not done this before because we‘re not going to cover and prepare you for
everything, so don’t just figure it out, get the right people involved to help figure it out properly”
(RNL04). Staff nurses leaned on experts around them and other disciplines, the clinical lead,
charge nurse, or manager, or by calling the ICU or a RRT for their expertise to get the “right
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eyes on the patient.” Staff nurses were perceived as using their team and resources around them
for their expertise. “We lean on other departments for the specialties if we are struggling with
something that is out of the ordinary or things we need support in and making sure that we are
carrying things out the right way” (RNL04). “Staff nurses use their resources [experts] around
them and that brings me comfort” (RNL06). Leaning on the clinical lead or charge nurse was the
safest day because they served as an expert resource for staff nurses on the unit.
Our clinical leads on the units really help with that flow and assures that nurses are
understanding the plan of care. They're kind of the gatekeeper of coaching and
mentoring along with stepping in when they feel like something is not right. They help
coach and mentor our team members to how to have conversations with providers and
then help with knowing that if they are having a hard time and we’ll offer to be there to
have that conversation, they will step in. Then, if they're having a hard time they pull on
me as well and then I go up the ladder if need be. (RNL02)
Nurse leaders “expect them [staff nurses] to come to me with any concerns, keep me in
the loop” (RNL08). An escalation process helped when staff nurses couldn’t get what they
needed from the physician. “Let’s say they [physician] were sleeping and didn’t pick up or said
we’ll deal with it in the morning, the nurse would escalate to the lead if they’re not already
involved they would take care of the situation” (RNL07). If they still didn’t get an answer the
clinical lead would “escalate to the house supervisor and continue to escalate to administration”
(RNL02).
Nurse leaders transitioned the supervisor role into a clinical lead role so “now my clinical
leads are here 24/7 and if they [staff nurses] feel uncomfortable they can escalate to the lead, a
house supervisor, or call me to do what’s right for the patient at the time” (RNL02). The clinical
lead or charge nurse needed to be approachable. RNL08 shared the reason a “very new nurse,
off orientation for a couple weeks, apologized for asking questions to manage an unstable
patient.” “When I told her not to apologize that’s how we learn, she had an experience with
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other leads that she should know this, you went to nursing school why don’t you know this”
(RNL08). Leaning on the lead or charge nurse was challenging because they were dealing with
staffing or taking assignments. Although nurse leaders identified themselves as someone staff
nurses leaned on for their expertise, nurse managers weren’t on the unit 24/7. Therefore, they
expected the clinical lead or charge nurse to fill the leadership gap however, “there’s no real
coaching or mentoring for them [leads and charge nurses]” (RNL09).
Staff nurses also escalated to get what the patient needed by calling the ICU or a RRT to
get “those right eyes” on the patient. Staff nurses not being able to get a hold of physicians or
get what they need from physicians was the main reason for escalating. The ICU was a resource
to “come lay eyes on” a patient “if you looked at the chart the patient looked like they were
perfectly fine but eyes on patient they were not okay” (RNL03). “So getting that second set of
eyes to help talk with the charge nurse was helpful” (RNL03). Calling a RRT helped to “get the
right eyes” (RNL03) on the patient. A strong physician and ICU nurse responding were “the
right eyes.” “They bring fresh eyes from multiple perspectives like critically trained RN’s,
respiratory therapist, physician, fresh eyes to look at maybe things we didn’t think about to
prevent further patient decline” (RNL08). “A patient was declining, the nurse was feeling the
patient was declining, tried to tell the provider I don’t feel this patient is stable, the provider said
I feel like they are, back and forth, then we called a RRT” (RNL05).
Even though they have the RRT, “responses for RRT’s are poor at best and we’re not seeing
those behaviors actually addressed even when they are brought forward. They are brought forward
directly to management but often they are deferring to the physician” (RNL09).
The worst experience was a patient who her chest tube fell out. She was having a very
difficult time breathing. She was very scared because she couldn't breathe and a RRT
was called. The ICU RN was in the room with the surgeon and the surgeon was [being
inappropriate] in front of the patient who was scared to death that she was going to die.
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The two nurses felt very uncomfortable in that situation and weren't able to speak up in
that moment because they were in disarray with what they were seeing and hearing. They
were just focused on the patient and trying to shelter the patient from seeing and hearing
it, but it delayed the patient from getting a chest tube. It was one of the first times that the
nurses came to me because they felt very uncomfortable. I needed to escalate to the
medical team which is very scary because I never did it before and I was their colleague
that they worked with side-by-side for years and it was trying to share with them why it
was inappropriate. (RNL02)
Other poor behaviors were physicians “come into a RRT very narrow-minded, and they have
their mind made up before listening to suggestions from the nurse” (RNL07). Sometimes it
depended on who responded. Some were stronger than others, “some share ideas and
brainstorm” (RNL07). You can say can I have an EKG and there is pushback. When we do the
post-RRT huddle, the ICU nurses will write on it “the doctors didn’t give us what we needed”
(RNL07). Staff nurses “look to see who [physician] is working before they call” (RNL01).
Staff nurses had to really push and make a case to get what they needed for their patients.
“Really explaining to them [physician] we can’t one-on-one this patient, we have been in the
room constantly for the first four hours, really explaining this patient is too high acuity for our
floor and if we’re still not getting what we need we go through the escalation process” (RNL03).
RNL05 witnessed the push back staff nurses received when trying to escalate to get “extra eyes”
on their patient, “they feel that the patient's declining and they’re pulling on the resources and
getting made to feel that they shouldn’t be feeling that way even though the patient is declining.
They feel like they’re not being heard.” “The ICU nurses come up, why are you calling this, I
shouldn’t be here” (RNL05). The physicians or ICU pushed back because “they don’t
understand the floor’s perspective. That patient may be doing OK with a blood pressure in the
80’s, but we are also managing three other patients that need our attention as well” (RNL08).
The pushback and bad behaviors were contributed to the responding physician, or ICU
nurse, being busy. These negative experiences could cause staff nurses in the future to question
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if they should call a RRT. “Those situations that happened or it’s not embraced, you felt you’re
following and people make you feel a certain way, and next time they may think I’m not going to
[call RRT] because I could be made to feel I shouldn’t” (RNL05).
Nurse leaders made sure there staff nurses were keeping patients safe. They made sure
nursing interventions were in place. They struggled making sure staff nurses had what they
needed to provide safe care. Nurse leaders expected staff nurses to stop things or escalate when
they were uncomfortable. They then described needing the organization to align goals and
prioritize safety.
Organization Prioritizes Patient Safety
The theme organization prioritizes patient safety is defined as a shared understanding by
all departments and members of the healthcare team that patient safety is the overarching priority
supported and reinforced by communicating, listening, and responding (n = 10). Nurse leaders’
subthemes described establishing goals and providing transparency and communicate, listen to
understand, and respond to staff nurse concerns. This didn’t always result in a shared
understanding and response to prioritize patient safety.
Establishing Goals and Providing Transparency
The subtheme establishing goals and providing transparency is defined as setting an
organization vision of zero preventable harm, developing and aligning patient safety goals across
all roles within the organization, and providing routine transparency of the safety goals. The
organization prioritized safety through “a call from the top of the organization to focus on safety
and quality, aligning leaders to focus on that was a big change” (RNL01). All leaders were told
to “get obsessed with safety and quality” and the new CEO shared that “zero harm is possible”
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(RNL01). All leaders understood “we want our patients safe, we are trying for zero defects”
(RNL07). Communicating zero harm is possible and sharing external benchmarks helped
leaders understand how they were performing compared to the rest of the nation.
Prioritizing safety at the organizational level created safety as a focus for everyone.
Being able to focus on safety helped nurse leaders prioritize safety. “With previous leadership I
don't feel that there was a lot of focus on safety but with new leadership it’s helping to change
our mindset of what good looks like so that we are providing that care for that patient” (RNL02).
For example, “keeping people free from infections, three years ago it wouldn’t be unheard of for
our 24 bed unit to have 8 to 10 foley’s, 5 to 6 central lines, now we go a week without any of
those” (RNL01). Nurse leaders were also able to get equipment and supplies to achieve patient
safety, like “external foley’s to make that happen [no infections]” (RNL01).
After setting the vision, the organization established goals to align the organization
around safety so “we are all on the same page” (RNL02). Aligning goals and getting all leaders
to focus on safety was a big change. Goals around safety “are established by the executive team
and cascade to all leaders and departments down to the frontline staff” to align everyone around
safety (RNL01). “Having those system goals and bringing those goals down to my nurses so
they know what the goals are and they know their role in meeting the goals. They didn't know
that before” (RNL01). Although it was a long journey, the alignment helped everyone
understand a culture of safety.
It's more of everyone having the same understanding of what a culture of safety is. What
does it look like, what does it feel like and then having shared outcome goals of what we
can do from a process standpoint to help pull that care team together more so that
everyone's on the same page on providing that kind of care for that patient. When
everybody is on the same page about safety it looks beautiful. (RNL02)
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Reporting safety data provided transparency and alignment. “I honestly think we've done
a better job in the last year or two years in terms of sharing information, sharing the dashboard,
now we’re doing that together and sharing. I think that was helpful” (RNL06). Transparency of
sharing data and events related to patient safety was observed during daily unit, facility, and
system safety huddles when each huddle started by sharing patient harm numbers and patient
harm stories. Transparency of the current state of quality helped nurse leaders prioritize work
that needed to be done to achieve safe patient care by providing “transparency of where we are”
and “where the focus needs to be” (RNL05). Alignment got everyone on the same page and
created a shared ownership to keep patients safe. “It’s a priority for everybody, it’s shared.
Everybody feels ownership. Alarm goes off every ancillary on the floor responds to it and
makes sure someone is taking care of it. No silo between departments. We’re all in this
together” (RNL04).
Even though the organization aligned and prioritized safety, it didn’t always translate the
same to all departments. There was a lack of shared understanding of what it meant that safety is
a priority for everyone and people don’t want to change which caused nurses leaders to not feel
respected as a nurse manager.
I feel like departments vary in that understanding. My team members probably can speak
to how I lead and how I speak about it and share what their thoughts are, but I believe
from the actions from other departments just even in this hospital people don’t share the
same passion like we do which is very frustrating and very sad because it's like banging
your head on a wall. (RNL02)
Even though the call from the top of the organization prioritized safety as everyone’s focus,
nurse leaders were challenged in receiving support to remove barriers for staff nurses to give safe
patient care:
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I feel like people don’t want to change. I feel like also as a unit manager I don't feel that I
am respected. For example, last year I was trying to work with our inventory supply to
make sure that we had the right supplies at the right time for our nurses so we’re not
running around and he kept on going to the directors to get approval for the things that I
wanted to try on my unit. So it was very frustrating. (RNL02)
Too many priorities and too many changes related to leadership turnover because “we’re
constantly starting over and it’s hard to create a culture because the culture is always changing
and it creates fear” (RNL04) made prioritizing safety challenging. Having too many priorities
and lack of support to implement and sustain the changes necessary to improve quality and
safety was a barrier.
I would say it’s conflicting priorities because there’s so many indicators that we’re trying
to focus on and there’s really no support to our unit for any of that so it really relies on
me. You can’t focus on all of them every day and then you’re trying to coach on fall
prevention and a 17 page policy and by the time you get around to every nurse to
personally coach them, they changed it. To actually sit with them, have purposeful
valuable conversations where they actually are present to ingest what you’re trying to get
them to do with 44 nurses is a struggle. Prioritizing the right work at the right time is
really a struggle. It’s hard to feel like you’re doing a good job at anything. (RNL04)
Communicate, Listen to Understand, and Respond to Staff Nurse Concerns
The subtheme communicate, listen to understand, and respond to staff nurse concerns is
defined as a structure and process nurse leaders followed to communicate patient safety
information, actively listen to understand staff nurse challenges, and respond to staff nurses to
address the disconnect between leaders and staff nurses. Nurse leaders described communicating
through staff meetings, weekly updates or newsletters, and email. Daily rounds and daily
huddles emerged as a consistent and effective method of communicating with staff nurses.
Daily rounds were an effective way nurse leaders communicated with staff nurses. Nurse
leaders used rounds to connect with their nurses, touch base with their leads, check on high risk
patients, understand what staff nurses were worried about, and follow up on their concerns.
They also tried to connect on different shifts. For example,
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Every morning I do my leadership rounds. I check with some of our patients, check in
with my team members to see how they're doing and if there's any support I can do, touch
base with my clinical lead right away in the morning, try to understand who they're
worried about, safety quality, any issues that we need real-time follow-up. (RNL02)
Huddles emerged as another effective way nurse leaders communicated with staff nurses.
Setting the stage at the start of the day through unit huddles made the whole team “aware your
patient in 817 is our highest safety risk, we’re all part of the team and we’re all going to work on
a safety plan for the patient” (RNL01). Unit huddles gave nurses a different perspective. For
example, “if they’re always thinking the same they’re not going to know what to change to make
it better” (RNL03).
Facility huddles allowed nurse leaders an opportunity to “reach out to other departments
to see and understand if they are seeing the same things or if we need somebody to help correct a
problem” (RNL01). This was observed when nurse leaders were working with clinical
engineering during huddles to create a safe plan around broken bed alarms. Nurse leaders
described weekly huddles in which “executive leaders touch base with our zero defects and
whatever project we’re working on” (RNL07). The executive leaders would always say “do you
guys have what you need, what's going well, what's not going well” (RNL07).
Daily unit huddles helped nurse leaders communicate and connect with their staff nurses,
facilitated understanding of the highest safety risks, facilitated making sure there was a plan to
keep patients safe, provided a venue to educate and follow up with staff nurses on safety related
issues, facilitated teamwork, and helped connect staff nurses to the whys and the purpose of
safety interventions and nursing contributions.
For example, I think it gives the nurses a different perspective. If they're always thinking
the same they're not going to know what to change to make it better. So for example,
printing the policies, if they haven't reviewed, like our foley policy changed in the past
three months and a lot of the nurses did not know I need to remove that foley, put a new
one in to get a UA [urinary analysis], or the red seal is non-intact what do I need to
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know. So it's really helping them think and pull the policy before they do if you haven't
done it in a in a month or two you really should pull it up and review. Also to understand
the hard work that they have done so pulling up...it’s been this many days since we had
an incident on the floor. What you're doing is working. Keep up the hard work.
Recognizing them so they don't feel like it's just mundane every day and every day that
what they're doing is purposeful and contributing to what we need to do. (RNL03)
This was observed when nurse leaders shared at their unit safety huddle tips for staff to stay safe
from aggressive patients that they learned from the facility huddle when an employee from
another unit was hurt by a patient. Leaders focused communication on the safety scorecard and
safety learnings. This was witnessed during huddle observations.
Huddles, including post fall huddles, were used to learn and communicate learnings to
the rest of the nursing team. For example, nurse leaders shared “you [staff nurses] have to call
tele before you transfer a patient otherwise they won’t know and they can call the wrong nurse.
Someone could have died because we’re not following the oxygen protocol” (RNL07). There
were a lack of huddles on night shift because there were “fill in leads or charge nurses on night
shift and there is a lack of expectations and limited follow up with night shift” (RNL09). Nurse
leaders identified inconsistent messaging among nurse leaders as a barrier to communication
because staff nurses were receiving conflicting information. Nurse leaders interpreted
information differently causing a disconnect with messaging and confusion for staff nurses.
Nurse leaders didn’t always “share with each other to spread what’s working well so other areas
can benefit” (RNL06). Nurse leaders weren’t always on the same page causing confusion for
staff nurses when leaders communicated. Nurse leaders weren’t always available to talk with
staff, “you've got to be at a meeting, your staff is busy, how do you have time to go back to them
and discuss those safety issues” (RNL09).
Nurse leaders then listened to understand the staff nurse challenges in providing safe
care. Then they responded by advocating for their staff nurses by “speaking up for my team to
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represent what’s really happening at the frontline, to be that connection” (RNL07) to bridge the
disconnect between leaders and staff nurses. Listening to understand happened by having an
open door policy, being open-minded, and honest. “It's really speaking to high reliable
organization and really changing my leadership style to seek clarity, asking questions, listening
differently, opening my eyes differently” (RNL02). Nurse leaders acknowledged a disconnect
between “what we’d like to do as a system” and “where we are at the bedside” (RNL06). Nurse
leaders described needing to stay connected to the staff nurse so they can support their
perspective to bridge the disconnection gap between leaders and staff nurses. This was observed
when nurse leaders were listening and following up with their staff nurse concerns at unit safety
huddles. Escalating concerns about the safety of floor mats was one example.
Nurse leaders made sure staff nurses were keeping the patient safe. They made sure
nursing interventions were in place. They had challenges making sure staff nurses had what they
needed to provide safe care. Nurse leaders expected staff nurses to stop things or escalate when
they were uncomfortable. The organization aligned goals and prioritized safety. They then
described making sure staff nurses were learning and growing.
Making Sure Staff Nurses are Learning and Growing
The theme making sure staff nurses are learning and growing is defined as a structure and
process to support learning from internal threats to patient safety and through formal programs to
develop skills of the staff nurse (n = 10). Nurse leaders’ subthemes described a nonpunitive
response and follow through and support staff nurse knowledge and education. These subthemes
resulted in supporting learning and growing.
Nonpunitive Response and Follow Through
The subtheme nonpunitive response and follow through is defined as learning and
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growing through encouraging reporting and follow through in a manner that supports staff nurse
decisions without assigning blame to facilitate learning and mitigating patient harm. Nurse
leaders encourage “nurses reporting everything, even good catches” (RNL03). Good catches
were circumstances that could have the potential to harm a patient, but had not reached the
patient or caused harm. However, nurse leaders wanted to be more proactive by “celebrating
good catches, but we don’t utilize it [incident reports] like that as much as we should” (RNL01).
Staff nurses reported safety concerns through an online, anonymous incident reporting
system. The online incident reporting system made follow up “very clear what I need to do, to
change. I can see reports on what is happening on the unit, it helps you think differently on
different areas” (RNL03). Once the incident was reported, nurse leaders provided nonjudgmental feedback as close to real time as possible to help staff nurses learn. A nonjudgmental approach by the organization that supported nurses also helped encourage staff nurse
reporting. “If something happens, we don't point fingers and discipline you, we put in an incident
report, gather data and then we build off of that, because it only makes everybody stronger
instead of just pointing fingers” (RNL07). For example, “at every staff meeting not to embarrass
people, but to educate others we review every issue [incident report]” (RNL06). “I try to be
available and open-minded. I’ve been here long enough to know anything is possible [laughing],
so just trying to seek to understand how we got there and how we could prevent getting there
again” (RNL04). A trusting, non-judgmental response by leaders began by building trusting
relationships with staff nurses. “For me, it’s building a different relationship with my team by
building trust through being approachable and not judging” (RNL02). “Being able to
respectfully coach and learn why people maybe aren’t doing something one way or the other
promotes that patient safety factor” (RNL01).
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In spite of their attempts to create a non-judgmental, nonpunitive response, nurse leaders
felt staff nurses still perceived reporting safety events as punitive. “I don’t know why but it’s so
frustrating” because staff nurses “perceive mistakes will be punitive or put in their file”
(RNL05). This was frustrating because “we’ve always been honest to say if something happens
we’re gonna talk through it. It’s not to say you did something wrong, but it's to understand what
happened and what we could do differently, it’s just making sure” (RNL05). A nurse leader
shared the staff nurse perspective:
I want my organization to stand by me and I know that but a lot of people don’t
necessarily trust leadership, not the manager, the higher ups. I feel like if something were
to happen, a patient fall, those things happen, but I know my organization would still
support me, they’re not going to say you’re canned, but some people don’t feel that way.
(RNL07)
A nurse leader described how following up with staff nurses made her feel.
My hair stood up every time we have to call them in [staff nurse] even though I say we
have your back, we still need to understand what happened so that we don’t keep
repeating that, there’s still an element of I didn’t do something right and that guilt spills
over to make it feel like I’m making them feel bad. (RNL06)
A nurse leader had pride in providing real-time feedback and how she along with her
clinical leads accomplished providing feedback as close to real time as possible. “We don’t
bother them at home but we put a reminder on my calendar for the next time they’re here, days
or nights, to touch base with them to understand what happened and what they would do
differently next time” (RNL04). For example when reviewing a surgical site infection, “we
share the learnings with everyone, then follow up personally with everyone involved and we
share celebrations too of what good really looked like so everyone can learn from it and grow
from it” (RNL04). Nurse leaders compiled incident reports and brought them forward to the
appropriate person or department to resolve the issue from a systems perspective. For example,
pharmacy and information technology assisted in resolving incidents with heparin drips. Nurse

192
leaders shared the results of safety reporting to facilitate reporting. “We've had heparin drip
incident reports and I was able to bring that to our medication safety officer and say we need to
do something differently” and this resulted in a system change to make medication
administration safer because “there is going to be something in place that will have a stop so the
nurses are not hanging it incorrectly” (RNL03).
Nurse leaders acknowledged the staff nurse perception that leaders don’t always follow
up. Nurse leaders used huddles to talk through learnings with staff nurses so they know they’re
following up. “I don’t know if they just didn't know if the follow-up was completed, but really
doing the huddles and talking through it they’re starting to understand more” (RNL03). They
also followed up and provided feedback immediately “if there’s any huge safety concern we’d
obviously give feedback with the staff right then” (RNL05). Debriefing facilitated talking about
what went well and what should be done differently. For example, “if there is a fall, we do the
post-fall huddles, so like immediate feedback” (RNL07). Learning also occurred from a root
cause analysis and by focusing on system issues and not blaming.
It’s truly investigated from the unit manager, the frontline team, quality, infection
prevention coming together to really dig deep into that particular case. Discover if we
can come up with the root cause and proactively initiate changes for the system to
mitigate that risk for the next patient. (RNL01)
Root cause analysis did not always reflect what was going on at the frontlines. “I’ve been at a
few of them that pretty loudly I can say that this is not how our nurses do it, this is not the way
it's done” (RNL09). This created the perception that “it’s a lot of blame versus finding system
opportunities to fix the potential for error” (RNL09).
Support Staff Nurse Knowledge and Education
The subtheme support staff nurse knowledge and education is defined as the support
nurse leaders provided to staff nurses for continued development of their skill set. Nurse leaders
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supported staff nurse knowledge and education through an online education system, outside
conventions to support nursing education, supporting certification, and supporting orientation.
“We have the LMS [learning management system]” (RNL04) online learning system. “We have
a great donor who financially supports nurses to go to conventions and get education and we do
compensate, but that’s not something people [staff nurses] are utilizing” (RNL04). Nurse leaders
believed staff nurses didn’t go to conferences or get certified because it wasn’t required. A nurse
leader shared “there’s a lot of education provided around code STEMI and code stroke”
(RNL10). However, she thought it was “sad” regulatory agencies had to require
“multidisciplinary drills to ensure patient safety.”
A nurse leader shared the biggest concern with staff nurses being able to provide safe
care was the orientation process:
We were tasked with creating your own orientation for your floor. I did the best I could
and I’m constantly asking for feedback, but I never received training on how to create an
orientation plan for an RN. There’s a lack of resources, I have no educational support.
So you’re trying to manage that along with other things. We are doing the best we can
with what we have. What we lack in orientation we make up for with a lot of love and
caring for our new people. (RNL04)
RNL03 shared similar concerns, “I try to develop something myself, I might not know best
practice, I don’t have an education background” and staff nurses “feel the education gap too.”
Orientation was critical to making sure staff nurses had the “foundation to know how they
needed to perform their job and deliver patient care, how to correctly administer medications and
how to follow policies here” (RNL05). Finding the best preceptor was challenging because of
the preceptor workload as they often had “a full, busy assignment in addition to training a new
nurse” (RNL05).
Nurse leaders struggled with the lack of leader training or development for themselves.
“It’s tricky because there is no leader training and you are trying to develop yourself so you can
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do a good job and develop your team and maintain the day-to-day work with no support”
(RNL04). For example, “we’ve been given the responsibility to manage a budget, we’ve never
been trained. You’re leading your team and you don’t want them to see you’re struggling,
struggling to get positions approved but you’re working short. It’s a vicious cycle” (RNL09).
Summary Nurse Leader Results
In summary, nurse leaders’ experiences with safety culture on a medical-surgical unit
were described in six themes. Nurse leaders made sure staff nurses were keeping the patient
safe. They made sure nursing interventions were in place. Nurse leaders made sure staff nurses
had what they needed to provide safe care. They expected staff nurses to stop things or escalate
when they were uncomfortable. They needed the organization to prioritize patient safety.
Finally, they made sure staff nurses were learning and growing.
Results: Similarities and Differences Between Staff Nurses and Nurse Leaders
The following results answered the research question describing the similarities and
differences of medical-surgical staff nurses’ and nurse leaders’ experiences with safety culture.
The themes between staff nurses and nurse leaders were similar in language; therefore, shared
language categories were developed. The shared language categories were (1) relationships with
patients; (2) nursing interventions; (3) relationships with colleagues; (4) resources;
(5) organization prioritizes; and (6) learning. The subthemes portraying meanings supported by
rich descriptions of staff nurses’ and nurse leaders’ experiences were coded using convergence
coding in respect to shared, unique, or discord to understand the convergent, unique, or divergent
perspectives between staff nurses and nurse leaders. These themes and subthemes resulted in
staff nurses and nurse leaders making sure the patient was safe as displayed in the final model
(Figure 8). Staff nurses made sure patients were safe by being able to provide safe care. Nurse
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leaders made sure patients were safe by making sure everyone was doing what was best to keep
the patient safe.

Figure 8. Final Model
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Convergence Assessment
There were 18 staff nurse subthemes and 17 nurse leader subthemes. Of those, 12
(34.3%) were shared, three (8.6%) were unique, and 20 (57.1%) were discord (Figure 9). The
convergence within themes between participant groups is likely attributed to the participants
sharing a registered nurse background and a shared immersion in the same culture. Conversely,
the unique and discord findings more than likely are related to differences in the participants’
role within the organization.

Figure 9. Convergence Assessment
Completeness Comparison
The convergence assessment identified shared, unique, and discord subthemes between
participant groups. These findings will be described within the shared language categories to
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answer the final research question of the similarities and differences between staff nurse and
nurse leader experiences with safety culture. A definition of the shared language categories will
be provided.
Relationships with Patients
Although the staff nurse theme time to “know my patient to keep the patient safe” (n =
16) and the nurse leader theme making sure staff nurses are keeping patients safe (n = 10) were
similar in language between participant groups, there were differences in meaning. Relationships
with patients, the shared language category, is defined as the process staff nurses used to build
relationships with their patients by getting to know the patient to understand their health and
safety risks to keep them safe. Developing relationships with patients facilitated knowing the
patient. Nurse leaders described the importance of building relationships with patients by
listening and building relationships. Staff nurses described how they developed relationships
with their patients when they had time to “talk to their patients.” They both identified that
getting to know the patient was the critical first step in providing safe care. There were no
shared subthemes. There were two unique staff nurse subthemes, bedside risk assessments
supported by “going with my gut” and frequent rounds. There were no unique nurse leader
subthemes. There was discord within five subthemes including the staff nurse subtheme time to
“know my patient” by reviewing the EMR, the nurse leader subtheme knowing the patient by
reviewing the EMR, the staff nurse theme “get eyes on my patient’ through BSR, the nurse
leader theme BSR to know the patient and “catch things upstream”, and the nurse leader theme
making sure there is a clear plan.
Relationships with patients: Unique. The unique staff nurse subtheme, bedside risk
assessments supported by “going with my gut”, supported the staff nurse to “get eyes on the
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patient” to facilitate knowing their patient to keep them safe. Staff nurses provided rich
description of how their nursing gut was developed, felt, and used to provide safe care. This was
not described by nurse leaders. The unique staff nurse subtheme, rounding, described how staff
nurses developed relationships with their patients through frequent rounding to get eyes on their
patients throughout their shift. This gave staff nurses time to talk to their patients, make sure
they were still safe, and reinforce education when they had the time to conduct rounds. This was
not described by nurse leaders.
Relationships with patients: Discord. There was discord between the staff nurse
subtheme time to “know my patient” by reviewing the EMR and the nurse leader subtheme
knowing the patient by reviewing the EMR. The EMR provided a source of knowing the patient.
They both identified the EMR to know the patient was inefficient and unreliable and
documentation burden contributed to taking time away from the patient. The discord between
staff nurses and nurse leaders was the rich description provided by staff nurses on how the EMR
was an important part of their process to know the patient and prepare for interactions with the
patient and family; whereas, nurse leaders described the EMR as simply a source of information
and did not describe the integration of reviewing the EMR as part of the nursing process critical
to knowing the patient. Staff nurses described depending on the EMR particularly when the
patient had cognitive barriers that prevented staff nurses from getting to know them. Staff nurses
didn’t have much time to review the EMR because of their workload and having to rush to get to
BSR. Being too busy and having too many interruptions prevented staff nurses from knowing
their patients. Staff nurses described an intense, negative, emotional impact that not having time
with their patients created for them as staff nurses. Nurse leaders did not describe these
experiences.
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There was discord between the staff nurse subtheme “get eyes on my patient” through
BSR and the nurse leader subtheme BSR to know the patient and “catch things upstream.” Staff
nurses described in rich detail how BSR was incorporated into their nursing process to conduct
their first assessment, however they didn’t have sufficient time to conduct BSR; whereas, nurse
leaders focused on BSR to prevent errors. Both identified BSR was an effective method to listen
and talk to patients to get to know them and involve them in their plan of care. BSR also
facilitated getting eyes on the patient and the environment to make sure the patient and
environment were safe.
Staff nurses provided a richer description of why BSR was so important. Staff nurses
identified the patient as the best source of information. They described BSR as their first
important “eyes on patient” assessment and used their “gut” to identify patient risks that would
help them prioritize patient care. They described needing to conduct BSR early in the morning
before they got too busy so they could get a baseline assessment. Instead, nurse leaders’
description focused on BSR as a mechanism for the on-coming staff nurse to catch things the offgoing staff nurse missed to prevent errors. Even though they both concluded BSR was not
conducted consistently and described similarities in barriers to conducting BSR, staff nurses
described the time pressure of having “a half hour” to get the off-going nurse out on time
making BSR challenging with a full patient load. Instead, nurse leaders focused on holding staff
nurses accountable and sharing stories to help explain the rationale to perform BSR to ensure it
happened consistently. Conversely, staff nurses described a lack of expectations and
accountability to ensure BSR was conducted, especially when patients were being transferred
from other units.
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There was also discord with the nurse leader subtheme having a clear plan in place to
keep patients safe and staff nurses’ experiences described within several other subthemes. Nurse
leaders described knowing the patient and keeping them safe as making sure there was a clear
plan in place. This was described as their most safe day. A clear plan included collaboration and
input from the patient, physician, nurse, and other disciplines. Nurse leaders described
physicians as rounding with staff nurses to educate and develop them as nurses. Nurse leaders
also described clear follow up, following orders, and following policies as making sure there was
a plan in place. Staff nurses put much less emphasis on this view of collaboration. Instead, they
described needing physicians to listen, be more willing to hear the staff nurse perspective,
acknowledge staff nurse recommendations even if they don’t both agree, and take them
seriously. Conversely, they did not describe a collaborative plan as following orders or policies
or having the physician develop or educate them. The purpose of collaborative rounds from the
staff nurse perspective was a quick understanding of what each discipline needed, including the
staff nurse, and direction for follow up. Both identified a lack of physician relationships and
unwillingness to collaborate with staff nurses was a barrier to having a collaborative plan in
place and keeping the patient safe.
Nursing Interventions
Although the staff nurse theme “using my gut” and nursing interventions (n = 16) and the
nurse leader theme making sure staff nurses have nursing interventions in place (n = 10) were
similar in language between participant groups, there were differences in meaning. Nursing
interventions, the shared language category, is defined as risk assessments, policies, and
protocols nurses followed to keep patients safe. There were four shared subthemes including
staff nurse and nurse leader workarounds and staff nurse and nurse leader alarms, warnings,
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checklists and safety checks described by both groups. There were no unique subthemes. There
was discord in three subthemes including the staff nurse subtheme appropriate nursing
interventions, the nurse leader subtheme nursing interventions “for nurses to follow”, and the
nurse leader subtheme nurse leaders setting expectations and holding staff nurses accountable for
following nursing interventions.
Nursing interventions: Shared. Workarounds to keep patients safe and alarms,
warnings, checklists, and safety checks were shared subthemes of nursing interventions. Staff
nurses and nurse leaders acknowledged staff nurses implemented workarounds in the best
interest of keeping patients safe. Time pressure, resources not available, unrealistic nursing
interventions, nursing interventions that didn’t make sense, and not understanding the rationale
of the nursing interventions contributed to workarounds. Both rationalized workarounds as they
were in the best interest of keeping the patient safe. Nurse leaders didn’t feel there was ever a
good reason for workarounds, but understood they facilitated the staff nurse to get what they
thought the patient needed. There was agreement staff nurses wouldn’t do something they felt
was unsafe for the patient.
Both agreed alarms and warnings were useful if they were answered and not broken.
Staff nurses were concerned alarms and warnings decreased the development of critical thinking.
They also agreed checklists and safety checks helped busy staff nurses remember; however, both
agreed the resources weren’t always available to do checks and they added extra work burden to
the already busy staff nurse. There was a shared perception that staff nurses focused on
completing the checklist instead of focusing on the patient and the rationale of the intervention.
Nursing interventions: Discord. There was discord between the staff nurse subtheme
appropriate nursing interventions and nurse leader subtheme nursing interventions “for nurses to
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follow.” Appropriate nursing interventions were described by staff nurses; whereas, nursing
interventions for staff nurses to follow was described by nurse leaders. The discord was in the
staff nurse description of nursing interventions supplemented by nursing judgment; conversely,
nurse leaders described nursing interventions as standards of care that nurses should follow
without taking into consideration nursing judgment. Furthermore, staff nurses described
concerns that merely following nursing interventions was not only unsafe at times, but it
undermined the development of critical thinking and nursing judgment.
Staff nurses and nurse leaders described nursing interventions as risk assessments,
policies, and protocols that guided evidence-based nursing interventions. Staff nurses
emphasized the importance of nursing interventions to support autonomous nursing practice
when applied using clinical judgment. On the contrary, nurse leaders emphasized using nursing
interventions to make sure staff nurses had the correct interventions in place to make sure
patients were safe.
Staff nurses believed risk assessments had the potential to provide a false sense of
security as they were not predictive by nature, conflicted with critical thinking, and decreased the
development of critical thinking by creating a reliance on a risk screen score. Nurse leaders did
not describe this, instead they described risk assessments as ensuring staff nurses were meeting
the intervention requirements to keep patients safe. On the contrary, staff nurses described
following all of the interventions required by a risk screen score, or only following the risk score
interventions, posed a risk to patient safety.
They both identified nursing interventions supported by clinical judgment facilitated
individualized patient care. However, staff nurses described nursing interventions as too black
and white; whereas, nurse leaders couldn’t agree on the right amount of direction nursing
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interventions should provide staff nurses. Furthermore, even though nurse leaders described the
importance of clinical judgment to facilitate individualized care, they described in rich detail
audit processes to make sure nursing interventions were implemented as stated without
consideration for clinical judgment. This created conflict for staff nurses between following
what they believed was best for patient care and their requirement to follow organizational
policies and protocols.
Staff nurses also described the process they used to apply clinical judgment to keep
patients safe. They described an eyeball test that facilitated in just a few minutes of getting eyes
on their patients a gut feeling that determined if their patient was at risk based on their nursing
experience and judgment. While both identified nursing judgment developed over time with
experience, nurse leaders didn’t emphasize through rich description the importance of nursing
experience and judgment to keep patients safe or how “nursing gut” felt. Instead, nurse leaders
focused on making sure staff nurses were compliant with nursing interventions.
Staff nurses felt they couldn’t know everything; therefore, they relied on knowing where
to find their resources. They both identified nursing interventions were not easily accessible at
the point of care and were confusing. Staff nurses described using their nursing experience to try
to remember if they couldn’t find the resources in a timely manner; instead, nurse leaders
described that staff nurses will always use their resources around them if there is something they
don’t know. Although both groups described resources to implement nursing interventions
weren’t always available, staff nurses provided rich description on how “rationing resources”
that were not available was “not fair” and was a risk to patient safety. Nurse leaders did not
describe how that experience made staff nurses feel or the risk that posed to patient safety.
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Nursing interventions were described by both participant groups as not having enough
staff nurse input. Councils and committees were recognized by both groups of participants as
ineffective in obtaining staff nurse input because of lack of staff nurse participation, not listening
to their perspective, not focusing on the important things, and lack of training to effectively work
together within a council or committee. However, nurse leaders also described staff nurses as
not caring enough to be involved, not wanting to come in on their day off, and the nurse leader
didn’t have enough staff to send someone during a work shift. On the contrary, staff nurses
acknowledged they could have input if they were part of a council or committee, but they were
tired and didn’t want to come in on their day off. Staff nurses and nurse leaders described how
not having nurse input contributed to added work for the staff nurse without benefit to the
patient.
Nurse leaders set expectations and held staff nurses accountable to implement nursing
interventions; however, staff nurses did not agree. Nurse leaders set expectations by sharing
stories to make sure staff nurses understood the rationale. They also had open, direct
conversations to support accountability. Then, nurse leaders rounded to make sure interventions
were in place. Staff nurses did not acknowledge any of these descriptions of setting expectations
and holding people accountable. Instead, staff nurses described nurse leaders as struggling to
hold staff nurses accountable. Staff nurses did not see that things changed, the same people
weren’t accountable, and the same poor behaviors were never addressed.
They both identified staff nurses didn’t always implement nursing interventions because
the interventions didn’t always make sense, staff nurses were busy or didn’t have time, and staff
nurses didn’t understand the rationale. Nurse leaders admitted that due to inconsistent and poor
communication by leaders, staff nurses didn’t always know or weren’t educated on nursing
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interventions. While staff nurses acknowledged they weren’t always aware or educated, they
believed they were too exhausted from working long shifts and multiple shifts in a row, busy
with too much to do, and had frequent interruptions causing them to forget to implement nursing
interventions. Nurse leaders described nursing interventions weren’t implemented because staff
nurses didn’t care or were too busy socializing. They also described staff nurses chose not to
follow policies, protocols, or expectations and the organization didn’t address personal choices
and accountability. Nurse leaders took accountability for lack of staff nurse compliance with
nursing interventions because they failed getting to the hearts of staff nurses causing them to
forget it was all about the patient. Conversely, staff nurses felt they were doing everything they
could to keep the patient safe and get them what they needed. The problem was there was too
much to do for the patient and they didn’t have the time.
Time was the most frequently cited barrier to implementing safety interventions between
both groups of participants. Nurse leaders felt staff nurses were busy, overwhelmed, and needed
more time but didn’t describe, as staff nurses did, that staff nurses needed more time with their
patients. Nurse leaders thought time barriers were perceived versus actual barriers. Staff nurses
provided rich descriptions of being busy and not having time including there was too much to do,
phones constantly ringing, patients constantly talking, and endless interruptions. They both
described having to push to get the patient to a higher level of care and getting others to see
things from the staff nurse perspective as a significant contributor to staff nurses not having time.
Staff nurses, however, emphasized through richer description the physical, mental, and
emotional toll busy took on them and not feeling like a nurse at all because of the lack of time
they spent with their patients. Nurse leaders did not describe that experience.
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Nurse leaders relied on staff nurses to conduct audits on nursing interventions to increase
knowledge and accountability. However, experienced staff nurses felt audits were a waste of
their time because they were too busy to do them. Staff nurses with less experience appreciated
the double check. All staff nurses felt nurse leaders didn’t do anything with the audits, therefore
accountability was not reinforced.
Relationships With Colleagues
Although the staff nurse theme getting “extra eyes on the patient” (n = 16) and the nurse
leader theme “I expect staff nurses to stop things or escalate if they feel uncomfortable” (n = 10)
were similar in language, there were differences in meaning. Relationships with colleagues, the
shared language concept, is defined as relationships staff nurses and nurse leaders had with other
colleagues to lean on each other or escalate to keep the patient safe. There were three shared
subthemes including the staff nurse subtheme leaning on others for their expertise, the nurse
leader subtheme getting the “right eyes on the patient”, and the staff nurse subtheme escalating to
keep the patient safe. There were no unique subthemes described be either group of participants.
There was one nurse leader subtheme, “I expect direct conversations about safety” in discord
with staff nurses’ meaning described within several subthemes.
Relationships with colleagues: Shared. Staff nurses got “extra eyes on the patient”
was described by two subthemes, leaning on others for their expertise and escalating to keep the
patient safe. There was shared meaning with those two staff nurse subthemes and the nurse
leader subtheme getting the “right eyes on patients” when staff nurses were not getting what they
needed for the patient. These shared subthemes described other eyes as other staff nurses,
disciplines, nurse leadership, and calling the ICU or a RRT. They both believed staff nurses
used their resources around them for their expertise and escalated to nursing leadership or
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by calling a RRT to keep the patient safe. They both described an inadequate or lack of
physician response as the contributing reason staff nurses didn’t get what they needed for the
patient. Staff nurses were acknowledged by both participant groups as exhausting all their
resources before escalating to a physician. They both also described similar barriers to leaning
on each other. Staff nurses described the negative impact having new staff nurses, nurses not
familiar with the unit, or co-workers that didn’t work together as a team had on getting extra eyes
on the patient. Staff nurses and nurse leaders agreed the charge nurse or clinical lead was a
valuable expert resource on the unit if they were not busy dealing with staffing issues or taking
an assignment. Charge nurses and clinical leads conducted proactive rounds to keep patients
safe when they had time. Both agreed charge nurses and clinical leads not being approachable
was a barrier.
Both participant groups agreed staff nurses would always escalate to keep their patients
safe. They both described fear based on previous experiences as the contributing factor for
delaying escalation. Although staff nurses didn’t hesitate to escalate because they were patient
advocates, they described not always feeling supported during escalation due to the leader not
being available or not removing the barriers. Nurse leaders acknowledged they were not always
available; therefore, they implemented the 24/7 clinical lead staffing model to supplement
leadership on the night shift and weekends. Nurse leaders didn’t believe the organization
provided mentoring or education to the charge nurses or clinical leads to support them in
succeeding in their role as a leader extension. Both agreed charge nurses and clinical leads not
being approachable was a barrier. They also both acknowledged they had little ability to address
poor physician behaviors that were experienced by staff nurses during escalation.
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They both agreed staff nurses were afraid to escalate. The fear derived from previous
experiences and being yelled at by the physician, hierarchies between physicians and staff
nurses, getting too much pushback, and the staff nurse not wanting to look like they don’t know.
In addition, staff nurses and nurses leaders described the negative experiences staff nurses had
when escalating created a safety risk causing staff nurses to hesitate escalating in the future.
Relationships with colleagues: Discord. There was discord between the nurse leader
subtheme “I expect direct conversations about safety” and meaning described by staff nurses
within several subthemes. Overall, they both acknowledge staff nurses weren’t comfortable
having direct conversations. They both identified a lack of confidence, hierarchies with
physicians, fear of jeopardizing relationships, not wanting physicians angry or yelling at staff
nurses, lack of leader follow up, lack of accountability, and repeat poor behaviors as reasons staff
nurses didn’t have direct conversations about safety.
Nurse leaders described their role in creating a culture that speaks up; however, staff
nurses described a fear of jeopardizing relationships with colleagues and expected nurse leaders
to hold others accountable. Nurse leaders focused on creating a culture that spoke up to
challenge unsafe practices and behaviors. Nurse leaders felt staff nurses who had courage and
confidence were perceived as speaking up more. They described their role in developing staff
nurses to have difficult, direct conversations in real time. They coached, encouraged,
empowered, and role-modeled speaking up. They did not describe how they empowered staff
nurses other than when the CEO communicated his support of empowering staff nurses. They
acknowledged staff nurses were afraid to speak up and were unaware of their power to speak up.
Conversely, staff nurses felt empowered when they felt a lack of fear. They also needed
their nurse leaders to intervene in difficult, direct conversations so they wouldn’t jeopardize the
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relationships they depended on to keep their patients safe. Staff nurses then described negative
behaviors and unwillingness to help out by the same staff nurses over time because nurse leaders
were not following up and holding staff nurses accountable. Nurse leaders did not describe this
situation, instead focused on developing staff nurses to speak up and address challenging
behaviors in real time creating a discord between groups.
Nurse leaders also showed gratitude, had an open door policy, made escalation a priority,
and followed up when there was an escalation to show it was important and to support staff
nurses in stopping unsafe actions and behaviors. On the contrary, staff nurses described times
when nurse leaders were unavailable or couldn’t remove barriers. Nurse leaders did
acknowledge they needed more time to and the ability to remove some of the barriers staff nurses
brought forward.
Resources
Although the staff nurse theme not always having what is needed to provide safe care (n
= 16) and the nurse leader theme making sure staff nurses have what they need to provide safe (n
= 10) were similar in language, there were differences in meaning. Resources, the shared
language category, are defined as the human resources, patient supplies, working equipment, and
relationships staff nurses needed to provide safe care to keep patients safe. Staff nurses and
nurse leaders both acknowledged staff nurses didn’t always have resources and relationships they
needed to provide safe care. There were two shared subthemes including the staff nurse
subtheme supplies and working equipment are not always available and the nurse leader
subtheme supplies and working aren’t always available to keep staff nurses at the bedside. There
were no unique subthemes. There were six subthemes in discord including the staff nurse
subtheme inadequate staffing contributes to unsafe care, the nurse leader subtheme balancing
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financially responsible staffing with patient needs is challenging, the staff nurse subtheme we
don’t always work together as a team, the nurse leader subtheme the whole team doesn’t always
work together, the staff nurse subtheme “more respect from physicians would be appreciated”,
and the nurse leader subtheme we don’t have great relationships with our physicians.
Resources: Shared. Staff nurses and nurse leaders both agreed staff nurses did not
always have supplies and working equipment readily available to keep staff nurses at the
bedside. They both agreed they got the supplies and equipment they needed; however, nurse
leaders felt there was better equipment available out there. They also both agreed challenges
with not having supplies available and broken equipment contributed to workarounds and took
staff nurses away from the bedside.
Resources: Discord. There was discord between safe staffing models that supported
workload and what contributed to inadequate staffing between participant groups. Inadequate
staffing was the most described negative safety culture experience between groups. In order to
spend more time with their patients, staff nurses described needing staffing models that
supported their workload with the correct support staff that allowed them to practice as registered
nurses. On the contrary, nurse leaders described appropriate staffing models that supported
workload except when staff nurses were managing high acuity patients, staff nurses disagreed.
They both described similar barriers to staffing such as the skill mix and experience of
staff nurses, algorithms that don’t reflect the acuity and high needs patients, patient acuity,
documentation burden, geography of patient placement, admission work burden, inefficient
workflows, and push back when trying to get others to see things from their perspective.
However, staff nurses felt nurse leaders could relieve some of the burden by holding others
accountable for doing their jobs.
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Nurse leaders described nursing turnover, vacancies, call ins, flexing staff nurses to other
units, staff nurses on orientation, and the emotional and mental status of the staff nurses as
barriers to staffing not described by staff nurses. Nurses leaders felt force over, creative
assignments, staff nurse recognition, and support from the staffing office facilitated staffing.
These were not described by staff nurses, instead the staffing office was described as a barrier for
staff nurses that prohibited proactive planning. Nurse leaders didn’t describe proactive planning.
Staff nurses described inadequate support staff as a barrier not fully described by nurse leaders.
Nurse leaders believed technology could facilitate support staff challenges, this was not
described by staff nurses. Nurse leaders struggled balancing staffing with being financially
responsible and supporting the needs of the community, this perspective was not described by
staff nurses.
They both identified algorithms were not helpful because they only addressed the census.
They also both identified that the disagreement between nurses, physicians, and the ICU on
appropriate level of care and admission guidelines was a barrier. Staff nurses struggled with the
inability for charge nurses to right size teams by distributing high acuity and high needs patients
across staff nurse teams; conversely, nurse leaders acknowledged the distribution of high acuity
patients contributed to a safe day and believed this happened. Nurse leaders described not
having the right people in the right roles such as a transport team or IV team to support nurse
staffing that was not described by staff nurses.
There was discord in working together as a team. Specifically nurse leaders believed
staff nurses worked well with the team on their unit, seemingly unaware of the amount of
challenges faced with the staff on their unit. Instead, nurse leader described not working
together as a team with other departments, this was not the focus for staff nurses. They both
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described needing to work together as a team together on the unit and with other departments.
Staff nurses described how important working together as a team was to help them get through
challenging days; however, nurse leaders didn’t describe the importance of those relationships.
This contributed to their most safe day and alleviated being too busy and workflow challenges.
They both described the team on the unit as the staff nurses and support staff on the unit.
They both described situations in which they didn’t work together as a team on the unit;
however, nurse leaders felt overall staff nurses worked together as a team on the unit.
Conversely, staff nurses described the challenges they faced when the same staff nurses or team
on the unit didn’t work together as a team making them feel they were alone and the challenges
this posed with providing safe care. They described nurse leaders as not holding staff nurses
accountable for their behaviors. Nurse leaders were silent on this described experience and
impact.
Staff nurses and nurse leaders described personal characteristics and behaviors that
supported positive working relationships between staff nurses such as positive behavior,
willingness to help out, and huddles to communicate about safety. Staff nurses that were new, or
those who recalled when they were new, described challenges with working together as a team
that resolved as they built relationships with their co-workers over time, although nurse leaders
acknowledged relationships build over time they did not describe staff nurse experiences with
feeling intimidated by other staff nurses on the unit and how this made them feel. They both
described other departments not working together as a team; however, nurse leaders placed a
greater emphasis on the impact of other departments not helping out by ignoring call lights and
their own struggles working together with other departments. This made nurse leaders feel
disrespected and unable to remove barriers for staff nurses, not described by staff nurses.
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Both agreed poor relationships with physicians were the main contributor, after staffing
challenges, to unsafe care. Nurse leaders felt it was the hardest barrier to overcome because they
had little power or influence to address repeated, poor physician behaviors. Staff nurses felt the
organization needed to set behavior expectations and hold people accountable. The discord was
that staff nurses needed physicians to respect them and be accountable for doing their job to
provide safe care; whereas, nurse leaders described role-modeling how to interact with
physicians without describing in rich detail the lack of overall respect physicians showed staff
nurses and how this made them feel.
Staff nurses provided rich descriptions of what was contributing to poor physician
relationships including, physicians aren’t there for the patients like they’re there for the patients.
Not being there for the patient was described by staff nurses as physicians relying on staff nurses
to double check their work and remind them to fix wrong orders or put in new orders. They also
had to call physicians repeatedly to get them to do their work or follow through. This not only
added extra time for the already busy staff nurse, but it created an environment conducive to staff
nurses making errors in providing care. Conversely, nurse leaders didn’t describe those
experiences as contributing to poor relationships between staff nurses and physicians, instead
focused on having to coach staff nurses to have different conversations with physicians than
what they were hearing. They both identified a lack of or inappropriate physician response was a
contributor to the poor relationships.
Staff nurses and nurse leaders experienced intimidating physician behavior and
physicians looking down on nurses. Newer nurses, in particular, felt physicians looked down on
them because they were new. Staff nurses believed their role as patient advocates and building a
backbone or thick skin were facilitators for coping with poor relationships with physicians. This
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was not described by nurse leaders. They both identified that relationships and trust between
staff nurses and physicians developed over time. They both also identified a lack of follow up
with poor physician behaviors and negative experiences with physicians contributed to unsafe
care.
Staff nurses were not being respected as the eyes and ears of the patient. They wanted to
be trusted and respected for their role as a staff nurse. Staff nurses didn’t feel physicians
respected or actively listened to their perspectives. Instead, nurse leaders focused on their role in
cultivating relationships and trying to create bonds between staff nurses and physicians by role
modeling collaborative relationships with physicians, modeling professional conversations,
asking for feedback from physicians, and leading by example to show we are here to work
together. They did not describe advocating for the role of the staff nurse. Staff nurses needed
nurse leaders to follow up and remove barriers in real time so they could spend more time with
their patients, however nurse leaders described challenges in removing barriers for staff nurses.
Organization Prioritizes
The staff nurse theme organization prioritizes patient safety (n = 16) and the nurse leader
theme the organization prioritizes patient safety (n = 10) were similar in language, however there
were differences in meaning. The organization prioritizes, the shared language category, is
described as the process the organization used to establish safety goals, align safety goals, and
communicate safety goals and safety interventions across the organization. There was shared
meaning in three subthemes “giving nurses a voice in making improvements”, “sharing the
numbers and keeping us updated”, and establishing goals and providing transparency. There
were no unique staff nurse or nurse leader subthemes. There was discord in communicate, listen
to understand, and respond to staff nurse concerns.
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Organization prioritizes: Shared. There was shared meaning of the staff nurse
subtheme “giving nurses a voice in making improvements” and nurse leader experiences
described within other subthemes. A disconnect between what organizational leaders believed
was happening on the frontline and what was actually happening on the frontline was a shared
experience. This caused organizational leaders to create safety interventions that added extra
work for the staff nurse without benefitting the patient. Both groups of participants agreed
giving staff nurses a voice in making improvements closed the disconnect between staff nurses
and leaders, but staff nurses didn’t always have a voice in decisions. Councils and committees
were a venue to give nurses a voice, but they were ineffective, lacked staff nurse participation,
and staff nurse voices weren’t always heard or listened to.
There was also shared meaning of the staff nurse subtheme “sharing the numbers and
keeping us updated” and the nurse leader subtheme establishing goals and providing
transparency. There was agreement that communicating patient safety goals and providing
transparency of the patient safety data set the tone across the organization. They both agreed
declaring zero harm was possible had changed their mindsets and behaviors. Leaders changed
what they thought was important and started focusing on making sure safe care was provided.
Staff nurses started providing care differently. For example, they became aware foley catheters
and central lines were a source of risk so they became proactive to remove them from patients.
Transparency of sharing safety goals helped them understand where they were and where they
needed to go. Nurse leaders appreciated external benchmarks. Staff nurses had no idea they
weren’t providing safe care until safety data was shared.
Nurse leaders kept staff nurses updated by communicating and sharing what the
organization was doing to improve patient safety was also shared. This created a sense among
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staff nurses that they were listening and responding. Communication occurred through multiple
modalities, however safety huddles emerged as a consistent, favorable method. Huddles were an
effective mechanism to check on staff nurses and patients, educate, mentor, make sure everyone
had what they needed, and follow up. Communication was a shared barrier as nurse leaders
provided ineffective and inconsistent messaging and there was a gap in communicating and
follow up on night shift. Nurse leaders also described that leaders interpret information
differently and staff nurses and nurse leaders were too busy to communicate with each other.
Staff nurses agreed nurse leaders communicated different interpretations of information.
Nurse leaders believed aligning everyone to prioritize and focus on safety through shared
goals helped get everyone on the same page, although this wasn’t described by staff nurses.
Nurse leaders described the importance of aligned goals from the executive team to the staff
nurse role to prioritize safety and help staff nurses understand their role in patient safety. Nurse
leaders had too many priorities and felt like they weren’t doing anything good at all. Staff nurses
were silent on this description, although acknowledged nurse leaders were busy. Nurse leaders
were frustrated with the lack of shared understanding of what it meant for everyone to focus on
safety causing nurse leaders to feel a lack of respect and inability to remove barriers for staff
nurses. Although staff nurses acknowledged nurse leaders tried and could not remove barriers,
they were silent on this making nurse leaders feel disrespected. Nurse leaders also described the
challenges with creating a culture when the culture was always changing because of leadership
turnover.
Organization prioritizes: Discord. There was discord in the nurse leader subtheme
communicate, listen to understand, and respond to staff nurse concerns and staff nurse
experiences described within other subthemes. Nurse leaders described, with rich description,
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the methods they used to facilitate listening to their staff nurses to understand their perspective.
Nurse leaders stayed connected to their staff nurses by building trusting relationships with staff
nurses and rounding. Staff nurses were silent on nurse leader rounding to stay connected,
however they described good relationships with their nurse leaders. Although nurse leaders
described listening, staff nurses didn’t feel listened to, heard, or that they had a voice.
Nurse leaders acknowledged a disconnect between staff nurses and organizational
leaders. They believed they served as a voice to advocate for staff nurses. There was discord in
nurse leader as a staff nurse advocate. In fact, staff nurses wondered who was looking out for
them. This suggested they did not feel like they had any advocates.
Learning
The staff nurse theme learning: “Have our backs” (n = 16) and the nurse leader theme
making sure staff nurses are learning and growing (n = 10) were similar in language, however
there were differences in meaning. Learning, the shared language category, is defined as the
mechanisms in which staff nurses learned or were supported to learn to improve the safety of
care delivery. There were no shared subthemes. There were no unique staff nurse subthemes.
There was one unique nurse leader subtheme support staff nurse knowledge and education.
There were four subthemes in discord including the staff nurse subtheme time to teach and learn
from experience, the staff nurse subtheme learning from mistakes, the nurse leader subtheme
nonpunitive response and follow through, and the staff nurse subtheme we don’t always learn
from audits.
Learning: Unique. Nurse leaders had a unique perspective on learning through
conferences and certifications, orientation, and professional development. Nurse leaders
supported conferences and certification, but acknowledged staff nurses didn’t participate. Nurse
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leaders described the importance of nurse orientation and their concerns that education was a
barrier for staff nurses to provide safe care. Nurse leaders shared their own discontent with lack
of leadership development opportunities. Staff nurses were silent on professional development.
Learning: Discord. Although staff nurses and nurse leaders described staff nurses as
learning by experience, nurse leaders described a different approach to learning by experience by
sharing stories to facilitate learning by experience. Conversely, staff nurses needed to learn from
each other. Staff nurses learned through experiences, especially if they were positive
experiences. They also needed time to learn and teach by sharing experiences with each other
through debriefs, reflections, and sharing their own experiences to build their knowledge. A lack
of time was a barrier for staff nurses to teach and learn from each other, this was not described
by nurse leaders. Nurse leaders were silent on staff nurses needing time to teach and learn from
each other to build nursing experience and judgment; instead focused on sharing stories of
experiences of other staff nurses.
Within learning, there was identification between staff nurses and nurses leaders that staff
nurses learn from mistakes. Staff nurses described fear of reporting safety concerns. They also
described a lack of leader follow through and punitive response to mistakes. Conversely, nurse
leaders prided themselves in timely, nonjudgmental follow through when mistakes or safety
concerns were reported. Staff nurses also described receiving no follow up on safety culture
survey results; whereas, nurse leaders did not describe safety culture surveys.
Staff nurses and nurse leaders acknowledged learning began with staff nurses reporting
safety concerns. They reported safety concerns through an anonymous online incident reporting
system. Both identified providing anonymous feedback in real time facilitated reporting as well
as a focus on fixing processes and not blaming individuals. While nurse leaders encouraged
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reporting by following through in a non-judgmental, as real-time as possible manner, they
acknowledged their frustration with staff nurses not reporting safety concerns. Nurse leaders felt
they provided feedback and followed up, however they acknowledged the staff nurse perception
that follow up was inadequate. They described pride in their processes for following up on staff
nurse concerns and safety events. Nurse leaders were aware of the discord in perception of
follow up, but they believed the perception was influenced by ensuring the integrity of the
confidential, no blame process of following up. Conversely, staff nurses described not reporting
safety concerns because they experienced a lack of follow up and feared they would be punished.
They also reported fear of jeopardizing relationships with colleagues and physicians as
contributing to their fear of reporting, not described by nurse leaders.
Learning by debriefing on safety incidents, such as a post-fall huddle, facilitated learning
from the mistakes by sharing those experiences with individuals and the entire team through
safety huddles. Root cause analysis after a mistake was reported was seen as an effective
method to fix systems issues while not blaming individuals, however it was also experienced by
both groups as punitive.
There was discord in the nonpunitive approach. Nurse leaders felt they were available,
open-minded, built trusting relationships with their staff nurses, and respectfully coached to
facilitate a nonpunitive response. While staff nurses were silent on these descriptions, they
appreciated listening and not writing things down. Staff nurses wanted to learn from mistakes in
a non-judgmental, positive learning environment. They needed their nurse leaders to have their
back and support them. They described not wanting to be judged because they were humans and
humans make mistakes, however they feared punishment for making mistakes. Staff nurses
described a punitive response based on what they’ve heard from others on the unit and the horror
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stories they heard in nursing school when staff nurses were fired or reprimanded for making a
mistake. Nurse leaders were frustrated that staff nurses perceived a punitive response to
mistakes. Nurse leaders focused on systems and not blaming individuals as a learning approach;
however, staff nurses and nurse leaders described inconsistencies in leaders focusing on fixing
the process and not blaming the person. Nurse leaders felt they needed to not blame, but staff
nurses needed to be held accountable for their decisions. Staff nurses didn’t describe
professionally accountability.
Finally, as previously described, staff nurses and nurse leaders were in discord with
learning from audits. Nurse leaders felt they not only used audits to hold staff nurses
accountable, but they shared learnings based on audit findings with individuals and the team,
however staff nurses disagreed.
Summary of Similarities and Differences Between Staff Nurse and Nurse Leader Results
The results answered the final research question describing the similarities and
differences of medical-surgical staff nurses’ and nurse leaders’ experiences with safety culture.
There was convergence among the language of themes between participant groups; therefore,
shared language categories were developed. These shared language categories identified the
importance of relationships with patients, nursing interventions, relationships with colleagues,
resources, organization prioritizes, and learning as the means by which staff nurses and nurse
leaders kept patients safe. Subthemes provided rich description of participant meaning attributed
to the themes. Subthemes varied in convergence and divergence, with few unique findings. The
convergence in subthemes reflected the shared language used by registered nurses immersed in
the same culture. The differences in subthemes reflected the unique role of each of the
participant groups. The themes and subthemes supported making sure patients were safe. Staff
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nurses made sure patients were safe by being able to provide safe care. On the contrary, nurse
leaders made sure patients were safe by making sure everyone was doing what was best to keep
the patient safe. They both agreed everyone was doing their best to keep patients safe.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The results of staff nurse and nurse leader experiences with safety culture were described
in the previous chapter. Similarities and differences between staff nurse and nurse leader
experiences with safety culture within a medical-surgical hospital unit context were described.
Staff nurses and nurse leaders used similar language to describe experiences with safety culture
with differences in meaning, unique to their individual roles, to describe six themes within each
participant group. The similarity in language of themes allowed for the description of shared
language categories. These shared language categories were described as relationships with
patients, nursing interventions, relationships with colleagues, resources, organization prioritizes,
and learning. The meanings of the themes described within the subthemes varied in respect to
convergent, unique, and divergent experiences between groups. The themes and subthemes
resulted in making sure patients were safe for both groups of participants. Making sure is
defined as “to find out or do something so that one has no doubt about whether something is true,
correct, will happen, etc.” (Merrian-Webster, n.d.). In this study, staff nurses were “making
sure” by providing care, nurse leaders were “making sure” by ensuring “everyone was doing
their best to provide safe care.” Safe, in this study, was consistent with the standard definition of
safe defined as “the condition of being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury or loss”
(Merrian-Webster, n.d.). Staff nurses and nurse leaders both believed everyone was trying to
provide safe care.
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Making sure patients were safe was either facilitated or inhibited through relationships
between everyone and between everyone and the organization. Relationships are defined as “the
way in which two or more people are connected” and “the way in which two or more people or
groups regard and behave toward each other” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Although all
relationships had some constraints in which staff nurses and nurse leaders were able to resolve or
work through issues, relationships between staff nurses and physicians were particularly
constrained without a process for a resolution. For example, although nurse leaders did not feel
respected by other departments limiting their ability to remove barriers for staff nurses to provide
safe care, they described a means to work with other departments to improve those relationships.
Conversely, poor relationships were addressed by nurse leaders who focused on role modeling
how to have professional conversations with physicians for staff nurses that did not result in
improved relationships.
Time to build trust between staff nurses and physicians did result in improved
relationships for several experienced staff nurses; however, unprofessional interactions between
staff nurses and physicians was consistently experienced and witnessed. Staff nurses and nurse
leaders did not feel the staff nurse role was respected or trusted as the eyes and ears of the patient
by physicians. Respect is defined as “a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something
elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievements” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Staff nurses and
nurses leaders described unique abilities, qualities, and a skill set staff nurses contribute that
warrants respect because of their impact on making sure patients were safe. Relationships were
essential to making sure patients were safe. Staff nurses and nurse leaders agreed that poor
relationships between staff nurses and physicians was a barrier to making sure patients were safe.

224
In this chapter, findings from this study will be compared to the safety culture framework
to ascertain theoretical triangulation to promote a more complete picture of safety culture in
medical-surgical units as experienced by staff nurses and nurse leaders (RSSB, n.d.). Findings
will be compared to previous research and previous SOPS findings to illustrate the
complementarity this design contributed to the safety culture literature. This research provided a
rich description of the human behaviors and responses of staff nurses and nurse leaders provided
by those experiencing the phenomenon, safety culture. Findings that were shared, unique, and in
discord will be compared to previous findings. This will be followed by a discussion of
strengths and limitations of this study. Finally, recommendations for future application in
nursing research, practice, education, and policy will be described.
Key Findings Compared to Previous Research Findings
The findings of this study will be compared to knowledge that is known. Shared
language categories will be compared within the situational, behavioral, and psychological
aspects of a safety culture to provide methodologic triangulation and complementarity. Findings
will also be compared to the 2018 AHRQ SOPS trending database to provide a richer description
of the discrepancy of results between staff nurses and nurse leaders (Famolaro, et al., 2018).
Situational Aspects
Situational aspects are what an organization has to promote a safety culture such as
policies, regulations, and organizational structures (Cooper, 2000). Situational aspects,
changeable organizational factors, support a normative approach to culture that result in the
organization being cultured (Edwards et al., 2013). Several key situational aspects were
described in this study including the organization prioritizes, resources, nursing interventions,
and learning.
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Organization Prioritizes
A review of safety culture literature in the United States identified the critical role leaders
and the organization contributed to safety culture. They contributed by designing, fostering, and
nurturing a safety culture through acknowledgement that hospitals were high risk environments,
by aligning the organization’s vision and mission to support patient safety, developing
competencies, and aligning resources (Sammer et al., 2010). However, evidence supporting
those relationships is scarce (Sammer et al., 2010). The SOPS composite management support
for patient safety found an 86% favorable response of leaders compared to a 65% favorable
response from nurses (Famolaro et al., 2018). This composite is comprised of assessing if
management provides a safety climate that promotes patient safety, the actions of management
show patient safety is a top priority, and management seems interested in patient safety only after
an adverse event happens.
Staff nurses and nurse leaders described inadequate staffing, lack of working equipment
and supplies at the bedside, poor behaviors that went unaddressed, work processes that didn’t
make sense, and the inability to influence these factors. The convergence in description between
participants in this study suggests nurse leaders, a subset of leaders in the SOPS, do not represent
the perspectives of the leader unit of analysis or staff nurses do not represent the nurse unit of
analysis. There was discord in meaning of staff nurses and nurse leaders that provided insight
into the discrepancy between leaders and nurses in particular, listening and responding.
In this study, the organization set the tone by declaring zero harm was possible. They
then prioritized patient safety by aligning goals and providing transparency of safety outcomes to
get everyone on the same page. Expectations were then set and leaders held others accountable;
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however, there was discord in this meaning. Staff nurses and nurse leaders agreed there was a
disconnect between organizational leaders and staff nurses.
Zero harm is possible. When the organization declared zero harm was possible, staff
nurses and nurse leaders changed their mindsets and re-prioritized their focus and work.
Participants in this study acknowledged no one wanted to cause harm; however, there were
significant barriers in systems, processes, and people that made zero harm more of an ideology
than a reality in the current state. This could explain why declaring zero harm without
understanding the psychological and behavioral aspects wasn’t sufficient to positively impact a
safety culture.
Targeting zero isn’t a well-defined construct in healthcare and lacks theoretical
grounding. There is no empirical evidence that declaring zero harm is possible and actually
improves a safety culture or patient safety outcomes, although it would be hard to disagree with
the approach. Critics of the pursuit of zero harm in healthcare have cautioned this approach due
to limitations with measurement and potential safety consequences, suggesting organizations
pursue a more pragmatic approach (Meddings et al., 2020). A meta-analyses of 70 international
studies identified a 6% pooled prevalence of preventable harm in hospitals, but there was a lack
of consensus on what constituted a preventable harm and minimal quality improvement work
focused on averting preventable harm (Panagioti et al., 2019). This study also suggested zero
harm in healthcare was impossible because some harms were not preventable, for example
known risks of treatment (Panagioti et al., 2019).
In this study, staff nurses described being human and humans make mistakes. Mistakes
can and have led to harm. Therefore, declaring zero harm is possible may be influencing the
perception that staff nurses, as previously described and corroborated in this study, are fearful
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mistakes will be held against them or they will be blamed. The consequences of the demand of
expecting perfection from human beings that are fallible has not been explored. Theoretical
support of zero harm could strengthen this lacking body of research.
Aligning goals and providing transparency. The organization in this study, prioritized
patient safety by aligning goals and providing transparency of safety outcomes. This was
previously supported in the review of literature. In this study, nurse leaders experienced
conflicting priorities, too many priorities, and a lack of shared understanding of priorities across
departments. Staff nurses acknowledged their nurse leaders were busy, but were silent on nurse
leaders having too many priorities. Nurse leaders being busy with too many priorities prevented
them from spending time developing staff nurses and making sure patients were safe. Lack of
leadership prioritization of patient safety and failure of leadership to prioritize and support
patient safety has been previously associated with poor patient safety outcomes (Atkins & Cole,
2005; PSAG, 2017).
Having too many priorities is described in the literature. A theoretical model identified
role overload among nurse leaders as the most important predictor of stress (p < .01). The
second and third most important predictors were organizational constraints (p < .01) and role
conflict (p < .01) (Kath et al., 2013). There has been an acknowledgement in the literature that
nurse leaders were busy. Authors recommended nurse leaders shift from busy work to focused,
strategic work through an energy preservation framework to promote vitality that drives
engagement, productivity, and innovation (Shirey & Hites, 2015). However, empirical support
of nurse leader tactics to promote prioritization and accomplishment of duties is lacking. This
study identified how too many priorities made nurse leaders they were doing the best they could
with what they had and not feeling like they were doing anything good at all. They also felt

228
ill-prepared to competently manage all their priorities. A survey of nurse managers (n = 37)
found decreased levels of nurse manager perceived competency with managing the business
and managing the people, taking six years to even reach a level of proficiency (Baxter &
Warshawsky, 2014).
The role of the nurse leader is to provide the vital link between the organization’s
strategy and the point of care (American Organization of Nurse Executives [AONE], 2015).
Nurse leaders must gain expertise in the science of managing the business; the art of leading the
people; and the leader within (AONE, 2015). Nurse leaders provide 24 hour accountability and
responsibility for creating safe, healthy environments that support the work of the health care
team and contribute to patient engagement (AONE, 2015). They are also influential in creating a
professional environment and fostering a culture where interdisciplinary team members are able
to contribute to optimal patient outcomes and grow professionally (AONE, 2015). Nurse leaders
in this study not only lacked confidence in their skill level, they didn’t feel confident they could
develop others as they weren’t supported to develop themselves. However, this is a key
competency in the AONE nurse leader competency model (AONE, 2015).
Nurse leaders, in this study, also acknowledged leader turnover as a threat to the
development of a safety culture. This impacted the ability to develop a culture when the culture
was always changing. Job demands have been associated with leader turnover. In a mixedmethods study, 21 nurse leaders attributed chronic fatigue to 24 hour accountability and intense
role expectations and described their intent to leave the role because of the job demands (Steege
et al., 2017). A qualitative study of 125 staff nurses and managers in Canada identified 19% of
the 60 staff nurses interviewed showed minimal interest in pursuing a role in nursing leadership
because the perceived rewards were not greater than the perceived concerns (Wong et al., 2013).
They observed the effects of nurse manager stress attributed to long hours, heavy workload, poor
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work-life balance, and dissonance nurse managers experienced trying to meet the needs of nurses
and the organization. Another qualitative study of Canadian nurse managers (n = 95) identified
work overload/not having work-life balance, insufficient ability to ensure quality care,
insufficient human/fiscal resources, and insufficient empowerment as factors influencing intent
to leave (n = 28); whereas having work-life balance, support from an immediate supervisor, and
the ability to ensure quality of care were factors influencing intent to stay in the nurse manager
role (n = 67) (Hewko et al., 2015).
If nurse leaders hold such an influential and important role, attention needs to be paid to
the fact that nurse leaders experience role overload, organizational constraints, and role conflict
without any empirical support to help them navigate this situation successfully to create a
healthy, professional work environment while fostering a safety culture. Support to ensure nurse
leaders can successfully manage all their key competencies or a redesign of the role may be
warranted.
Set expectations and hold staff nurses accountable. After declaring no harm was
possible and prioritizing safety, nurse leaders set expectations and held staff nurses accountable.
However, there was discord between staff nurses and nurse leaders when describing nurse
leaders as effective in setting clear expectations or holding staff nurses accountable.
Management support for patient safety, through leadership expectations and actions promoting
patient safety, was supported by the SOPS framework (Famolaro et al., 2018). Although this
was a higher scoring composite, there was still a discrepancy of favorable results between nurses
(77%) and leaders (90%) (Famolaro et al., 2018). The discord in experiences with accountability
found in this study informed the discrepancy in results.
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A recent study identified a positive association between organization support, as part of
an initiative to improve patient safety outcomes, and safety culture in 70 community hospitals
achieving a 62.5% decrease in patient harm (p < .001) and 29% increase in safety climate scores
(p = .00) (Frush et al., 2018). This was accomplished by leadership showing absolute and
unwavering commitment to patient safety, setting patient safety expectations, holding others
accountable, sharing transparent data, creating systems that support patient safety as part of daily
management practices, and executive rounding (Frush et al., 2018). Other interventions included
using well-established improvement science and focusing on components of culture including
teamwork behaviors, mutual respect, accountability, and provider well-being (Frush et al., 2018).
There was no empirical evidence on how leaders hold each other and themselves accountable to
foster a safety culture. Nurse leaders in this study, acknowledged they weren’t always
accountable for clear communication, setting expectations, and holding staff nurses accountable.
In this study, staff nurses and nurse leaders felt staff nurses struggled having peer to peer
accountability conversations. In fact, nurse leaders recognized a lack of professional
accountability, whereas staff nurses were silent on the matter. Although professional
accountability is a core aspect of professional nursing practice, a review of the literature (n = 26)
identified no consistent language or definition of professional accountability in nursing
(Krautscheid, 2014). Empirical evidence linking professional accountability to safety culture or
management practices to influence safety culture was not found. This is also not a component of
the SOPS survey.
Hierarchical accountability is the traditional sense of the organization holding people
accountable from a top-down approach (Tye & Dent, 2020). Building a culture of ownership,
instead of a culture of accountability, promotes intrinsic motivation of doing something because
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you expect it of yourself which is more impactful than doing something because it is expected by
others (Tye & Dent, 2020). This supports the notion that situational factors alone won’t have a
significant impact on safety culture as psychological aspects, such as intrinsic motivation,
contribute to culture. Cultural accountability is a peer-to-peer process of employees holding
each other accountable for standards and behaviors (Tye & Dent, 2020). The lack of progress in
accountability may warrant exploring alternative accountability models.
Disconnect between organizational leaders and staff nurses. In this study, staff nurses
and nurse leaders described a gap between what organizational leaders thought was going on at
the bedside and what was actually going on at the bedside. Safety experts have proclaimed a
safety culture is facilitated when organizational leadership is deeply involved with and attentive
to issues frontline workers face and an understanding of the established norms and hidden
cultures that guide behaviors (AHRQ, 2019).
Nurse leaders attempted to serve as staff nurse advocates to address this gap; however,
described not having the ability or influence to advocate successfully on the behalf of staff
nurses. In addition, this study identified how this made nurse leaders feel disrespected and
frustrated. This role conflict was previously described. Staff nurses did not describe the nurse
leader as a nurse advocate, in fact wondered who was advocating on behalf of their interests. An
advocate “pleads, defends, or supports a cause or interest of another” (Merrian-Webster, n.d.).
Advocacy requires a nurse leader to be able to problem-solve, communicate, influence, and
collaborate (Tomajan, 2012). Nurses readily embrace advocating for the patient; however,
advocating on behalf of the profession, oneself, or the work environment although clearly
outlined in nursing standards of practice and code of ethics, is not consistently addressed
(Tomajan, 2012). Nurse leaders advocate for appropriate resources to promote a positive work
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environment (Tomajan, 2012). In this study, nurse leaders didn’t feel they had influence to
remove barriers for their staff nurses or to promote a positive work environment. For example,
they couldn’t get supplies at the bedside without going through executive leadership. They also
struggled with securing the appropriate staffing models.
Advocacy also involves bringing groups together to address issues or concerns to
promote a healthy work environment (Tomajan, 2012). In this study, physician behaviors were
escalated repeatedly without being addressed. The nurse leaders didn’t feel they could impact
the work environment related to addressing physician behaviors.
Other activities that promote the profession of nursing include teaching, mentoring, peer
review, involvement in professional associations, community service, and knowledge
development and dissemination (ANA, 2015). Nurse leaders described teaching, mentoring, and
knowledge development and dissemination as activities they promoted. Relying on professional
associations to develop nursing standards was also described in this study. However, nursing
peer review and community service was not described. This study showed nurse leaders shared
similar language describing safety culture as staff nurses, with variation in subthemes or
meaning. This suggests nurse leaders perception of safety culture may not be represented within
the majority of the AHRQ SOPS leader safety culture survey results. This study also informed
the need for a powerful nurse advocate to influence safety culture and promote the unique and
valuable role of nursing within a safety culture.
Staff nurses can also serve as powerful nurse advocates through memberships on
committees, councils, and improvement teams (Tomajan, 2012). In this study, staff nurses
acknowledged they could have a voice by joining councils and committees, but they were tired
from working long shifts multiple days in a row, often times not getting a break in a challenging
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work environment. Even though they were paid to participate in committees, councils, and
improvement teams, they didn’t want to stay extra to attend a meeting. Staff nurses and nurse
leaders also agreed although staff nurses could have a voice, their voices often weren’t heard. A
significant relationship between shared governance and empowerment of staff nurses (p < .0001)
indicate a well-designed shared governance model could impact staff nurse empowerment and
promote the voice of the staff nurse (Barden et al., 2011).
The SOPS assesses the perception that the manager/supervisor seriously considers staff
suggestions for improving patient safety (Famolaro et al., 2018). This is a higher scoring
composite with leaders (92%) and nurses (78%). In this study, staff nurses felt their nurse
leaders listened, but felt a disconnect with organizational leadership. Supporting staff nurses to
want to participate to share their valuable voices can be accomplished through administrative
support and modification of the staffing model and working environment to facilitate
participation.
Executive rounds were a method that connected executive leaders to frontline staff.
Several staff nurses and nurse leaders that participated in executive rounds described executive
rounds as a positive experience. Executive rounds connected executive leaders to staff nurses to
support alignment, prioritize, and show leader support of patient safety. There were mixed
empirical results associating executive rounds with improved safety culture (Singer & Tucker,
2014). Implementation differences, intensity of exposure, executive leaders’ understanding and
engagement when conducting rounds, willingness of frontline workers to speak up, and follow
up barriers impacted the effectiveness of executive rounds (Singer & Tucker, 2014).
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Resources
Staff nurses described inadequate staffing as contributing to being too busy and not
having enough time to provide safe care as the primary barrier. Nurse leaders provided a similar
description with slightly differing perceptions of barriers and facilitators. The research results
pose the question, if the role of the nurse leader is to make sure staff nurses have
what they need to provide safe care, and they acknowledged barriers, then who is advocating for
these critical resources on behalf of the staff nurse?
Inadequate staffing. Staffing emerged as the most frequently cited and emotionally
charged negative safety culture experience in this study. Although staff nurses and nurse leaders
acknowledged staffing as a barrier, they differed in their opinion of barriers and facilitators with
staffing. Staffing is a factor in the SOPS, however it was previously reported as having the
lowest reliability (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This composite is also a lower scoring item among
leaders (64%) and nurses (53%) (Famolaro et al., 2018).
A systematic review which included the results of a meta-analysis (n = 27), a narrative
review (n = 28), and 15 new studies identified strong evidence of relationships between
increased nurse staffing per patient ratios and decreased mortality outcomes with no reported
serious patient harms associated with an increase in nurse staffing ratios (Shekelle, 2013).
However, there was no study that identified increased staffing ratios as an intervention to
improve patient outcomes (Shekelle, 2013). Mandated nurse to patient ratios in California have
resulted in fewer patients per nurse on average, significantly decreased patient mortality,
increased nurse job satisfaction, decreased burnout, and increased the ability for nurses to care
for patients compared to two states that didn’t have mandated ratios (Aiken et al., 2010).
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Evidence shows nurse staffing per patient ratios are effective in reducing harm and
improving the workplace environment, yet staff nurses and nurse leaders in this study and in the
SOPS identified staffing challenges. This study showed the barriers were much more
than just ratios. Sitters or care companions were described by staff nurses as a critical facilitator
to managing “high needs” and impulsive patients to prevent falls despite a systematic review (n
= 20) that identified limited evidence for the use of sitters to reduce falls (Greeley et al., 2020).
Nurse leaders described force over or making staff nurses stay four extra hours after their
12 hour shifts as a facilitator for staffing. Staff nurse exhaustion was associated with long hours,
multiple shifts in a row, and the physically and emotionally demanding nature of their work.
This created a barrier to working together as a team because they were exhausted leading to
acting crabby and being too tired to help others. Nurse leaders did not describe the impact force
over or challenging work practices had on safety culture. Leadership failure to recognize and
address burnout was identified as a factor impacting poor safety outcomes (PSAG, 2017). Long
working hours were associated with poor patient safety grades and poor teamwork scores (Wu et
al., 2013). As described in this study, a multiple state study in the United States identified direct
care nurses working in a non-ICU setting (n = 16,074) reported working 12 hour shifts or more
(64%), 12 hour shifts were the median, with 46% disagreeing they had time to take a 30 minute
break within that shift (Witkoski et al., 2013). Compared to direct care nurses working < 10
hours in any hospital setting (n = 22,275), direct care nurses had a higher odds of reporting a
poor hospital safety grade when they worked 12-13 hours (OR = 1.21, 95CI[1.11,1.31], p <
.0001) and when they worked > 13 hours (OR = 2.25, 95CI[1.89,2.68], p < .0001). There was
also a higher odds of poor quality of nursing care reported by direct care nurses who worked
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12-13 hours (OR = 1.27, 95CI[1.13,1.41], p < .0001) and when > 13 hours was worked (OR =
2.43, 95CI[2.04,2.89], p < .0001).
Almost 20 years after the IOM report to support safe patient care, recommendations to
improve the safety of care by supporting prohibition of mandatory overtime to reduce extended
work hours is not routinely followed (IOM, 2003). A scoping review reported key historical
drivers for 12 hour shifts were financial savings, a positive impact on recruitment and retention,
and improved continuity of care (Harris et al., 2015). The review (n = 95) identified inconclusive
evidence of the effects of 12 hour shifts on risks to patients, patient experience, risks to staff,
staff experience, and impact on the organization. Further studies to identify the risks and
benefits of 12 hour shifts is required as staff nurses described the physical, emotional, and mental
exhaustion created by 12 hour shifts.
Nursing Interventions
As described in this study, safer systems of care were described in the literature as, but
not limited to, evidence-based practice bundles, checklists to reduce practice variation, and
supportive technology solutions (Leape, 2015). Staff nurses described nursing interventions as
too black and white causing them to be under or over-utilized. They also described a reliance on
alarms and warnings as negatively impacting critical thinking skills. Nurse leaders had mixed
reactions to nursing interventions describing them as either too grey and not prescriptive enough,
or too black and white not allowing for nursing judgment or critical thinking for individualized
patient care. Safer systems of care have resulted in improvements in patient safety outcomes
(AHRQ, 2014; Longmate et al., 2011; MHA Keystone Center, 2019). However, safer systems
have been plagued by lack of spread and adoption (Leape, 2015).

237
In this study, staff nurses and nurse leaders identified many barriers to spread and
adoption of nursing interventions including: they didn’t understand the whys, they were
confusing, they conflicted with nursing judgment, they weren’t easily accessible, and they were
outdated. They described situations in which risk assessments recommended interventions that
weren’t safe for the patient or the staff nurse. They also described challenges because of
differences in how individuals go about things, lack of nursing experience to apply appropriately,
they were too busy and forgot, the resources weren’t available, and the patient or family didn’t
agree with the interventions. These barriers were consistent with empirical evidence that
identified organizational barriers that were out of the nurses control such as insufficient time,
lack of information sources of evidence-based practice (EBP), insufficient tools related to
research, individual barriers including lack of knowledge and skills, perception of lack of
influence to change practice, and unsupportive colleagues (Black et al., 2015). An integrative
review (n = 20) found individual barriers to EBP may be influenced by programs or interventions
designed to address barriers in incorporating EBP into practice by increasing knowledge and
improving nurses’ attitudes, beliefs, or values related to EBP (Middlebrooks et al., 2016).
However, not all the studies identified an impact with EBP programs and increased knowledge
or improvement in individual barriers (Middlebrooks et al, 2016). The need to provide
individualized patient care as a barrier to implementing EBP was not identified in the integrative
review. Safety interventions are not assessed in the SOPS.
Checklists, alarms, warnings, and double checks were described, in this study, as
facilitators to support busy staff nurses to ensure safe care was provided. Each of these have
been supported in the literature to positively influence safe behaviors (Bates & Singh, 2018).
Lack of support and response to alarms was also described in this study because staff nurses
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were so busy and everyone was on alarms. Alarm fatigue caused by desensitization related to
excessive alarms and the burden of responding to false positive and nonactionable alarms is
supported in the literature (Turmell et al., 2017).
Learning
Learning was described by staff nurses and nurse leaders as reporting safety concerns,
timely follow up and real time feedback, and focus on fixing the process and not blaming the
person. Staff nurses identified needing time to learn from each other to build experience and
judgment. Nurse leaders described their role in supporting nursing knowledge and education.
Learning was identified as a factor of safety culture that occurred when organizations valued and
learned from mistakes and sought new opportunities to improve (Sammer et al., 2010).
Learning was also empirically supported through the SOPS through feedback and
communication about errors, organizational learning-continuous improvement, communication
openness, and nonpunitive response to errors (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Organization learningcontinuous improvement received 85% favorable results among leaders and 72% among nurses
(Famolaro et al., 2018). The item, mistakes have led to positive change, had the largest
discrepancy between leaders (82%) and nurses (62%). This was corroborated in this study when
staff nurses wondered what happened to the events they reported; however, nurse leaders felt
they did a good job following up and sharing learnings. Feedback and communication about
errors also showed discrepancies between leaders (81%) and nurses (65%), also corroborated in
this study (Famolaro et al., 2018). Nurse leaders in this study shared follow up at safety huddles;
however, safety huddles only happened once a day and never happened on night shift, possibly
explaining the staff nurse perception that safety events had no follow through. Nurse leaders
also described the confidential nature of follow up contributing to the perception of lack of
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follow through.
A systematic review (n = 18) was conducted to identify the nurse leaders’ role in
influencing the development of staff nurse knowledge and competence. The study identified
organizational culture that supports learning, sharing of information, learning together, reciprocal
feedback, leadership characteristics including transformational leadership, Magnet hospital
status, and leader traits and competencies positively influenced the development of staff nurse
knowledge and competence (Lunden et al., 2017). The study also identified factors inhibiting
knowledge management including an organizational culture that lacked motivation to learn,
lacked support for learning, lacked knowledge, organizational traits, lack of time, and lack of
human resources. Organizational traits were small capacity of an organization, non-Magnet
status, and individualistic and task-oriented organizational culture. In this study, nurse leaders
identified that staff nurses didn’t participate in medical-surgical nurse certification programs.
Medical-surgical nurse certification is a mechanism for staff nurses to build and demonstrate
commitment, confidence, and credibility with their nursing practice (Academy of MedicalSurgical Nurses [AMSN], n.d.). A review of the literature (n = 8) identified inconsistent
empirical evidence that nursing certification had an impact on patient outcomes (Biel et al.,
2014). The reasons staff nurses weren’t motivated to participate in nursing certification
programs was neither identified nor explored in this study. Staff nurses did not describe
certification programs as learning. No staff nurses were certified in this study.
Situational aspects in healthcare are challenging because the context of a medicalsurgical unit is neither highly controlled nor tightly supervised (Edwards et al., 2013).
Situational aspects both facilitated and inhibited a safety culture. The results of this study
informed how and why situational aspects influenced behavioral aspects.
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Behavioral Aspects
Behavioral aspects are described as what people do, or the work (Cooper, 2000). This is
described as the pragmatic approach to culture or the way the work is done (Edwards et al.,
2013). Staff nurses work in a dynamic environment in which behavior is self-regulated based on
situational and psychological aspects (Cooper, 2000). Behavioral aspects emerged in this study
including relationships with patients, nursing interventions, relationships with colleagues, and
learning.
Relationships with Patients and Nursing Interventions
Staff nurses described a process of knowing patients, getting eyes and extra eyes on
patients, and having a plan in place as how they provided safe care. Nurse leaders shared a
similar process. Making sure was the process staff nurses and nurse leaders used to ensure that
patients were safe and staff nurses had what the needed to provide safe care. Making sure is
described within relationships with patients and nursing interventions. Time to know the patient
supported relationships with patients and nursing interventions. Other nursing interventions
were workarounds, BSR to know the patient while getting eyes on the patient, and handoff
communication.
Making sure. Every nurse and most nurse leaders (n = 8) described making sure as a
process to ensure patients received safe care. A substantive, making sure theory was developed
by Schmidt (2010) describing the social process registered nurses used to watch over their
patients. The process included knowing what’s going on, being close, watching and not taking
anything for granted, taking action, and protecting patients from harm and negative events. This
study corroborated those results.
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A concept analysis described surveillance as a nursing process that used behavioral and
cognitive processes of monitoring, evaluating, and acting upon emerging indicators (Dresser,
2012). Antecedents of surveillance included staffing, skill mix, human and material resource
adequacy, collegial relationships with physicians, nurse expertise, education, experience, and
knowledge. The outcomes were described as, when performed adequately, lower rates of
mortality and failure to rescue with cost savings by avoiding adverse events (Dresser, 2012).
Each of the antecedents were described as barriers or facilitators to safety culture in this study.
For example, working together as a team was described as a facilitator to help staff nurses get
through busy days and keep patients safe. Poor relationships with physicians were described as a
barrier. Nurse leaders were concerned about lack of staff nurse and nurse leader education. In
this study, additional challenges included monitoring, evaluating, and acting upon emerging
indicators. Acting upon emerging indicators was challenged by needing to work with others who
pushed back staff nurses such as the ICU staff and physicians and not having time.
Situational aspects that facilitated making sure were alarms, warnings, checklists, and
safety checks. However, alarms, warnings, checklists, and safety checks were not always
reliable. Staff nurses also didn’t always have enough time to respond. They also had the ability
to bypass these which were described as precursors to unsafe acts.
Time to know the patient. Staff nurses described needing time at the bedside, with the
patient, to make an assessment and apply their nursing judgment to identify the patient’s risk and
apply the appropriate interventions. Staff nurses described making decisions based on their
experiences with other patient situations. This process was empirically supported in the
literature. An integrative literature review (n = 18) identified factors and processes medicalsurgical nurses used to make patient care decisions (Nibbelink & Brewer, 2018). Key findings
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were: nurses’ clinical judgment was influenced by previous experiences rather than the actual
clinical situation; time spent as a nurse led to confidence and increased trust in decision-making;
and intuition was based on recognition of patterns or similar experiences.
Inexperienced nurses used protocols to support decision-making to increase confidence in
decision-making. Experienced nurses relied on protocols for unusual situations because of a
perception protocols interfered with patient specific care and confidence in their ability to make
patient specific decisions rather than simply follow a protocol, this was corroborated in this study
(Nibbelink & Brewer, 2018). Inexperienced staff nurses, in this study, appreciated detailed
nursing interventions to facilitate decision making; whereas, experienced staff nurses found them
too detailed and impractical to access during time-constrained situations.
Autonomy to make decisions was influenced by experience as was the urgency of the
situation (Nibbelink & Brewer, 2018). This was corroborated as staff nurses didn’t hesitate to
call a rapid response for a sudden decline in patient status. During less urgent situations staff
nurses would also seek out expertise by leaning on others with more experience.
Other findings were collaboration with experienced colleagues was preferred over their
own experience or protocols; protocols were difficult to reference during time-constrained
situations; organization and unit culture influenced decision-making based on concerns related to
how they will be perceived by others, all corroborated in this study (Nibbelink & Brewer, 2018).
In this study, nursing experience predicted how a patient would progress. Staff nurses relied on
other staff nurses to share their experiences and knowledge to facilitate safe decision-making.
Previous negative experiences and fear of looking incompetent to their co-workers and
physicians caused hesitancy for staff nurses to reach out for decision-making help. However, as
patient advocates they escalated or called a RRT if the patient’s condition was deteriorating.
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Understanding the patient status, which developed over a period of time, facilitated
decision-making (Nibbelink & Brewer, 2018). This occurred through time the nurse spent
physically with the patient to support more holistic decisions based on a deeper understanding of
individual patient responses. Staff nurses in this study provided rich description on why they
needed time with their patients and the negative impact of not having time with their patient had
on patient safety. This also contributed to distress caused by their inability to provide safe care.
Nurse leaders did not share that perspective. Time to spend with the patient was identified as
highly valued to know the patient and pick up on cues; however, the lack of time to know the
patient to support decision making was a barrier to safety culture. The EMR supported knowing
the patient but had limitations.
Workarounds to get what the patient needs now. Nursing interventions were
identified as a situational factor. However, the barriers described previously with nursing
interventions influenced staff nurse decisions to create workarounds to get what the patient needs
now. Workarounds were often justified as staff nurses believed they were making the safest
decision to get what the patient needed immediately at that time, which is consistent with other
research (Debono et al., 2013). Although there is a perception workarounds are routine practice
in nursing, there is no empirical evidence to support this claim; however, workarounds make
national headlines when human errors result in harm to patients. This was identified in this study
as perpetuating fear within staff nurses. Time pressure, lack of safety benefits of interventions,
and barriers in technology contribute to workarounds (Bates & Singh, 2018). These barriers
were described in this study as precursors to workarounds.
A systematic review of workarounds in acute care identified staffing workload,
productivity pressures, poor leadership, and lack of nurse involvement in decision-making as
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contributors to workarounds (Debono et al., 2013). All these factors, except poor leadership,
were described in this study as conditions leading to workarounds. Participants in the study also
identified work processes that didn’t make sense, not understanding the why, and that the
workaround wouldn’t cause patient harm as justification for workarounds, also supported
empirically (Debono et al., 2013).
Workarounds were described as a necessity because of a lack of response by physicians,
not having equipment, supplies or resources readily available at the point of care, and time
pressures to address patient needs immediately. In the study by Debono et al. (2013) a lack of
availability of doctors, equipment and supply barriers, and the need to get what the patient
needed in a timely manner were also precursors to workarounds. Similarly, Debono et al. (2013)
identified fatigue, cognitive load, not being familiar with policies, not understanding the why,
increased patient risk if the policy was implemented, and not listening to nurses’ voice as
precursors to workarounds. Each of these were described in this study. Staff nurses described
there’s just so much to do and forgetting to do things because they are so tired as well as barriers
with policies, not understanding the why, practices that created more risk than benefit, and lack
of nurse input in safety interventions as precursors to workarounds.
Staff nurses described interruptions as a barrier to safe care in this study and were
associated with contributing to workarounds in the literature (Potter et al., 2005). Tucker and
Spear (2007) described interruptions, not having physician orders, medication problems, supply
barriers, and broken or missing equipment as barriers in the system that contributed to
workarounds. Again, these were all described in this study. Staff nurses responded with guilt
and embarrassment when they conducted workarounds, acknowledging they were at times taking
a risk.
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Bedside shift report. Staff nurses and nurse leaders described BSR as an evidencebased practice that was not performed consistently. Staff nurses and nurse leaders identified
many barriers to conducting BSR, however, they believed many were just excuses and there
really was no good excuse. A systematic review identified patients and families described BSR
positively and reported feeling more informed and engaged in care (McCloskey et al., 2019).
Staff nurses, in this study, also described the value BSR brought by enhancing knowledge about
the patient and allowing nurses to spend more time with their patients. Barriers were described
as a desire to uphold confidentiality and privacy and varying desire and ability; however,
challenges can be overcome with adaptive practices.
Handoff communication. Communication across transitions of care was described as a
barrier in this study due to staff nurses being busy and unreliable and inaccurate information in
the EMR. Time pressure to keep patient flow moving was a barrier to handoff between
departments. There was a lack of expectation and accountability to perform BSR during patient
transfers from other units. Handoff communication remains a low scoring composite in the
SOPS without much improvement over time (Famolaro et al., 2018). Previous research
described teamwork, perceptions of staffing, and management support for safety were
significantly associated with successful handoffs (Richter et al., 2016). These facilitators to
support handoffs between units were not described in this study. Handoffs were the lowest
scoring composite for leaders (51%) and nurses (48%) in the SOPS (Famolaro et al., 2018).
Relationships with Colleagues
Several key behaviors emerged within the relationships with colleagues. Staff nurses
escalated to get what the patient needed. They also worked together as a team to keep patients
safe.
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Escalating to get what the patient needs. Staff nurses leaned on each other for
additional expertise. Each staff nurse and nurse leader described, in spite of negative
experiences with escalating, not hesitating to escalate to get what the patient needs now. They
also described lack of physician response or inappropriate physician response as the main reason
for escalating.
Assertive communication in a clinical situation requires immediate action and appropriate
persistence until there is a clear resolution to prevent harm (Premeaux & Bedeian, 2003). Staff
nurses in this study didn’t hesitate to escalate or get what the patient needed. Trusting,
collaborative relationships that were built over time were described as facilitators to speaking up
for safety by staff nurses and nurse leaders. Trusting relationships facilitated respectful
communication and speaking up. Staff nurses felt empowered when reacting to a patient who
had an immediate change in status requiring immediate intervention due to their role and
obligation as a patient advocate. However, they often negotiated between each other before they
reached out to others in less urgent conditions.
A systematic review identified perceived patient risk, hospital administrative support,
policies, team work, safety of speaking up, and relationships among colleagues as factors
influencing speaking up (Morrow, 2016). Staff nurses in this study felt empowered to speak up
when they felt their nurse managers had their back; this was also supported in the literature
(Morrow, 2016). Also, this study identified a barrier to speaking up was lack of follow up and
poor repeated behaviors of staff nurses and physicians. Poor behaviors didn’t get addressed so
staff nurses didn’t bother saying anything anymore.
There was an overarching theme of fear that prevented speaking up in non-urgent
conditions and a hesitancy to speak up that could negatively impact safe patient care. The fear
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was described as a fear based on previous negative experiences of being scolded or questioned
from predominantly physicians but also was described at times when reaching out to the ICU or
each other. A metasynthesis of speaking up behaviors identified hierarchies and power dynamics
and communication that was unsafe and ineffective negatively affected safety voice (Morrow et
al., 2016). Embedded expectations, nurse behaviors, and nurse managers having a powerful
positive or negative voice had an effect on safety voice (Morrow et al., 2016). Power gradients
were obvious in this study and were stated as “I’m just a nurse” (RN06) when discussing
interactions with physicians. The ability for staff to question the actions and decisions of those
with more authority was a low scoring item for nurses (48%) compared to leaders (73%) in the
SOPS, this study corroborated those findings (Famolaro et al., 2018).
Nurse leaders described their role in creating a culture that challenges unsafe practices
and behaviors; however, nurse leaders didn’t describe a process for improving systems and
processes to prevent the need to challenge unsafe practices. Communication openness was
another composite that showed discrepancies between leaders (80%) and nurses (64%),
suggesting leaders were unaware of the challenges nurses face in speaking up and
communicating (Famolaro et al., 2018).
Working together as a team. Working together as a team in a collegial, collaborative,
cooperative environment facilitates open, safe, respectful communication and is a necessary
component of safety culture (Sammer et al., 2010). The evidence supports that teamwork
training can improve relationships between all disciplines, suggesting this is a skill that can be
taught (Blegen et al. 2010; Pettker et al., 2011; Provonost et al., 2005; Sexton et al., 2011). As
described in this study, teamwork was also a factor supported by the SOPS; however, nurses
perceived working together as a team as more favorable within their units (83%) than across
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units (59%) with leaders sharing similar perceptions (Famolaro et al., 2018). This study did not
identify any teamwork training that occurred.
In this study, although staff nurses identified a few individuals as not willing to help and
being crabby as barriers to working together as a team, for the most part they relied on each other
for knowledge and to get through their busy days. Working together as a team on the unit was
facilitated by having relationships with their co-workers. These relationships built over time.
Negative relationships between nurses are established in the literature as influencing quality and
safety of patient care (Purpora et al., 2015). Lateral violence was inversely related to peer
relations (p < .01), inversely related to the quality of patient care (p < .01), and was positively
correlated with adverse events (p < .01). However, the relationship between staff nurses and
each other, other than lateral violence, and safety culture has not been studied.
Learning
Several key behaviors emerged within the learning shared language category. Reporting
safety concerns was necessary for learning. Leader behaviors supported “having our backs.”
Reporting safety concerns. Reporting safety concerns was described by staff nurses and
nurse leaders as necessary for learning. Several barriers were described including fear from staff
nurses and lack of leader follow up. Nurse leaders were extremely frustrated with the perception
of fear staff nurses described because they felt they reiterated to staff nurses that reporting was
nonpunitive and used for learning. Staff nurses described the fear as fear of jeopardizing
relationships and fear of getting in trouble. Fear of jeopardizing relationships was created by a
lack of organizational infrastructure and process to hold people accountable for poor behaviors.
Only one staff nurse described an experience with reporting that felt punitive, however the other
staff nurses described positive experiences and positive changes in the system to make care safer.
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Other than staffing, nonpunitive response to error is traditionally a low scoring composite
that is supported by the SOPS (Famolaro, 2018). Previous findings identified a willingness to
report safety incidents was influenced by the transparency of the incident reporting system, the
effectiveness of reporting, and management support (Pfeiffer et al., 2013). Nurse leaders
corroborated those findings in this study as a transparent incident reporting system was described
as a facilitator.
Another study, also corroborated by this research, identified retaliation fear as the
primary reason employees wouldn’t report an error; however, increased psychological safety
increased error reporting (Derickson et al., 2015). Nurse leaders in this study built trusting
relationships with their staff nurses as a mechanism to reduce fear; however, there was still a
staff nurse perception of fear of getting in trouble that was not substantiated by any personal
experiences of getting in trouble. Fear of retaliation from physicians and co-workers that could
jeopardize relationships was described by staff nurses. Keeping feedback anonymous facilitated
staff nurse reporting. The SOPS identified a disparity in perceptions of a nonpunitive response
to errors between nurses (47% favorable) and leaders (68% favorable) which encompassed
believing mistakes are held against people, when an event is reported it feels like the person is
written up, not the problem, and nurses worried mistakes were kept in their files (Famolaro, et
al., 2018). These experiences were all described and informed the discrepancy and unfavorable
perceptions.
Leader behaviors. The role of a nurse leader was previously described as was the role
of the nurse leader in creating a safe, healthy environment. Leader behaviors that facilitated a
safety culture were described by staff nurses in this study as non-judgmental, “having our
backs”, giving staff nurses the benefit of the doubt, actually listening, and asking if staff nurses
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have questions. Nurse leaders described their role in listening to understand, advocating for my
team, open door, open honest conversations with nurses, showing gratitude, following up,
coaching, and encouraging as behaviors they used to support staff nurses. Leader behaviors that
were supported in the literature positively impacting safety culture were trusting relationships,
rounds, education, and providing support in a relationship-oriented leadership style (Weaver et
al., 2017). All of these behaviors were described in this research; however, staff nurses were
silent on their nurse leaders rounding. Overall, staff nurses described positive relationships with
nurse leaders.
Situational aspects described in this study were not always embraced or supported as
evidenced by behavioral aspects. This study described barriers associated with situational aspects
that influenced behavioral aspects and were identified as precursors to unsafe acts. This helped
explain why culture was a barrier to embracing safety interventions. Behavioral aspects are also
influenced by psychological aspects.
Psychological Aspects
Psychological aspects influence behavioral aspects. Psychological aspects are how
people feel, this is typically measured in safety climate or safety culture surveys (Cooper, 2000).
Surveys measure the perception of how people feel, however they can’t describe the cultural
norms, attitudes, and values (Edwards et al., 2013). The perception of fear was already described
above as a barrier to safety culture. Several psychological aspects were evident within the
relationships with colleagues and nursing interventions shared themes.
Relationships with Colleagues
Several key psychological aspects including conflict related to scope of practice, poor
relationships with physicians, power gradients and hierarchies, and empowerment emerged
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within relationships with colleagues. Staff nurses were challenged when they couldn’t get a
response to get what the patient needed because it was outside of their scope of practice. Staff
nurses described exhausting all of their resources before having to interact with physicians due to
poor relationships between staff nurses and physicians. Power gradients and hierarchies with
physicians were described by staff nurses and nurse leaders as a barrier to safety culture. Feeling
empowered was described from the perception of staff nurses when they were in a position to
advocate for their patient and from a nurse leader perspective when they focused on trying to
empower staff nurses.
Scope of practice. What is a medical-surgical nurse? Nursing is the protection,
promotion, and optimization of health and abilities; prevention of illness and injury; facilitation
of healing; alleviation of suffering through the diagnosis and treatment of human response; and
advocacy in the care of individuals, families, groups, communities, and populations (ANA,
2015). Medical-surgical nursing is a unique specialty with a unique body of knowledge (AMSN,
n.d.). In this study, staff nurses and nurse leaders agreed staff nurses should have the ability to
use clinical judgment to diagnose and respond to patient responses within the scope of nursing
practice. However, staff nurses were challenged in getting responses to the patients’ needs when
the response was outside of their scope of care and when nursing interventions weren’t
sufficient. For example, when a patient required a physician order to manage pain that wasn’t
responding to nursing interventions or when a patient was in respiratory distress and needed to
be intubated. These were outside the staff nurse scope of care. Staff nurses didn’t feel respected
for their role in providing safe care.
Nurse autonomy is an essential element of professional status, however autonomy in
nursing is complex with various definitions (Varjus et al., 2011). A review of the literature (n =
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36) identified nurses were expected to practice autonomously; however, they felt they had little
support and were hindered by limited autonomy when trying to safeguard the patient’s interests
when there was conflict between the patient’s interests and others such as physicians or
colleagues (Varjus et al., 2011).
Empowerment enhanced autonomy of nurses in clinical hospital practice. A qualitative
study described and interpreted staff nurse experiences (n = 11) with autonomy in nursing
practice (Skar, 2009). Staff nurses experiences of autonomy were to have a holistic view, to
know the patient, to know that you know, and to dare (Skar, 2009). In this study, staff nurses
described each of these experiences. They also acknowledged that they know through
experience and if they don’t know they reach out to other staff nurses who have had experiences
and share their knowledge to facilitate to know. To dare occurred when there were no formal
standards or routines to follow. Rowe (2010) described the first three themes as not autonomy
but the acquisition and development of knowledge and skills needed to practice confidently and
competently in a familiar situation. However, to dare is a starting point for autonomy in nursing
practice as there are no rules to follow.
In this study, there was debate among leaders as to how prescriptive standards should be
when guiding nursing practice. This was described in nursing interventions. However, it was in
this grey space where staff nurses in this study felt significant distress in not being able to
respond to the patients’ needs. Physicians trained to diagnose and treat diseases and nurses
trained to respond to suffering and facilitate healing will naturally be at odds with one another,
particularly when the response to medical treatment creates suffering and inhibits healing for the
patient. The lack of respect of the staff nurse role by physicians was described in this study and
created significant resentment and distress for staff nurses.
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Poor relationships with physicians. Lack of or inadequate physician response was also
described in this study. A review of the literature (n = 10) identified an alarming existence of
disruptive physician behavior as perceived by nurses (Saxton et al., 2009). Although disruptive
physician behavior had differing definitions, verbal abuse, condescending language, failure to
respond, and intimidating behaviors were described. These behaviors were described in this
study. Disruptive behavior was associated with increased staff nurses’ intent to leave the
organization, a reported increase in patient errors by staff nurses, and staff nurse inability to
concentrate or engage in critical thinking (Saxton et al., 2009).
Power gradients. The ability to understand and respect each disciplines’ individual,
unique role in providing safe care to the patient is necessary infrastructure to support a safety
culture. In this study, power gradients and conflict between staff nurses and physicians were
barriers in creating a collaborative relationship between the staff nurse and physicians. Staff
nurses and nurse leaders described power gradients with physicians and “I’m just a nurse” as
barriers to a respectful, professional, collaborative relationship with physicians. Staff nurses
didn’t feel like they were respected or trusted as eyes or ears for the patient. They described
needing to feel trusted, listened to, and respected.
Nurse leaders described fear of physicians yelling at staff nurses or jeopardizing
relationships with physicians as reasons staff nurses hesitated speaking up and escalating. This
negatively impacted staff nurses’ willingness to speak up and communicate with physicians.
Despite filing multiple reports of rude and disrespectful physician behavior, staff nurses did not
see a change in the physician behavior. Consequently, staff nurses were balancing advocating
for patient needs and also trying to not upset the physician so they didn’t lose their support.
Nurse leaders felt similarly and because of their lack of power and influence to address poor
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physician behaviors, they consequently leaned toward managing poor physician behaviors by
encouraging and modeling conversations with physicians for staff nurses. Organizational
tolerance of rude behaviors negatively impacted staff nurses’ willingness to speak up and
communicate with physicians.
Power gradient assessments exist in the SOPS described as feeling free to question
decisions or actions of those with more authority (Famolaro, 2018). This has been a low scoring
composite over time. A systematic review identified nurses as wanting to work collaboratively
with physicians to coordinate care, equity in decision-making and developing the patient’s plan
of care, a two-way knowledge exchange with their input and concerns considered, the ability to
share their concerns and suggestions, and valuing open and clear communication with active
listening from physicians (House & Havens, 2017). Siedlecki and Hixson (2015) reported that
physicians rated relationships with nurses significantly better than nurses and 55% of nurses said
physician’s behavior negatively impacted nursing decisions. An integrated literature review
identified physicians viewed physician-nurse collaboration as less important than nurses but
rated the quality of collaboration higher than nurses (Tang et al., 2013). Communication, respect
and trust, unequal power, understanding professional roles, and task prioritizing were identified
as factors affecting nurse-physician collaboration, while interdisciplinary rounds and interprofessional education emerged as improvement strategies (Tang et al., 2013).
Nurse-physician collaborative rounds were described as a facilitator for safety culture and
safe patient care in this study; however, nurse leaders described them as a need to know only
basis and infrequently conducted together with the nurse. Nurse leaders described an
environment in which physicians round and teach staff nurses as an ideal environment to support
patient safety, however this practice was not described consistently at this study site and was
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physician dependent. Nurse leaders also found value in staff nurses and physicians learning
from each other. Staff nurses’ perspectives of nurse-physician collaborative rounds was the
physician shared what they needed, the staff nurse shared what they needed, and a plan was
developed with clear follow up. The perspective of the physician was not assessed in this study.
Nursing as a profession brings a defined, empirically supported, nursing science, and an
ability to understand and translate a holistic view of the patient through relationships developed
with patients by being with them 24/7 to make sure the patient is safe. Participants in this study
acknowledged leaning on others for their expertise to keep patients safe through collaborative
relationships with the patient at the center. According to Nursing’s Social Policy Statement
(2010) collaboration requires working relationships that consist of true partnerships, power
valued by all, with recognition and acceptance of separate and combined spheres of activity and
responsibility, mutual safeguarding of the legitimate interests of each party, and commonality of
goals (ANA, 2010). Although all participants in this study believed everyone was doing their
best to keep patients safe, poor relationships and lack of collaboration, particularly with
physicians, undermined safety culture. Staff nurses and nurse leaders also didn’t feel
empowered.
Empowerment. In this study, nurse leaders didn’t believe staff nurses realized they
had power. Nurse leaders described their role in coaching, encouraging, and role modeling
behavior to support staff nurses in feeling empowered. Staff nurses described being new or
inexperienced and lacking confidence as barriers to speaking up and asking questions or feeling
empowered; however, as they gained experience they gained confidence and empowerment.
Empowerment enhances the ability to make decisions and contributes to safer care and a safety
culture (Laschinger, 1996). Kanter’s theory of empowerment described having the power or
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ability to access and mobilize resources and having opportunities within the work environment
empowered individuals to achieve organization goals and effectiveness (Laschinger, 1996). A
systematic review of nurse work environments in the United States identified how promoting
nurse empowerment, engagement, and interpersonal relationships at work helped achieve a
healthy work environment and improved quality of patient care (Wei et al., 2018).
Empowerment was described in terms of the environmental structures supporting
empowerment. Empowerment for nurses is more complex and consists of not only the structural
empowerment within the workplace, but a psychological belief in one’s ability to be empowered
to shape their work role and context, and acknowledgement that there is power in the
relationships and caring that nurses provide (Manojlovich, 2007). Although this
recommendation is slightly outdated, the results of this study suggest there is still a need to have
a more thorough understanding of all three components to help nurses become empowered and
use their power for better patient care.
Patricia Benner (1982) developed a novice to expert framework for nursing in acutecare settings based on the Dreyfus skill acquisition model. This frameworks described the
movement of a staff nurse from novice to expert by moving from reliance on abstract principles
to the use of experience as paradigms and the ability to understand a situation. This moves the
situation from a compilation of equally required bits of information to a more complex whole in
which only certain parts are relevant. Lack of experience was not only described as a barrier to
empowerment, but also described as a barrier for applying nursing judgment to situations in this
study. Benner (1982) described the novice staff nurse as having no experience with situations in
which they were expected to perform tasks and an inability to use discretionary judgment.
Although novice staff nurses rely on rules to perform tasks, they can’t discern if the tasks are
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relevant in the current situation. This concern was raised by experienced nurses in this study in
relation to the application of evidence-based practice (EBP) standards. EBP caused unsafe
situations for novice staff nurses as they tended to under or over-utilize interventions because of
their inability to discern appropriateness. This is a consideration that warrants further study as it
was described as a contributor to a lack of safety culture and unsafe care. The novice to expert
framework may also explain why novice staff nurses tend to have more favorable safety culture
survey responses than more experienced staff nurses as they may not fully understand the whole
of the situation (Famolaro et al., 2018).
Medical-surgical nursing is the largest nursing specialty in the United States (AMSN,
n.d.). Medical-surgical nurses provide care to adults with a variety of medical issues and adults
who are preparing for or recovering from surgery, requiring a broad knowledge base (AMSN,
n.d.). Medical-surgical nurses have advanced organizational, prioritization, assessment and
communication skills and are leaders in coordinating care among the interprofessional health
care team (AMSN, n.d.). Other than the charge nurse and clinical leads, neither staff nurses nor
nurse leaders recognized staff nurses as leaders in this study.
A qualitative study identified a shared perception between staff nurses and nurse leaders
that staff nurses were influential employees; however, staff nurses identified charge nurses as
formal leaders (73%) more often than nurse leaders (48%) (p = .04) (Weaver et al., 2018). The
clinical lead or charge nurse role was the most valued expert resource available on the unit in this
study, not only for having expert knowledge but for being able to facilitate conversations with
physicians as they described having built positive, trusting relationships with physicians over
time. When they were busy taking an assignment or dealing with staffing challenges they were
not available as resources to staff nurses.
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Staff nurses must be empowered to practice within their scope of practice. Nurse leaders
described uncomfortable situations in which staff nurses had to put in an order because a
physician was too busy, thereby practicing outside their scope of practice. Staff nurses in this
study identified awareness of their scope of practice and were uncomfortable when they couldn’t
respond to patient suffering when the response depended on physicians who weren’t responding.
Ensuring staff nurses are empowered, competent, supported, and accountable to work within
their scope of practice is necessary for safe patient care as is expecting all disciplines to work
within their scope and respond appropriately to patient needs. Evaluating staff nurses on their
ability to competently work within their scope of practice will enhance empowerment by
improving confidence in nursing practice and supporting the development of competencies. A
unified agreement of the educational preparation of registered nurses may increase the power of
nursing nationally.
Nursing Interventions
Being too busy and not having enough time emerged as key psychological aspects within
nursing interventions. The experience of being busy and not having enough time emerged as a
barrier to safety culture. This influenced behavioral aspects and were precursors to unsafe care.
Too busy and not enough time. The most frequently described barrier for staff nurses
and nurse leaders was being too busy and not enough time. Lack of time also emerged as a
barrier to building relationships and working together as a team. Time is defined as “the
indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as
whole” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Although staffing not adequate for the workload was the
primary contributor to not having enough time and being too busy, there were a multitude of
factors contributing to this perception. This was described as the amount of care patients need is
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not feasible, fighting for the patient, and just always rushing because there’s too much to do.
The additional work from safety checks, documentation, interventions, searching for things staff
nurses needed to provide safe care, inaccurate and ineffective EMRs, and getting ahold of
physicians contributed to busyness. Individual patient factors including being confused, going
through detoxification, incontinence, and the amount of education patients and families needed
also consumed significant time. Staff nurses described challenges with everything for the patient
going through the nurse and having to remind the physician to do their job as contributing to not
having enough time.
Being too busy and not having enough time were the most significant contributors to
shortcuts, workarounds, not answering alarms, not implementing safety interventions, and basic
care being missed. Working together as a team was the way staff nurses got through the day;
conversely, too busy and not enough time was a barrier to working together as a team. Similarly,
a quantitative measure of workflow and computer use among 27 medical-surgical nurses
identified assessment, charting, and communicating as the most frequent activities comprising
18.1%, 9.9%, and 11.8% of nurse time, respectively (Cornell et al., 2010). The other activities
were random, meaning that the activity lasted less than 10 seconds as nurses were constantly
switching activities and locations in a random pattern impacting the ability to critically think and
engage in planning care.
A phenomenological hermeneutical exploration of staff nurse busyness identified busyness as
an experience of disparity between perceived necessary tasks and time available to accomplish
tasks that was acceptable; however, became uncomfortable if important tasks didn’t get done
creating negative emotions and personal struggles in trying to cope (Govasli & Solvoll, 2020).
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Staff nurses in this study were also visibly bothered by guilt for not being able to spend
time with their patients and provide the care they believed their patients deserved. One staff
nurse described this is not nursing. Despite the acknowledgement that staff nurses and nurse
leader contribute significantly to safety culture, staff nurse and nurse leader busyness and not
having time had little empirical support in the literature. Staff nurses and nurse leaders both
described that everyone was doing the best they could to provide safe care. Staff nurses had
emotional responses when they described their inability to spend time with their patient and
provide the level of care they thought the patient required and deserved.
Summary of Discussion
This research set out to address the gap in the literature about the poor perception of safety
culture among staff nurses and the discrepancy in safety culture perception between staff nurses
and nurse leaders. The purpose was to understand, explore, and describe safety culture as
experienced by staff nurses and nurse leaders in medical-surgical units. Results showed
similarities in language of themes describing safety culture between participant groups enabling
the creation of shared language categories. This is to be expected as both groups of participants
were registered nurses, sharing a common language, and immersed within the same culture. The
shared language categories were well supported in the literature. There was variation in shared,
unique, and discord in meaning, or subthemes, describing experiences of participants within the
themes. Again, this is to be expected as their experiences are from their unique roles within the
organization. This study provided an insight into the discrepant perceptions of safety culture
between staff nurses and nurse leaders. Nurse leaders sharing convergent experiences suggests
they don’t represent the perceptions of leaders within the SOPS. Relationships emerged as a
critical component of safety culture that lacks empirical support in the literature. Time also
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emerged as a significant barrier, lacking empirical support in the literature. The process of
making sure was corroborated, as was the lack of support and empowerment for staff nurses to
make sure to keep patients safe. Although the shared language categories were empirically
supported in the literature, the rich description of situational, behavioral, and psychological
aspects informed the importance of the interaction between these aspects and the impact on
safety culture. This study offered complementarity and a description that provided clarity of
previous findings and identified the how, why, and impact of the experiences on safety culture.
Strengths
The study of safety culture has been limited by inconsistent definitions and management
strategies to address isolated theoretical elements in hopes of improving an organization’s safety
culture. Safety culture has been predominantly presented in a manner that increases its
application within organizations through a normative approach of assessing the presence or
strength of a safety culture and then building or strengthening upon those results (Edwards et al.,
2013). A limitation of this approach is assuming culture can only be manipulated from the top
down leaving deeper levels of culture unexplored by focusing on organizational systems and
structures with little emphasis on social dynamics and sub-cultures (Edwards et al., 2013).
Inherent in the safety culture definition most adopted in healthcare are anthropological
roots, culture is possessed by all ensuring conduct is repeated, describing safety culture as a
product of individual and group values, attitudes, and assumptions (Edwards et al., 2013).
However the anthropological approach is often not explored in healthcare. Through this
approach a richer understanding of the positive and negative effects of culture and underlying
assumptions can be explored providing insight into the culture rather than evaluating the
presence or strength of the culture (Edwards et al., 2013). Current safety climate research
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focuses on employee attitudes and perceptions related to organizational structures, processes, and
procedures used by an organization in support of safety, whereas an anthropological approach is
not limited to the role of the organization around the individual making it more applicable to a
broader range of organizations (Edwards et al., 2013). Finally, a pragmatic cultural approach,
shared practices, behaviors or the way things are done, can provide insight into safety behaviors
and safety outcomes (Edwards et al., 2013).
A strength of this study was it provided a unique approach to understanding safety culture
through exploring a normative culture, described as situational aspects, pragmatic culture,
described as behavioral aspects, and anthropologic culture, described as psychological aspects to
provide a richer description of safety culture. Exploring normative, pragmatic, and
anthropologic conceptualizations of culture together provided a richer description of the
interaction between the different conceptualizations of a safety culture. This provided a better
understanding of the culture within a safety culture and described precursors of unsafe acts that
can ultimately be linked to safety outcomes (Edwards et al., 2013).
Another strength of this study was the description of safety culture experiences were
provided by those who were currently living those experiences. A final strength of this study
was it presented a unique description of safety culture from the lens of medical-surgical staff
nurses and nurse leaders, sharing similarities and differences which have not been explored in
the literature.
Limitations
There were several limitations to this study. The role of researcher occurred
simultaneously while employed as a system leader. Although the researcher holds no formal
position of authority over the participants and works in a different building, one staff nurse and
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five nurse managers were aware of the researcher’s role within the organization. This could have
prevented the participants from honestly describing their experiences, however this affiliation
could have also served to establish rapport and trust with the participants. The dual roles may
have biased interpretations of the data; however, the dual roles may have also provided insight
into the context of the environment. The transcription of all interviews and analysis and coding
helped maintain a focus on the data. Remaining close to the data through maintaining a personal
research journal to reflect on researcher perspectives, weekly meetings with the dissertation
chair, and validation of results through follow up interviews with staff nurse participants and
nurse leader participants assured the researcher captured the voice of the participants.
Midway through the interviews a pandemic was experienced. While the pandemic did
not have an impact on the immediate environment until during the final validation, there was
awareness that a pandemic was occurring which could have created an unusual environmental
context. The investigator of this study has had an extensive background with patient safety that
may have contributed to bias in the interpretation of results. Finally, this study described staff
nurse and nurse leader experiences with safety culture on a medical-surgical unit. Since unique
cultures are present at the unit level, these results are not intended to be generalizable to other
medical-surgical units.
Implications for Research
This study described a process staff nurses and nurse leaders followed for making sure
patients were safe. Making sure was shared common language when describing patient safety
and safety culture. Nevertheless, relationships either facilitated or inhibited making sure patients
were safe. This study revealed a shared description of poor relationships between staff nurses
and physicians. Relationships between staff nurses and patients, each other, other disciplines,
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and leaders were described more favorably. Described experiences with relationships either
gave staff nurses’ courage or created hesitancy to making sure patients were safe. A
phenomenological study could offer interpretation of these relationships and the influence on
making sure patients are safe and safety culture.
Safety culture was described from the lens of medical-surgical staff nurses and nurse leaders;
however, to fully understand the culture at the unit level the perspective of physicians and other
members of the care team is needed. Understanding the physician’s perspective is necessary to
further understand the discord between staff nurses and physicians so that solutions may be
found in regards to power gradients, hierarchies, collaboration, communication, and respect for
each disciplines unique role in providing safe care.
Empowerment beyond what the organization can provide with a focus on psychological
and relational aspects of empowerment must be explored. Culture was previously reported as the
biggest barrier to embracing safety interventions. Until there is a deeper understanding of these
relationships and the impact these relationships have on safety behaviors there may be little more
than another 20 years of initiatives aimed at improving the safety of care to patients with
minimal impact.
A qualitative study to understand the experiences and interpretation of the contribution of
nursing as a unique body of knowledge is warranted. The scope of nursing practice is at times
inherently in conflict with medical care. This disparity was described as a barrier to providing
safe care in this study. Further defining nurse autonomy and how unique roles can complement
each other on medical-surgical units to promote a safety culture is warranted.
The notions of time and busyness emerged as barriers. These concepts are underexplored in
the literature and could offer explanations and solutions to the challenge nurse leaders and staff
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nurses experienced. The impact of being busy on cognitive load should also be explored as this
was described as leading to burnout, forgetting, and potentially having a negative impact on
patient safety. Understanding how being busy and not having time impacts safety behaviors
should be further explored.
The organization setting the tone and declaring zero harm changed behaviors and mindsets;
however, there was little theoretical support for the construct of zero harm that warrants further
exploration. While this study offered insight into the reasons causing the perception of fear, fear
should continue to be explored since it continues to be a barrier to speaking up, in particular
understanding the relationship between negative experiences and/or perceived negative
experiences and the long term impact on fear.
The challenges of balancing EBP with nursing judgment and individualized patient care
emerged in previous literature and in this study. The significant barriers that remain when
applying EBP merit further exploration. There was little empirical evidence exploring
relationships between professional accountability and safety culture or safer patient care
outcomes; therefore, empirical support is justified to understand not only staff nurse professional
accountability, but leader accountability.
Understanding the impact of the reliance on alarms and warnings on critical thinking skills
deserves further research. Barriers to behavior aspects, or safety practices, are well described in
the literature and supported by this study; therefore, developing a model that could potentially
predict safety behaviors based on the factors described as facilitators or barriers could assist
leaders in proactively mitigating unsafe behaviors by addressing factors proactively. Handoffs
and transitions continue to plague safety culture. A qualitative study could support observation
of the process to inform new processes that will be embraced.
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Finally, nurse leadership is a specialty within nursing that has been deemed as critical by
many professional organizations. A more robust body of evidence to facilitate evidence-based
nursing leadership is necessary to be able to not only develop a safety culture, but to ensure staff
nurses are respected and supported in their role to make sure patients are safe. This may also
contribute to decreased nurse leader turnover and a more robust succession plan to ensure
ongoing nurse leader support.
Implications for Practice
Staff nurses and nurse leaders described processes for making sure patients were safe and
processes supporting decision making, both supported within the literature. Leaders can support
this process by ensuring they are setting the tone, aligning goals, and providing transparency;
however, there needs to be a mindfulness that the message is translated consistently across an
organization and that each department understands their role and contribution.
Nurse leaders should have manageable priorities and support for those priorities to
prevent turnover and burnout. Nurse leaders need to be aware of organizational and
psychological aspects that influence unsafe behavioral aspects so they can be addressed or
removed to facilitate safety behaviors. Executive rounds served as a mechanism to connect the
executive leadership team to staff nurses. Organizations should require and provide time in
leader schedules to support executive rounds. Leader rounds and huddles to connect with staff
nurses and bridge the gap between what leaders think is happening and what is happening should
be incorporated into a leaders day. However, building in time for follow up is important. Nurse
leaders must be supported and empowered to remove barriers for staff nurses to provide safe care
by revisiting their authorities outlined in their job descriptions.
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Making sure and the decision-making process described within this study and
corroborated in the literature should serve as the foundation for safe nursing practice. In order
for this to happen, hospitals must support the autonomy of nursing practice within their
organizations and address the antecedents to making sure. Nurse leaders must advocate and
drive change in the environment to support nursing practice. This includes creating a shared
mental model on the responsibilities and unique perspectives of each discipline, in particular
staff nurses and physicians. Nurse practitioners were briefly mentioned in this study as a
resource that helped keep patients safe when physicians were unable to respond. Promoting and
supporting a model that incorporates advanced practice nurses on medical-surgical units can
facilitate a safety culture and safer patient care. Then, building a culture of ownership and/or
accountability needs to be cultivated to promote staff nurse involvement in influencing nursing
practice.
Attention to asking staff nurses to follow EBP without getting their input and
understanding their desire to provide individualized patient care instead of a one size fits all
protocol needs to be addressed. Staff nurses, based on their experience and judgment, are placed
in situations where they are over or under-utilizing interventions that they don’t perceive as
improving safe patient care and contributing to workarounds because they don’t see the value or
understand the why behind the EBP. Standards should then be efficient, accessible, and reliable
to support safe care.
Checklists and double checks that help the busy nurse remember important tasks should
be incorporated into the workflow as standard work that can’t be bypassed by busy staff nurses.
Other tools that can prevent unsafe behaviors should be explored and designed with staff nurse
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input. Technology was identified as a barrier, therefore technology barriers must be addressed to
facilitate efficient, safe patient care.
Nurse leaders’ identification of what is taking staff nurses away from the bedside is
essential to restructuring the work environment for nurses to practice within their scope. This
includes alleviation of barriers to allow staff nurses to get the valuable time they need with their
patients. Staff nurses and nurse leaders should work together to simplify, standardize, organize,
and prioritize nursing standards and workflow to support staff nurses in efficiently providing safe
care. A model of accountability should be implemented for leaders to ensure they are
performing their role to facilitate a safety culture. However, nurse leaders must embrace a
nonpunitive response.
Incorporating collaborative rounds and BSR including the patient should be a
requirement supporting the patient’s right to make autonomous decisions and be involved in their
care. Nurse leaders need to be aware that individual patient factors influence staff nurses’ ability
to make sure patients are safe as they can increase surveillance requirements. Therefore,
individual patient factors should be incorporated into staffing algorithms.
There was an intense focus on patient safety and safety culture in this study. However,
staff nurses described a need for more support. Nurse leaders focused on nursing practice related
to patient safety and safety culture; however, organizations need to also address support for
caring for the nurses who are caring for the patients. There were significant barriers identified
by staff nurses inhibiting them from providing nursing care in a safe manner. Nurse leaders
described challenges with removing staff nurse barriers. Someone in the organization must be
responsible for supporting the staff nurse role in providing safe care. The challenges described
are well established in the literature. Re-designing staff nurse and nurse leader roles to ensure
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they are supported to perform the work within their scope can potentially reduce turnover in staff
nurse and nurse leader roles and positively impact safety culture and safer patient care. A
fundamental paradigm shift from developing staff nurses to challenge unsafe practices to
leveraging the power of the unique role of nursing to build safer practices with other professional
colleagues may be what is necessary to truly foster a safety culture to deliver safer patient care.
Nurse leaders must be empowered and accountable to ensure staff nurses are respected,
empowered, held accountable, evaluated, and recognized for their unique contribution to safety
culture and safer systems of care.
Implications for Education
In this study, staff nurses learned from experience and mistakes. Learning from
experience started in nursing school. Nursing schools should continue to develop robust
interprofessional simulation activities to expose nursing students to practice situations to
decrease the challenges nurses experience when transitioning to practice. In addition to patient
situations, interprofessional relationships are as important, therefore practicing difficult
conversations is necessary. Interprofessional team training should be an ongoing part of team
development to facilitate the building of relationships and collaborative care. Teaching staff
nurses and leaders how to have accountability conversations with each other in a manner that
doesn’t jeopardize relationships should be part of ongoing education, starting in nursing school.
Learning from mistakes without scaring student nurses in academia and staff nurses in
practice was recommended by staff nurses in this study. Advocating for nursing practice is
comprised of skills that can be taught. Staff nurses and nurse leaders must be taught the skills
needed to successfully advocate for the nursing profession. Staff nurses described learning by
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experience. Time needs to be built into a staff nurse’s day to allow for sharing of experiences,
debriefing, and reflecting.
Developing nurse confidence can catalyze empowerment in staff nurses. Nurse leaders
should ensure there are development programs to increase staff nurse skills in communicating
with physicians, communicating with each other, and exposure to various experiences in a safe
simulated environment. Incentivizing or building in time for staff nurses to participate in formal
learning programs should be considered to address nurse fatigue and unwillingness to participate
in work-related activities outside of work hours. Basic and ongoing professional development of
nurse leaders should be foundational in every organization to assist nurse leaders in achieving
their goals while supporting their growth and development as nurse leaders. Explaining the
rationale when implementing interventions and using real experiences will enhance the teaching
method while facilitating acceptance.
Implications for Policy
Staffing and poor relationships with physicians emerged as the most significant barriers
to safety culture and safe patient care. Staffing has been a longstanding barrier leading to unsafe
behaviors and poor work environments. In spite of evidence of mandated ratios on patient and
nurse outcomes, policy to support safe nurse ratios has been resisted in many states. Safe work
practice policies must be instituted to address fatigue and enhance wellness and a healthy work
environment. Burnout contributes to poor safety outcomes, therefore burnout assessments and
interventions should be instituted as organization policy.
Clear escalation and non-retaliation policies must be instituted at each organization. This
includes appropriate follow up that focuses on improving systems and not blaming individuals
balanced with professional accountability. These policies should also support recognition of all
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care providers who speak up and stop unsafe and poor behaviors. Poor behaviors undermined
relationships and posed a threat to patient safety. A zero tolerance for poor behaviors should be
supported through policy with a clear follow up and an accountability plan. Staff nurses,
physicians, and other members of the care team should be involved in the development of
policies necessary to influence a safer environment. An alarm management program to decrease
alarm fatigue is warranted.
National policy has done little to impact safer patient care, other than provide
transparency of selected outcome measures and financial penalties or incentives. Preventable
harm to patients is typically not the result of negligence or incompetence, but a breakdown in
processes and systems of care (Sorrell, 2017). Since the nuclear industry was one of the first
industries to adopt safety culture as a mechanism for safety, there is much to learn from their
accomplishments and failures. The more recent nuclear disaster in Fukushima identified some
important lessons learned that can be applied within healthcare and institutional policy. History
of accidents in the nuclear industry have been attributed to decisions and actions that were
influenced by flawed shared assumptions, values, and beliefs (Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO), 2015). INPO (2015), identified although there was a focus on strengthening
the safety culture, the big picture of cultivating a questioning attitude, challenging assumptions,
practicing safety-first decision making, and promoting organizational learning contributed to the
accident.
Healthcare should take into consideration a focus on strengthening safety culture alone
was not sufficient to prevent accidents in nuclear. Organizational policy must require and
support a questioning attitude and ensure safety-first decision making. INPO requires the
reporting of lessons learned from actual or potential accidents that are shared securely within the
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nuclear industry to promote safer operations. Healthcare should consider mandatory reporting
and learning in a manner that protects those individuals involved.
Conclusion
Safety culture has been previously targeted as the reason safety interventions were not
embraced, thus perpetuating harm to patients in hospitals (Leape, 2015). The safety culture
framework and instruments to measure the presence or strength of a safety culture have been
empirically supported, as previously described in Chapter 2, yet surveying and interventions to
improve safety culture have not yielded significant gains in either safety culture or patient safety.
Furthermore, the most recent nuclear accident confirmed assessing and strengthening a safety
culture alone isn’t sufficient to penetrate psychological and behavioral aspects within a culture
that impact a safety culture.
This study described the experiences contributing to the very complex construct, safety
culture, by those embedded within the safety culture and providing the majority of care to
hospitalized patients, medical-surgical staff nurses and their nurse leaders. This study provided a
richer description explaining the ongoing poor perception of safety culture among staff nurses,
and discrepancies in perception of safety culture between staff nurses and nurse leaders. The
results of this study provided clarity to underlying values, cultural norms, and behaviors within a
safety culture as experienced by medical-surgical staff nurses and nurse leaders.
This study also highlighted the significance of relationships as fundamental, connecting
not only the product of the combined aspects comprising a safety culture and their reciprocal
relationships with each other, but also influencing the ultimate outcome of a safety culture which
was described in this study as making sure patients were safe. Understanding the safety culture
experiences of medical-surgical staff nurses and nurse leaders had not been previously
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investigated in the United States. A continued study of safety culture from an anthropological,
pragmatic, and normative cultural perspective begins to form evidence that can further inform
safety behaviors in nursing that and the impact on safer patient care.
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Composite

Cronbach’s alpha

Overall Perceptions of Safety

.74

Frequency of Event Reporting

.84

Supervisor/manager expectations and actions
promoting patient safety
Organizational learning-continuous improvement

.75

Teamwork within units

.83

Communication openness

.72

Feedback and communication about error

.78

Nonpunitive response to error

.79

Staffing

.63

Hospital management support for patient safety

.85

Teamwork across hospital units

.80

Hospital handoffs and transitions

.80

.76
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Investigator Skemp, Lisa
LU Number 212782
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The Context of Safety Culture from the Perspective of Nurse Leaders and Staff Nurses in a
Hospital

Date of
Review

02/05/2020

Reason

45CFR46.102(I) Category Not Research

Comments

This project consists of activities that do not meet the definition of human subject research
according to the 45 CFR 46.102(l). Research means a systematic investigation, including
research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge. Activities which meet this definition constitute research for purposes
of this policy, whether or not they are conducted or supported under a program which is
considered research for other purposes.
1. This is a quality improvement project being conducted at ThedaCare and will be
implemented as a partial fulfillment of requirements for a PhD Degree at Loyola University
Chicago Marcella Niehoff School of Nursing.
2. Should you wish to make modifications that involve changing the type, nature, source (etc.)
of the data/materials specified in the current proposal, you MUST request such changes in
advance from the Loyola IRB, as this may change the categorization of the proposed research.
3. LUMC is not engaged in this project.

This project has been determined to be EXEMPT from IRB review.
There are no reporting requirements associated with this project.
The Full Board will review this determination on 02/19/2020.
If the Board disagrees with this action, you will be notified by 02/26/2020.
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REGISTERED NURSE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS NEEDED

PURPOSE:

ELIGIBILITY:

BENEFITS:

Registered nurses play a key role in providing safe patient care. The purpose of this
study is to understand, explore and describe the patient safety culture experience of
nurses caring for medical surgical patients at ThedaCare Regional Medical Center,
Appleton and nurse leaders supporting those medical surgical nurses. This will provide a
deeper understanding of safety culture and the factors influencing safety culture and safe
patient care.
You will participate in one to three confidential interviews in a location of your choice.
Interviews can take up to 60 minutes.

Registered nurses with at least 6 months of experience working 50% of their time on a
medical-surgical unit in a direct care or nursing leadership role

We do not know if you will benefit from taking part in the research but the knowledge
obtained may help others.

COMPENSATION:

There will be no compensation for participating in this study

CONTACT:

Lisa Harton RN, MBA, MPA
Loyola University, Chicago
Call (708) 307-3576 or email lharton1@luc.edu
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Date:

INFORMED CONSENT
Participant’s Name:

PROJECT TITLE: The Situational Context of Safety Culture from the Perspective of Nurse
Leaders and Staff Nurses in a Hospital.
You are being asked to participate in this study because you are a registered staff nurse, working within, or nurse
leader, supporting, a medical/surgical unit within ThedaCare, Appleton. You have been asked to participate because
of your experience in providing or supporting safe patient care within a unit or facility culture.
The purpose of this study is to understand, explore and describe the patient safety culture experience of nurses
caring for medical surgical patients in a hospital through the lens of staff nurses and nurse leaders. The results of
this study can provide an understanding of perceived individual and organizational factors that support or inhibit a
safety culture or provision of safe patient care.
RESEARCH PROCEDURES: I would like to talk with you in one to three one on one interviews for 60-90
minutes at your convenience. The interview will take place in a private area of your choosing to ensure
confidentiality in a location that is convenient for you. I will ask you to share your experiences with patient safety
and working within a safety culture in your unit or within the hospital.
The interview will be tape-recorded and transcribed to facilitate data analysis. The research, transcriptionist and
dissertation chair will be the only individuals hearing the audiotapes. The tapes will be kept until the results are
published before they are destroyed. All materials will be kept in a locked and secure file cabinet in the researcher’s
office or in a secured electronic file that is password protected.
RISKS AND BENEFITS: When a researcher and participants are working closely to understand personal
experiences there can be psychological risks because of disclosing emotions and re-living events that are being
shared. The researcher will ask you if you need a break. The researcher will also refer you to ThedaCare’s
employee assistance program for voluntary follow up. If actual threats to patient safety arise the researcher will ask
you to escalate the threat to patient safety by referring you to follow ThedaCare’s incident reporting policy. You
will not benefit from participating in this study.
CONFIDENTIALITY: The data in this study will be confidential. The interviews will be analyzed and only I as
the researcher will know your identity as your interview will be identified by a fictitious name. The results of this
research study may be published in a journal for the purpose of advancing medical knowledge. You will not be
identified by name or by any other identifying information in any publication or report about this research.
If you participate in this study, I would like to be able to quote you directly without using your name. If you agree
to this, please sign the statement at the bottom of the form.
PARTICIPATION: Participation in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time and for any reason.
If you decide not to participate or you withdraw from the study, there is no penalty or loss of benefits to which you
are otherwise entitled. There are no costs to you. There will be no compensation for participating in this study. We
do not know if you will benefit from taking part in the research but the knowledge obtained may help others.
CONTACT INFORMATION: The study is being conducted by Lisa Harton RN, MBA, MPH, a doctoral student
at Loyola University, Chicago and supported by faculty advisor Dr. Lisa Skemp, Professor, Loyola University,
Chicago. Lisa Harton can be reached at (708)307-3576 or lharton1@luc.edu and Dr. Lisa Skemp at (319) 331-2728
or lskemp@luc.edu if you have any questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in this research
study.
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CONSENT
I have fully explained to ____________________________ the nature and purpose of the above- described
procedure and the risks that are involved in its performance. I have answered and will answer all questions to the
best of my ability. I may be reached at 708-307-3576.
________________________________________________Date:____/_____/____
Signature
You have been fully informed of the above-described research program with its possible benefits and risks. Your
signature below indicates that you are willing to participate in this research study and agree to the use and disclosure
of information about you as described above.
________________________________________________Date:____/_____/____
Signature: Participant

Your signature below indicates that you give permission to be quoted directly in publications without using your
name.
________________________________________________Date:____/_____/____
Signature: Participant
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DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL
Project Title: The Situational Context of Safety Culture from the Perspective of Leaders and
Staff Nurses in a Hospital
Research Team: Lisa Harton, PhD Candidate, RN; Lisa Skemp, PhD, RN
INTRODUCTION: Thank you for coming today and agreeing to participate in my research
project. Here is the consent letter that we discussed and you had an opportunity to review when I
first contacted you. Please take a moment to read it now. If you are comfortable proceeding
with our interview, please sign the consent letter and we can begin.
DESCRIPITON OF THE RESEARCH CONTEXT AND PURPOSE: Since the Institute of
Medicine reporting on patient harm in 2000, hospitals have implemented many tactics to
improve patient safety and create a safety culture. Registered nurses play a key role in providing
safe patient care in a direct care and leadership roles. The purpose of this qualitative study is to
understand, explore and describe the patient safety culture experience of nurses caring for
medical surgical patients in a hospital through the lens of staff nurses and nurse leaders.
INTERVIEW PROCESS: I am going to begin by asking you a few questions about your
background and professional experiences. From there we will talk about your experiences of
providing safe patient care and working within a safety culture. Before we begin, I want to
assure you that anything you say will remain confidential and will not be shared with anyone else
within the organization or outside of the organization. Do you have any questions for me before
we begin the interview?
Leader/Staff Nurse Characteristics (Code:

)

DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL
Staff Nurse and Leader Characteristics
Project Title: The Context of Safety Culture from the Perspective of Leaders and Staff Nurses in
a Hospital
Research Team: Lisa Harton, PhD Candidate, RN; Lisa Skemp, PhD, RN
Leader/Staff Nurse Characteristics (Psuedonym:
1. Role:

Staff Nurse

)

Staff nurse that acts as charge nurse

RN Clinical Team Leader
Nurse Leader (Clinical supervisor, house supervisor, manager, director)
2. Gender

Female

3. What is your birth date?

Male
____/____/____
Mo Da

Yr
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4. Highest Education Level completed:
Diploma

Associate’s

Bachelor’s

Graduate; state highest degree_______

PhD
5. Number of years as a registered nurse: _________________________________________
6. Number of years working as a registered nurse at the Facility: _______________________
7. Length of time working on your current unit: __________months

___________years

8. Number of hours worked per week: _________________
9. Shift most often worked:

Days

Nights

10. Nurse leaders: Number of years working as a nurse leader: _________________________
11. Nurse leaders: Number of years working as a nurse leader on your current unit: _________
12. Nurse leaders: Number of hours worked per week: ________________________________
13. Nurse leader: Role

Clinical Nurse Supervisor

House Supervisor

Nurse Manager

Nurse Director

14. List specialty certifications: ___________________________________________________
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Project Title: The Context of Safety Culture from the Perspective of Leaders and Staff Nurses in
a Hospital
Research Team: Lisa Harton, PhD Candidate, RN; Lisa Skemp, PhD, RN

Time of Interview
Date:
Location:
Participant code:
Setting:
I am interested in learning about patient safety, your experiences with patient safety and
what safety culture means to you.
1) Please describe what patient safety means to you? Prompts:
a) Are there policies or protocols that guide patient safety practice?
b) What organizational factors guide patient safety practice?
c) What technology guides patient safety practice?
2) Please describe your experiences with patient safety as it relates to your practice?
Prompts:
a) Best experience
i) Facilitators
ii) Barriers
iii) Challenges
b) Worst experience
i) Facilitators
ii) Barriers
iii) Challenges
c) Typical experience
i) Facilitators
ii) Barriers
iii) Challenges
3) How would you define safety culture? Prompts:
a) Close your eyes and describe your mental picture of safety culture.
b) When did you first hear this term?
c) How has it impacted your practice?
d) What do you/ others think about this term?
4) What are your experiences working in a safety culture?
a) Best experience
i) Facilitators
ii) Barriers
iii) Challenges
b) Worst experience
i) Facilitators
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ii) Barriers
iii) Challenges
c) Typical experience
i) Facilitators
ii) Barriers
5) Please describe your experiences with how a safety culture or the organizational culture
impacts safe patient care delivery?
Debriefing Questions:
1) Is there anything else you would like to share with me that will help me better understand
your experience?
2) How was your experience with this interview?
3) Do you have any additional questions or comments about the interview or your responses
to the questions posed?
Thank you for your participation in this interview. Please feel free to contact me if you have
any further questions.
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Activities Log
Interview
ParticipantCode

Role

Unit

Interview/
Observation
scheduled
(date)

Consent
form
signed

Interview/
Observation
complete
(date)

Interview/
Observation
transcribed
(date)

Transcribed
interview
(only)
validated
with
participant(s)
(date)
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Safety Huddle Observation Protocol
Project Title: The Context of Safety Culture from the Perspective of Leaders and Staff Nurses in a Hospital
Research Team: Lisa Harton, PhD Candidate, RN; Lisa Skemp, PhD, RN
Objective: A description of escalation, discussion and resolution of patient safety events within the medical-surgical
units and within the Facility daily safety huddle.
Date:
Length of Observation:
Descriptive Notes

Time:

Place:
Reflective Notes
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Staff Nurse Participant Demographics
Characteristic

%

n

Staff Nurse Role
Staff Nurse
Charge Nurse

69
31

11
5

Age
20-29
30-39
40-49

38
56
6

6
9
1

Highest Education Level Completed
Associate’s
Bachelor’s
Master’s

18.75
75
6.25

3
12
1

Number of Years as a RN
0-1
2-3
4-5
6-10
> 10

19
12.5
25
31
12.5

3
2
4
5
2

Number of Years Working in Hospital & Unit
0-1
2-3
4-5
6-10
> 10

19
12.5
50
6
12.5

3
2
8
1
2

Number of Hours Worked Per Week
0-24
25-40

12.5
87.5

2
14

Shift Most Often Worked
Days
Nights
Rotating

62.5
31.25
6.25

10
5
1
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Nurse Leader Participant Demographics
Characteristic
Nurse Leader Role
Supervisor
Manager
Director
Age
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
Highest Education Level Completed
Bachelor’s
Master’s
Number of Years as a RN
4-5
6-10
> 10
Number of Years as a Nurse Leader
2-3
4-5
6-10
> 10
Number of Years Working in Current
Hospital
2-3
4-5
6-10
> 10
Number of Years as a Nurse Leader Working
in Current Unit
0-1
2-3
4-5
6-10
> 10
Number of Hours Worked Per Week
0-24
25-40
Shift Most Often Worked
Days
Rotating

%

n

40
50
10

4
5
1

10
50
30
10

1
5
3
1

90
10

9
1

10
20
70

1
2
7

20
10
40
30

2
1
4
3

10
0
20
70

1
0
2
7

20
10
30
30
10

2
1
3
3
1

30
70

3
7

90
10

9
1
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